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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This summary presents the overall results from a study conducted by the Institute for the 
Study of Labor (IZA), NIRAS Consultants and the Swedish National Labour Market Board 
for the European Commission during 2007 and 2008. The study corresponds to the contract 
VT/2006/042. 
 
The study has a dual goal. The first objective is to present both a comprehensive and at the 
same time concise picture of the extent of geographic mobility in the European Union, its 
evolution over time and of the characteristics of individuals affected by mobility. The second 
objective is to investigate how geographic mobility in the European Union can be optimised. 
 
The study adopts a wide definition of geographic mobility. It considers not only changes of 
residency within countries and across borders, but also various other mobility contracts, such 
as cross-border and regional commuting.  
 
Background and Policy Context 
 
One of the founding principles of the European Union is the freedom of movement of workers 
(Article 39 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). The free movement of 
workers is essential for the creation of an area without internal frontiers, and for the strength-
ening of economic and social cohesion as well as active European citizenship.  
 
Despite these obvious returns geographic mobility rates are still relatively low in the Euro-
pean Union, both within and between countries. For instance, on average between 2000 and 
2005, workers’ mobility within EU Member States (regional mobility) amounted to only one 
per cent each year. This is much lower than mobility rates across Australian territories and US 
states, which exceed two and three per cent, respectively. 
 
In this context, it is not surprising that a key paradox persists within the European Union: 
skills shortages and bottlenecks coexist with areas of persistent high unemployment. Differing 
levels of economic growth and employment create simultaneous shortages and excesses of 
labour across Europe, which is due in part to heavily regulated labour markets and low labour 
market mobility.  
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For this reason mobilising the potential of labour mobility is one of the key issues in the Lis-
bon process and the European Employment Strategy. The Integrated Guidelines for Growth 
and Employment (2005-2008) calls upon Member States to “improve matching of labour 
market needs through the modernisation and strengthening of labour market institutions, … 
removing obstacles to mobility for workers across Europe within the framework of the EU 
treaties…”. 
 
The adoption of the Commission’s Job Mobility Action Plan in December 2007 represents the 
latest step in a long line of initiatives to promote worker mobility.  
 
This study is carried out simultaneously with the Action Plan and brings about further back-
ground knowledge on the current state of geographic mobility, discussions on the optimum 
level of mobility, as well as additional policy recommendations. 
 
Current State of Geographical Mobility in the EU 
 
Measuring geographic mobility is difficult because changes of location are relatively rare. 
Therefore, large sample data sets such as the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) are use-
ful for measuring mobility in terms of the stocks and flows, despite several shortcomings. In 
addition, information from the Eurobarometer is used to cover three important dimensions of 
geographic mobility, namely, a retrospective lifetime approach, the circumstances of the last 
move and the expectations regarding mobility in the intermediate future. 
Stocks of migrant populations 
 
In terms of stocks, for the EU-15 countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom) the share of active working-age foreign born with origin from an EU-27 
(i.e. EU-15 plus Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Hungary, Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria and Romania) or a non EU-27 country increased during the 
last decade. The largest increase is observed for Spain, followed by Greece, Denmark, Portu-
gal, Sweden, Ireland, the UK, and Austria. For the new Member States those with the highest 
initial share of foreign born (Latvia and Estonia) exhibit a decline over time, except Cyprus, 
while the other countries which show a low share of foreign born remained relatively stable.  
 
Focusing on the shares of foreign nationals, the observed pattern for the EU-27 countries is 
similar to the one for the foreign born. However, the share of foreign born is much higher in 
most cases, since in many countries they may obtain citizenship and become nationals. Dis-
tinguishing foreign nationals by origin reveals very interesting patterns. 
First, in most EU-15 countries foreign nationals from another EU-15 country comprise only a 
small share of the total population of foreign nationals. The largest part of the total population 
of foreign nationals consists of nationals from a non EU-27 country as the share of EU-12 
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foreign nationals is relatively low. Second, the share of foreign nationals exhibits a significant 
increase during the last decade especially among the EU-15 countries, with Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Denmark and the UK as the most notable cases. Third, what really explains the ob-
served increase in the overall share of foreign nationals in the EU-15 countries is the change 
in the share of foreign nationals from non EU-15 countries and, in particular, from non EU-
27. The share of foreign nationals from EU-15 countries is fairly stable across time, and the 
available information for the EU-12 countries shows lower shares of foreign nationals from 
EU-12 compared to non EU-27. 
Mobile EU-27 citizens by origin 
 
Another interesting dimension is to consider the share of citizens living in another EU-27 
country relative to the population of country of citizenship. This type of analysis shows that 
among the EU-15 countries Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal exhibit the highest share of 
citizens living in another EU-27 country. Among the EU-12 new Member States, the highest 
share of EU-27 mobile citizens are found for Cyprus, Malta and Romania, followed by Bul-
garia and Slovakia. 
Socio-demographic characteristics of EU movers 
 
Focusing on the socio-economic characteristics of the movers, the data show that the profile 
of movers from the EU-12 countries to the EU-15 is mainly related to low-skilled employ-
ment especially among the young. In contrast, movers from another EU-15 country are on 
average older and more educated. The movers to the EU-12 countries differ in many respects 
from the movers to the EU-15, especially citizens from another EU-15 country. They tend to 
be older, mostly males and more likely to be inactive. In contrast, EU-12 movers in another 
EU-12 country are younger (50% between 25-34 years old), with higher employment rates but 
also higher unemployment compared to the EU-15 citizens.  
Geographic mobility rates 
 
Although the analysis based on stocks provides an overview of the current state of (past) geo-
graphic mobility, it has the disadvantage that the development of migrant stocks over time 
captures the impact of net rather than gross mobility flows and that stock data conceal the 
vintage of migrant entry cohorts. Geographic mobility flows provide a more direct picture of 
current mobility patterns in Europe. 
The average cross-border mobility rate within EU-15 countries is annually around 0.2% 
(0.1% if Luxembourg is not taken into account). The average cross- border mobility rate from 
the new Member States to the EU-15 countries is about 0.2 per cent. For the new Member 
States, mobility rates from EU-15 countries are increasing in contrast to the mobility rates 
within EU-15 countries, which are relatively stable over time. 
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While cross-border mobility rates in the EU have been relatively small, mobility between re-
gions within countries is much more pronounced. The average regional mobility rate of the 
total population in the EU-15 countries based on NUTS 2 level was one per cent in 2006. Yet 
there are significant cross-country differences with lower mobility in the Southern European 
countries (about 0.5 per cent) and higher regional mobility in countries such as France, Ire-
land, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (about two per cent). For the new Member States 
the limited information available shows mobility rates of the order that can be observed in 
Southern European countries. 
Comparing average regional mobility rates within EU countries (one per cent) with interstate 
mobility rates in the US, the US exhibits mobility rates that are on average twice the EU rates. 
Finally, commuting is also considered as a substitute to geographic mobility by travelling 
longer distances to the work place on a regular basis. There are two types of commuting: 
cross-border, which involves working in one country while residing in another, and regional 
commuting, which occurs when an individual is working in a region different from the place 
of residence within the same country.  
The average cross-border commuting rate from one EU-15 country to another is 0.6 per cent, 
with Belgium showing the highest rate. The average cross-border mobility rates for the New 
Member States to an EU-15 country are of similar magnitude. The cross-border commuting 
rates to a non EU-15 country are much lower for all countries with EU-15 and EU-12 aver-
ages about 0.2 per cent. Finally, the average regional commuting rate for the EU-15 countries 
in 2006 based on the NUTS 2 level was 7.3 per cent, while it was much lower (4.0 per cent) 
for the EU-12 countries. 
Lifetime mobility 
 
A useful indicator for the extent of geographic mobility in Europe is the individual lifetime 
mobility rate, i.e. the share of the population who has experienced a move over their life cy-
cle. We observe that while for any type of move the average for the EU-25 is about 67 per 
cent, when we focus on moves within the country - excluding local moves - the corresponding 
EU-25 average is about 16 per cent, dropping to about 4 per cent for moves inside the EU and 
to about 3 per cent for moves outside the EU. The data confirms that job and geographic mo-
bility are positively correlated. More frequent job changes are associated with more frequent 
geographic moves, and vice versa.  
 
Mobility intentions 
 
To obtain a picture of current mobility patterns, we analyse mobility intentions, i.e. whether 
an individual believes that he or she is likely to move within the next five years. A few coun-
tries rank low no matter which type of geographic mobility is considered. Among this group 
are Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Portugal. On the other hand, five countries 
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clearly stand out as high mobility countries: Sweden, the United Kingdom (including North-
ern Ireland), Estonia, Finland, and France. 
 
Optimum Level of Geographical Mobility: Weighing Positive and Negative Externalities 
 
While it is clear that too little mobility may mean reduced adaptability, untapped employment 
opportunities and competitiveness, too much mobility may distort national labour markets and 
generate considerable social costs. Therefore the study complements the empirical evidence 
presented above with the more analytical exercise of identifying an optimum level of geo-
graphical mobility. This optimum level is not evident but nevertheless important in terms of 
policy intervention.  
 
Studying the issue of optimum mobility requires both an economic and a social perspective. 
For mobility to deliver its potential benefits over the long term, a balance must be struck be-
tween its economic and social affects, between mobility and stability. 
  
Economic perspective – positive and negative externalities 
 
To the extent that mobility of capital and goods do not achieve convergence of employment 
and real wages in open or integrated economies, mobility of labour may help balance labour 
market outcomes. Thus, from an economic perspective, geographic mobility serves as an 
equilibrating factor between regional labour markets. In general, geographic mobility carries 
in a major positive effect of bringing about economic growth in countries with labour deficits 
and prosperity in countries with a labour surplus.  
 
Current imbalances in unemployment rates across EU-27 are large. For instance, Poland ex-
periences an unemployment rate more than three times larger than the Netherlands. We also 
observe large imbalances between neighbouring Member States. High unemployment rates 
are at least partly explained by an insufficient availability of jobs. Hence, geographic labour 
mobility might lead to a more balanced allocation of jobs and workers in the EU. Differences 
in real wages across Member States are also enormous. Especially between new Member 
States and the EU-15 states we observe differences as high as 738 percent. 
 
Besides these balancing effects, enlarging the relevant labour market for individuals through 
geographic mobility may result in better skill matches. As a consequence, returns to human 
capital formation may increase, which changes the incentives to invest in human capital. Im-
proved skill matches and accelerated human capital formation may foster economic growth 
across the continent. 
 
Turning to the potential negative externalities, a frequent argument in the debate about mi-
gration is that it increases competition in national labour markets, puts downward pressure 
on wages, and hence reduces well-being of the incumbent population. Another fear is that 
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immigration could be a burden to the welfare state either because the labour market does not 
absorb the migrant workers, or because of an increase in unemployment rates among the in-
cumbent population. Finally, while these negative externalities may arise in the receiving 
countries, sending countries may fear a “brain drain” hampering long-term income growth. 
This occurs in case of permanent out-migration of highly productive and well educated per-
sons. The danger of a brain drain appears especially relevant in situations of large income 
differentials between destination and origin. In the EU context, brain drain may affect some of 
the Eastern European new Member States. 
From a supra-national perspective, however, it can be argued that positive externalities from 
mobility clearly outweigh the negative externalities. Geographic mobility may indeed be a 
win-win situation in economic terms for both the sending and the receiving country. Positive 
externalities mainly stem from positive growth effects associated with free movement of hu-
man capital reducing labour market imbalances, improved skill matches in an integrated mar-
ket, higher investment into education, and a higher level of innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Negative externalities are primarily pecuniary or fiscal, and these negative effects in the des-
tination country are at least partially offset by corresponding positive effects in the sending 
region. The efficiency gains, however, are unambiguously beneficial for Europe.  
 
Demographic and social perspective – positive and negative externalities 
 
From a demographic and social perspective, geographical mobility also brings about both 
positive and negative externalities. However, the picture seems somewhat blurred. 
Regarding demographics, in the concrete context, there is limited scope for geographic mobil-
ity within the EU alleviating the impact of ageing and population decline since almost all of 
Europe faces similar problems. Hence, trying to compensate for the low fertility rates by re-
placement migration would probably at best be a zero sum externality at the European level 
due to the rapid ageing process in all the European countries. Solutions to these problems lie 
more in the area of immigration from non-EU countries and the strengthening of incentives to 
work longer, i.e. not to exit the labour market via early retirement and other social benefits. 
Regarding the social consequences of geographic mobility, the empirical knowledge is still 
rather unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, there is some evidence for increased mobility fostering 
socio-cultural integration in the European Union, and strengthening European identity and 
intercultural networks. Positive externalities from migration are related to gains from cultural 
and ethnical diversity, urban growth and development, depending on successful integration of 
newcomers. 
The downsides of socio-cultural integration are the decline of more local cultures and social 
frictions. At present, several European metropolitan regions are experiencing tensions be-
tween ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. Whether these tensions prove to be similar to 
the transitional growing pains experienced by other attractive migration destinations in the 
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past is an issue that remains to be seen. Altogether, it seems as if there is a potential for posi-
tive externalities of geographic mobility in the form of social-cultural integration, but to capi-
talise on this effect it is paramount that the challenges to the social cohesion be dealt with.  
 
Conclusion: Geographic mobility in Europe is too low 
 
Weighing the positive and negative economic and social externalities, geographic mobility in 
Europe is too low. While it is practically impossible to determine what would be the optimum 
level, it appears that the current situation is sub-optimal. In view of the still substantial imbal-
ances, there seem to be unexploited, mostly economic gains of geographic mobility as a bal-
ancing factor in an integrated labour market.  
Thus, as the economic effects are clearly positive, the demographic effects are nil and the so-
cial effects are mixed, it seems reasonable to assume that increased intra-European mobility 
would increase the welfare of the vast majority of Europeans.  
At the same time, most social costs associated with increased intra-EU migration are probably 
not too large considering the low level of current geographic mobility rates in Europe. From a 
long-term demographic perspective, as the population share of the age groups most inclined to 
migration (the young) will decline, pro-active geographic mobility raising individual propen-
sities to migrate could serve to counteract falling mobility rates within an ageing Europe. 
Mobility Drivers and Barriers 
 
In order to understand how mobility might be increased, the study investigates key mobility 
drivers as well as key mobility barriers. Thus, the focus of analysis turns to the individual 
level where the mobility decision is also related to both benefits and costs. In general, a per-
son will decide to migrate if the expected utility of moving is higher than the expected utility 
of staying, net of migration costs. 
Individuals’ assessment of the benefits and costs of migration will depend on socio-
demographic characteristics, such as human capital endowment and transferability of skills to 
the destination, but also on personal preferences and expectations. Therefore, the human capi-
tal framework shows that migration between countries is not only a function of aggregate 
measures, such as differences in GDP per capita, unemployment rates or relative remunera-
tion of skills. On the contrary, heterogeneity between individuals is an important factor. Dif-
ferent individuals in the same sending country exhibit different propensities to migrate and, 
moreover, prefer different receiving countries depending on transferability of human capital 
and tastes.  
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Key mobility drivers 
 
Survey evidence suggests that migrants have a variety of motivations for moving. Employ-
ment-related factors, such as higher income and better working conditions, play a key role. 
But also family and network related factors, as well as housing and local environment condi-
tions often seem to affect migration decisions. Survey results do not support sentiments that 
migration is primarily triggered by access to welfare payments or better public services. 
Work and income related motivations are especially strong in the New Member States. Al-
most 60 per cent of past movers in the New Member States did change location because of 
job related reasons, whereas only about 40 per cent of movers in the EU-15 mention this fac-
tor. More than four in five respondents in the New Member States claim that work and in-
come related factors could encourage them to move in the future. This answer is given only 
by one in two EU-15 citizens. 
This result implies that mobility rates may fall in the process of convergence of European 
economies. In particular the strong mobility intentions in the New Member States would level 
out as these economies catch up to EU-15 countries. 
Empirical evidence shows that some people are more inclined towards mobility than others. 
Age, gender, household structure, education, employment situation, and past mobility experi-
ences are the key microeconomic determinants: young people are more mobile than older 
people, men are more mobile than women, unmarried people without children are more mo-
bile than families, high-skilled people are more mobile than the low-skilled, the unemployed 
are more mobile than the employed, and, finally, people who have moved in the past tend to 
be more mobile than others. 
Besides the microeconomic determinants, we also find some significant “country effects.” 
This result indicates that much of the variation in geographic mobility rates across EU Mem-
ber States, but also a significant part of the variation in the attitudes toward migration is not 
easily explained by structural differences in the observable mobility-influencing factors listed 
above. This observation rather emphasises the importance of national tastes and preferences, 
which are not easy for policymakers to address. These factors are highly relevant drivers of 
mobility rates. It also demonstrates that there is ample scope for raising mobility rates at the 
EU level. Among the EU, the Scandinavian countries clearly stand out as the area of high 
mobility. It thus seems worth studying the association between their policy model – flexicu-
rity – and geographic mobility. 
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Key mobility hurdles 
 
Overall, our study underpins that language and cultural barriers are extremely important 
when explaining the limited level of geographic mobility in Europe. While the capacity of 
acculturation, a process of re-socialisation involving changes in attitudes, values and identifi-
cation, is a rather difficult target for government intervention, the empirical evidence suggests 
two viable policy options. First, the promotion of language capacity could foster geographic 
mobility. The effect of language is direct as well as indirect. Directly, it reduces the language 
barrier, which is negatively associated with cross-border mobility propensities. Indirectly, it 
appears to reduce the cultural barriers preventing migration. Second, promotion of education 
abroad could foster geographic mobility. The effect could work through reducing both lan-
guage and cultural barriers. 
A third key mobility impediment besides language and culture perceived by Europeans is re-
lated to worries about finding a (suitable) job. This observation points toward the necessity to 
support information and transparency of international job opportunities in order to establish 
an environment creating opportunities for mobility. Put into a more general context, it estab-
lishes a need for flexible labour markets. An environment facilitating the reallocation of la-
bour creates better opportunities for outsiders, including those coming from a distant labour 
market. 
Also the persistence of national forms of labour market and housing market organisation, wel-
fare state and fiscal systems could constrain intra-EU mobility. Although our empirical evi-
dence suggests that EU citizens do not generally perceive these as the most essential mobility 
barriers, harmonisation and coordination are certainly relevant in designing effective mobility 
policies. Legal, recognition, portability and access barriers in these areas yield mobility costs 
for the individual, which, in turn, reduces migration propensities. 
Policy Recommendations 
 
Our discussion of optimum geographic mobility has shown that, all things considered, the 
current level of mobility in the EU is too low considering the net benefits of migration for the 
economy and the society. Thus there seems to be scope for government intervention aimed at 
raising the currently low level of geographic mobility. 
There is a twofold role of geographic mobility policies aimed at increased mobility rates: (i) 
enlarging the expected utility gains, and (ii) reducing mobility costs for the individual.  
As worries about finding a suitable job are perceived as one of the key hurdles to geographic 
mobility, this establishes a need for adaptive and transparent labour markets. An environment 
facilitating reallocation of labour, which exchanges job security for employment security, 
generally creates better opportunities for outsiders, including those coming from a distant la-
bour market. In this context, combining flexibility and security according to the concept of 
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flexicurity can be a viable solution. Indeed a flexicurity scheme adapted to the specific needs 
to cushion spatial flexibility – geographic mobility within countries and across borders – 
serves as a broad orientation for the formulation of our policy recommendations. 
This study points at the crucial importance of the following policies to minimise labour mar-
ket frictions at the national and the trans-national levels: 
Policy Recommendations 
Strengthening the institutional preconditions of mobility on the labour market  
• Member States should develop mobility-supporting active labour market policy schemes. 
• In accordance with the flexicurity principle, Member States should assess the role of their la-
bour market institutions in determining geographic mobility. 
• Financial compensation to mobile job seekers should be considered. 
• The European Commission should assess the role of housing, child care infrastructure and 
other public or enterprise policies influencing the costs of mobility. 
 
Developing mobility-friendly educational policies 
• Member States should put strong emphasis on creating foreign language learning capacities at 
all levels. 
• Existing European exchange programs such as Erasmus, Leonardo, Grundtvig etc. should be 
further promoted and participation encouraged. 
• Member States should develop and implement lifelong learning strategies with a direct focus 
also on geographic mobility. 
 
Creating effective information and social networks  
• Extend and improve the EURES network and Europass. 
• Raise mobility awareness at all levels. 
• The European Commission should identify roles and delegate responsibilities for all relevant 
social partners in relation to the promotion of mobility. 
• Ensure social integration of migrant workers and their families. 
• Good practice examples on successful integration strategies should be developed and shared. 
• Extend the knowledge base related to impacts of information activities. 
 
Easing mobility barriers stemming from the diversity of national social protection and quali-
fication systems 
• Despite the progress already made, the European Commission should continue to address 
remaining obstacles in the field of coordination of national social security regimes. This should 
take account of new forms of geographic mobility. 
• Progress is to be made regarding the issue of pension portability in the realm of preserving 
supplementary pension rights. 
• Improve transparency of qualifications. 
• Remove persisting barriers to mobile professionals. 
 
Extending the knowledge base and evaluating mobility-related policies 
• The European Commission should enhance the collection of valid data on geographic mobility 
and regional patterns of labour supply and demand. 
• The European Commission should also stimulate the collection of valid data on the efficiency, 
fairness and impact of various mobility promoting initiatives, such as campaigns. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the founding principles of the European Union is the freedom of movement of workers 
(Article 39 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). The free movement of 
workers is essential for the creation of an area without internal frontiers, and for the strength-
ening of economic and social cohesion and active citizenship.  
 
Taking an economic perspective, geographic mobility can have major positive effects by 
bringing about economic growth in countries with labour deficits and prosperity in countries 
with labour surplus. Hence, the diffusion of skills through occupational and geographic mo-
bility is a central factor to enhance the productive capacity of firms and put regions or na-
tional economies on a higher growth path. Taking a social perspective, geographical mobility 
has the potential of fostering social-cultural integration in the European Union, and strength-
ening European identity and inter-cultural networks. 
 
Despite these obvious returns geographic mobility rates are low in the European Union, 
within as well as between countries. For instance, between 2000 and 2005, the internal bor-
ders of the EU were crossed on average by only 0,1 to 0,3% of the working-age population 
each year. Geographical mobility within EU Member States (regional mobility) is higher 
though at about 1%. This is similar to the rate across Canadian provinces but much lover than 
mobility rates across Australian territories and US states, which exceed 2% and 3% respec-
tively.1
 
Thus, a key paradox in the European Union today is the fact that skills shortages and bottle-
necks coexist with areas of persistent high unemployment. Differing levels of economic 
growth and employment create simultaneous shortages and excesses of labour across Europe. 
It seems clear that rigid labour markets and low labour market mobility is a plausible explana-
tion for this.  
 
For this reason the problem of mobility is one of the key issues in the Lisbon process and the 
European Employment Strategy. The Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Employment 
(2005-2008) calls upon Member States to: “improve matching of labour market needs through 
the modernisation and strengthening of labour market institutions, … removing obstacles to 
mobility for workers across Europe within the framework of the EU treaties…” 
                                                 
1 OECD (2007b). 
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In these strategies it is underpinned that in a single market geographic mobility is a key 
equilibrating and integrating factor. This is true both for the old and new EU Member States. 
It is also clear however, that while too little mobility may mean reduced adaptability and 
competitiveness, too much mobility may distort national labour markets and generate consid-
erable social costs. Thus, although the focus is on geographic mobility on economic grounds, 
we do not ignore the individual and social dimension of the decision to migrate. 
 
In general, there is a need – not only to increase geographic mobility rates – but also to get 
closer to what could be considered an optimum level of mobility, weighing the potential eco-
nomic and social benefits associated with geographic mobility against the potential economic 
and social costs. Following, there is a need to assess current policies and to propose new ones 
in order to reach this optimum.  
 
This report presents the results of a study conducted by IZA, NIRAS Consultants and the 
Swedish National Labour Market Board for the European Commission during the course of 
2007. The study has geographic mobility as its key objective, while issues related to occupa-
tional mobility are targeted within a parallel study carried out simultaneously by the Danish 
Technological Institute.  
 
Since clear links between these two forms of mobility are obvious, this study also takes occu-
pational mobility into account. For instance, the importance of flexicurity (the combination of 
flexible labour markets, social security, and active labour market policies) will be a recurrent 
theme throughout the report. 
 
The study has two key objectives. The first objective is to present both a comprehensive and at 
the same time concise picture of the extent of geographic mobility in the European Union, its 
evolution over time and of the characteristics of individuals affected by mobility. The second 
objective is to investigate how geographic mobility in the European Union can be optimised. 
 
Against this background, this report: 
 
• gives an empirical account and interpretation of current trends in geographic mobility 
patterns in Europe 
• discusses the issue of optimum geographic mobility by balancing the potential positive 
and negative impacts of geographic mobility seen from the societal perspective 
• analyzes the micro and macro economic factors that drive and constrain individual 
migration decisions 
• surveys current policies at the EU and national level that may help optimising, i.e. in 
the European context raising, mobility rates and judges whether these policies are 
relevant, efficient and fair, 
• recommends policies adequate to improve geographic mobility in Europe 
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The study adopts a broad definition of geographic mobility. We consider not only changes of 
residency within countries and across borders, but also cross-border and regional commuting.  
 
Since most available mobility data relate to long term mobility (lasting at least a year) much 
of the analysis presented in this report naturally has this scope. However, it seems clear that a 
high share of actual mobility experiences are short term ones lasting less than a year. This 
kind of mobility does not necessarily entail a residential move but seem nevertheless impor-
tant if we see mobility as an equilibrating mechanism for the labour market. Throughout the 
report these forms of mobility are also discussed and assessed.  
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2. CURRENT STATE OF GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY IN EUROPE 
2.1 Introduction and Data Overview 
In order to establish an empirical basis for examining geographic mobility in the EU, this 
chapter first presents an up-to-date, concise picture of geographic mobility patterns and trends 
on the basis of the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). The EU-LFS will allow a har-
monized quantitative documentation of mobility in terms of flows and stocks, for EU-27. The 
cross sectional surveys of the Eurobarometer will provide complementary information. 
The EU-LFS, administrated by Eurostat, is a quarterly sample covering private households in 
the EU, EFTA and Candidate Countries. It provides quarterly figures on labour force partici-
pation of people aged 15 and over and persons outside the labour force. The sample size is 
approximately 1.7 million individuals, with sampling rates between 0.2% and 3.3% across 
countries. 
Despite certain limitations (highlighted in the adjacent box), the EU-LFS has the fundamental 
advantage that it allows accurate cross-country comparisons covering all EU Member States. 
It can do this because it follows harmonized concepts and definitions for different countries. 
Moreover, being a repeated survey allows studying a relatively long time-series, making it 
possible to discover possible time-trends. We will provide such dynamic aspects of mobility 
rates for the years 1995-2006.  
As the EU-LFS data records the country of residence one year before the survey, it provides 
information on cross-border mobility. The data also contain information on nationality, years 
of residence and country of birth. Hence it is possible to infer stocks of immigrants in the 
population, assuming the sample to be representative. We can obtain the share of foreign na-
tionals by country and year and distinguish between EU-15/EU-12 and non EU nationals. 
Furthermore, the LFS contains variables on the region/country of work and residence and on 
the region/country of residence in the year before the survey. These variables can be used to 
compute regional mobility flows and commuting. 
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An informative micro data base is the Eurobarometer survey of EU citizens aged 15 and over. 
Recently, it had special focus on European citizens’ geographic mobility patterns. The waves 
67.1 and 61.1, carried out in spring 2007 and 2005, respectively, contain a wealth of informa-
tion suited to qualitative description of mobility patterns in Europe.2
The data highlight mobility in the past, as well as future mobility intentions. The data include 
answers to a battery of questions clarifying the nature and frequency of moves, the reasons for 
moving, as well as the perceived benefits and costs of geographic mobility. In this context, 
factors impeding individual mobility have also been portrayed. 
Despite certain limitations – see the box below – the Eurobarometer has clear advantages: The 
data is up-to-date and covers EU-25 and EU-27, respectively. Sample sizes are sufficient to 
bring out cross-country differences. Furthermore, the data covers geographic mobility in three 
important dimensions. First, it adopts a retrospective, lifetime approach. Second, it collects 
detailed information on the circumstances of the last move. Third, it gathers data on expected 
geographic mobility in the intermediate future. 
Due to these advantages, we will employ the Eurobarometer through much of the empirical 
analysis. We refrain from using supplementary data from national registers. These are generally 
not comparable across EU countries, because of diverse measurement and reporting procedures. 
Shortcomings of the European Labour Force Survey 
 
Measuring geographic mobility is difficult because changes of location are relatively rare. Therefore, large 
samples data sets such as the LFS are required. However, even with the LFS there exist several shortcom-
ings. First, available information on year-to-year transitions is not available for all the EU-27 countries. 
Therefore, the reported average mobility rates need to be seen as an approximation based on the available 
information. This is very much the case in particular for the new Member States. Second, the LFS tends to 
under-report people who have only recently taken up residence in another country. This is due to difficul-
ties in including the newly arrived people in the sampling frame and due to a high non-response rate 
among migrants. 
There are additional problems related to the socio-economic characteristics of migrants and the factors 
impacting geographic mobility. Although the LFS contains a wide range of information on demographics 
and socio-economic characteristics, the small number of annual cross-border moves makes it problematic 
to use them for showing detailed and statistically reliable breakdowns by country. Therefore, any such 
analysis can be only performed at aggregate levels for the EU-15 and EU-12 countries. 
In addition, the overall picture of geographic mobility may not be captured accurately by the existing 
annual stocks and flows because the available information does not take into account short-term mobility, 
which refers to workers moving abroad for seasonal jobs or being sent on temporary assignment by their 
companies. 
                                                 
2 See Recchi et al. (2006), Bukodi and Robért (2006), Fouarge and Ester (2006) and Coppin and Vandenbrande (2006) 
for an overview of the 2005 Eurobarometer wave 61.1. Wave 67.1 is described in European Commission (2007) 
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Shortcomings of the Eurobarometer Surveys 
 
Though it is possible to observe the country of residence of an individual as well as the nationality in the 
Eurobarometer, sample sizes are not sufficiently large for reliable measurement of the population share of 
foreign nationals by country. In fact, immigrants appear to be systematically underrepresented in the na-
tional samples, since interviews are always conducted in the respective national language. 
For empirical analysis of individual decision making, the cross sectional nature of the Eurobarometer 
surveys is a clear disadvantage. It is impossible to control for unobservable individual characteristics. 
Another disadvantage is that the two waves with a special focus on geographic mobility did not contain 
the same set of questions. In particular, the 2007 wave omits many variables impacting strongly on geo-
graphic mobility propensities at the individual level. Thus, it is not useful to pool observations from the 
two waves. For this reason our econometric analysis will draw only on the richer data from the 2005 
wave. For the descriptive statistics, however, in order to provide an up-to-date, complete picture for EU-
27, will rely on the 2007 wave, too. 
Finally, a limitation of the Eurobarometer is that it contains somewhat idiosyncratic information on key 
individual or household characteristics. For example, education is captured only by a variable for age at 
first exit from full-time schooling. Current labour market class is only available for those who were em-
ployed at the time of interview, not for the unemployed. 
2.2 Stocks of Migrant Populations 
One may measure the size and structure of geographic mobility within and between regions 
and countries in terms of stocks and flows. Stock data of residents not originating from the 
current region of residents are summary statistics of past migration flows. When using micro 
data, considering that migration flows occur at low frequency, it is generally easier to estimate 
the correspondent stocks. 
In interpreting stock data on migrants, one has to be aware of the following issues: 
• The development of migrant stocks over time captures the impact of net rather than 
gross mobility flows. In survey data, year-to-year changes may also be the outcome of 
sampling variation and measurement error. 
• Stock data conceal the vintage of migrant entry cohorts. Areas with an identical share 
of migrants may have different migration histories. 
In the context of international mobility, one must distinguish between the population who is 
foreign born and the population of foreign nationals who may include the offspring of actual 
migrants. If shares of foreigners are computed on the basis of nationality rather than actual 
migration experience, country differences will capture differences in naturalization practice. 
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Stocks of Foreign Born Residents in EU-15 and EU-12 
For most of the EU-15 countries the stock of foreign born residents with origin from another 
EU-15 country is larger compared to the stock of foreign born residents with an origin from 
an EU-12 country (Table A1, see appendix). The top origin countries are mainly other EU-15 
countries: Germans in Austria, French in Belgium, Germans and Swedish in Denmark, Swed-
ish in Finland, Portuguese in France, French and Germans in Italy, Germans and Belgians in 
the Netherlands, French in Portugal and Spain, Finish in Sweden and Germans and Irish in the 
UK. 
Countries such as Austria, Spain, Greece and Italy are an exception as the stock of EU-12 
foreign born residents exceeds that of EU-15. Austria has attracted mainly foreign born from 
neighbouring countries (Czech Rep., Hungary) but also from Romania and Poland. Romania 
is the top origin country for the stock of foreign born for both Italy and Spain, while Bulgaria 
is for Greece. Finally, Poland is the top origin among the EU-12 for the UK. 
In the new Member States the stocks of foreign born residents from the EU-15 are much 
smaller and in many cases the figures are below statistical reliability limits (Table A2). Large 
stocks of foreign born are observed for the Greeks and British in Cyprus and Germans in 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Between the new Members States, Cyprus has large 
stocks of foreign born from Bulgaria and Romania; the Czech Republic from Slovakia; Hun-
gary from Romania; Slovakia from the Czech Republic. 
Share of Foreign Born Residents in the EU-27 
To obtain a comparable measure across countries, it is important to consider the share of for-
eign born with respect to the total population of the country of residence. Moreover, the evo-
lution of the share over time reveals the dynamics of immigration flows that took place in the 
last decade. 
For the EU-15 countries the share of active working age foreign born with origin from an EU-
27 or a non EU-27 country increased from 10.6% in 1995 to 12.9% in 2006 (Table A3). The 
corresponding share for the EU-12 new Member States for the most recent years, which pro-
vide more reliable figures, is about 6%. 
As for individual countries, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden show the highest share of foreign 
born (about 40%, 15%, 15% for year 2006, respectively) with respect to the total active work-
ing population in the country of residence, followed by Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, UK 
and France with shares above 10%. For Greece, Italy and Portugal the share is about 8%. As 
for the overall increase in the share of foreign born in the total population for the EU-15 coun-
tries, the largest increase is observed for Spain, followed by Greece, Denmark, Portugal, 
Sweden, Ireland, the UK, and Austria. 
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For the new Member States, Cyprus and Estonia stand out as the countries with highest share 
of foreign born individuals in the total population, followed by Latvia. For Cyprus the trend is 
increasing from 10.3% in 1999 to 17.3% in 2006, while for Estonia the trend is decreasing 
from 20.1% in 1997 to 14.3% in 2006 and for Latvia from 12.3% in 2004 to 10.6% in 2006. 
For the other countries the share of foreign born is much lower, about 4% for Lithuania and 
Malta, around 2% for the Czech Republic and Hungary, while Slovakia and Poland show 
shares lower than 1%. Overall, the new Member States with the highest initial share of for-
eign born exhibit a decline since the start of the observation period, except Cyprus, while the 
countries with the lowest share remain relatively stable. 
In comparison to the international experience, the share of the foreign born population in the 
EU-27 is somewhat smaller than that in countries which have traditionally defined themselves 
as immigration countries. In Canada, about 18 percent of the population is foreign born (and 
the trend is slightly rising), whereas in Australia, the share is even around 23 percent (with no 
clear trend).3 These levels are reached only by few Member States. But there are several coun-
tries in Europe where the share of the foreign born population is much larger than in the 
United States. In 2006, about 12.5 percent of the US population was foreign born. It was only 
9.3 percent in 1995. 
When comparing these figures, however, one should be aware that also the composition of the 
foreign born is very different. The five largest populations of foreign born in the US are from 
developing countries (Mexico, Philippines, India, China and Vietnam). The share of foreign 
born from such areas is also considerable in Canada and Australia. In Europe, in contrast, 
large non EU-27 immigrant groups are from Turkey and Northern Africa. Thus, we expect 
very different integration issues to be present in these immigration countries and in Europe. 
Share of Foreign Born Residents in the EU-27 by Origin 
Based on the LFS data for the more recent years (2005 and 2006) we are able to distinguish 
the foreign born residents in the EU-27 between those with origin from another EU-15 coun-
try and those from another EU-12 or a non EU-27 country. 
Figure 1 shows that the share of active working age EU-15 foreign born resident in another 
EU-27 country relative to the total active working age population of the country of residence 
in year 2006 is highest in Luxembourg (36%), followed by Ireland (6.3% in 2005), Belgium 
(6.2%), Sweden (4.1%) and Cyprus (6%). For the rest of the EU-27 countries, the share of 
EU-15 foreign born ranges from about 1% to 3%. 
                                                 
3 Data taken from International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI – 2006 Edition (via sourceOECD). 
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Figure 1: Share of Active Working Age EU-15 Foreign-born Resident in another EU-27 Country Relative 
to the Total Active Working Age Population of Country of Residence, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data for available countries. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. 
 
Compared to the share of foreign born from the EU-15, the share of foreign born from the 
EU-12 in year 2006 is lower in all countries except for Austria, Greece, Spain, Czech Repub-
lic, and Hungary (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Share of EU-12 Foreign-born Resident in another EU-27 Country Relative to the Total  
Population of Country of Residence, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data for available countries. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. 
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It turns out that the largest share of foreign born in the EU-27 countries have an origin from a 
non EU-27 country (Figure 3). For the EU-15 countries the highest shares – between 7.8% 
and 10% – are found (by decreasing order) in Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, UK, Austria, 
Luxembourg and France. For the other EU-15 countries the share of non EU-27 foreign born 
varies from 1.8% in Finland to 3.4% in Ireland, 4.6% in Denmark, 5.3% in Italy, 5.7% in Por-
tugal and 5.9% in Greece. For the EU-12 countries, Estonia, Cyprus and Latvia show the 
highest shares of foreign born from a non EU-27 country (13.6%, 11% and 9.6% in 2006, 
respectively). 
 
Figure 3: Share of Non-EU-27 Foreign-born Resident in another EU-27 Country Relative to the  
Total Population of Country of Residence, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data for available countries. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. 
 
Share of Foreign Nationals in the EU-27 
We next turn to the population shares of foreign nationals for the EU-27 countries. There are 
two important dimensions in the analysis of the stock of foreign nationals. The first one is the 
evolution over time and the second is the distinction between different origins. Looking at the 
total share of foreign nationals for the EU-15 countries in Table A4 (see appendix), we ob-
serve a pattern similar to the one for the foreign born. However, the share of foreign born is 
much higher in most cases, since in many countries the foreign born may obtain citizenship 
and become nationals.  
Table A4 shows that among the EU-15 countries in year 1995 (excluding Luxembourg), the 
countries with the highest share of foreign nationals are Austria, Belgium and Germany, with 
a share of about 9% of the total population. France follows with a share of 6.7%, and the 
Netherlands, Sweden and UK with 4-6%. Lower shares of foreign nationals are found in 
IZA, NIRAS Consultants, AMS 20 
IZA Research Report No. 19  
Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Social and Economic Benefits  
Denmark (2.4%) and Ireland (3.2%) in 1998. The South European countries – Greece, Portu-
gal, and Spain – exhibit shares around 1.5% in the years before 1999. 
Time trends are quite diverse across countries. Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, show a 
substantial increase in the share of foreign nationals from 1997 onwards. The most striking 
increase is observed in Spain. From a rate of foreign nationals of about 1% in 1995 it reached 
the level of 11.5% in 2006. For Ireland, the share of foreign nationals between 1995 and 2006 
increased from 3.2% to 9.4%, for Greece from 1.5% to 6%, and for Portugal from 1.3% to 
3.4%. Less substantial increases, in percentage terms, are observed in Denmark from 2.4% to 
3.9%, and for the UK from 4% to 6.8%. 
For the countries that initially had the highest share of foreign nationals (Austria, Belgium, 
and Germany), by 2006 there was either a slight increase, like in Austria (from 9.1% to 11%), 
or the share remained relatively stable. Stable shares of foreign nationals over time are also 
observed for the Netherlands and Sweden. 
For the new Member States, the share of foreign nationals in Table A4 is below 1% in most 
countries. Countries with higher shares of foreign nationals in year 2006 are Cyprus (13.5%), 
Estonia (17.1%) and Malta (2.9%). The trend follows the same pattern as for the foreign born, 
which is increasing for Cyprus but decreasing for Estonia. Worth mentioning differences be-
tween the share of foreign born in Table A3 and the share of foreign nationals in Table A4 are 
observed for Lithuania and Latvia with a large share of foreign born being nationals. 
Share of Foreign Nationals in the EU-27 by Origin 
The distinction between EU-15 and non EU-15 nationals in Tables A5 and A6 reveals very 
interesting patterns. First, in most EU-15 countries foreign nationals from another EU-15 
country comprise only a small share of the total population of foreign nationals (Table A5). In 
this respect, Belgium and Luxembourg are an exception. Second, the share of foreign nation-
als from EU-15 countries is very stable across time, although a slight increase is observed 
since year 2000. This suggests that what really explains the observed increase in the overall 
share of foreign nationals in some countries is the change in the share of foreign nationals 
from non EU-15 countries (Table A6). For instance, in Spain the share of foreign nationals 
from non EU-15 increased from 0.5% in 1995 to 9.9% in 2006, in Greece from 1.2% to 5.3% 
and in Ireland from 0.5% in 1998 to 2.8% in 2005. 
For the new Member States, the share of foreign nationals in Cyprus and Malta is evenly dis-
tributed between EU-15 and non EU-15, while for Estonia is dominated by nationals from 
non EU-15 countries. The observed increase in Cyprus of the share of foreign nationals over 
time is mainly due to an increase of the non EU-15 nationals. 
For the most recent years (2005 and 2006) we are able to distinguish further the non EU-15 
nationals between those from EU-12 and non EU-27. Figure 4 shows that the share of EU-12 
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foreign nationals is relatively low. It ranges from 1.5% to 2.3% (by descending order) in 
Spain, Ireland, Austria and Cyprus, around 1% in Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK, and 
below 1% in the rest of the countries. 
 
Figure 4: Share of Active Working Age EU-12 Nationals Resident in another EU-27 Country Relative to 
the Total Population of Country of Residence, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data for available countries. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size.  
 
In contrast, the share of foreign nationals from non EU-27 countries is much higher for most 
of the countries (Figure 5). In particular, the highest share is observed in year 2006 among the 
EU-15 countries in Spain (8.3%) followed by Luxembourg (5.6%), Austria (5%), Greece 
(4.8%), UK (4.3%), Italy (3.8%) and France (3.3%). Another group of countries exhibit 
shares between 2% and 3% (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the 
Netherlands), with Finland showing the lowest share (1%). Among the EU-12 countries, Cy-
prus and Estonia are found with the highest shares of non EU-27 foreign nationals (6.5% and 
16.8%, respectively). 
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Figure 5: Share of Active Working Age Non-EU-27 Nationals Resident in an EU-27 Country Relative to 
the Total Population of Country of Residence, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data for available countries. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size.  
 
To summarize, there are a number of facts worth emphasizing. First, in most EU-15 countries 
foreign nationals from another EU-15 country comprise only a small share of the total popula-
tion of foreign nationals. The largest part of the total population of foreign nationals consists 
of nationals from a non EU-27 country, as the share of EU-12 foreign nationals is relatively 
low. Second, the share of foreign nationals exhibits a significant increase during the last dec-
ade especially among the EU-15 countries, with notable cases Spain, Greece, Portugal, Den-
mark and the UK. Third, what really explains the observed increase in the overall share of 
foreign nationals in the EU-15 countries is the change in the share of foreign nationals from 
non EU-15 countries and, in particular, from non-EU-27. The share of foreign nationals from 
EU-15 countries is fairly stable across time and the available information for the EU-12 coun-
tries shows lower shares of foreign nationals from EU-12 compared to non EU-27. 
Mobile EU-27 Citizens by Origin 
The discussion on the current state of mobility in the EU-27 so far is presented in relation to 
the population of the receiving country. Another interesting dimension, however, is to con-
sider the share of citizens living in another EU-27 country relative to the population of coun-
try of citizenship. This type of analysis is performed for the stock of foreign nationals. Figure 
6 shows that Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal among the EU-15 countries exhibit the high-
est share of citizens living in another EU-27 country (9.6%, 8.2%, 7.4%, respectively). 
Among the EU-12 new Member States, the highest share of EU-27 mobile citizens are found 
for Cyprus (13.3%), Malta (7.2%) and Romania (5.3%) followed by Bulgaria (3.4%) and Slo-
vakia (2.7%). 
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Figure 6: Mobile EU-27 Citizens by Origin Country, 2006  
(Share of Citizens Living in another Country Relative to the Population of the Country of Citizenship) 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data for available countries.  
 
Socio-demographic Characteristics of EU Movers 
Table 1 gives an overview of the social-demographic composition of the recently arrived mo-
bile individuals for the EU-27 by origin. The movers are defined as active working age citi-
zens who have moved from the country of citizenship to the current country of residence less 
than five years ago. Due to the small number of movers the analysis is performed pooling the 
EU-15 and EU-12 countries together.  
For the mobile population to the EU-15 countries, those who have moved within the last five 
years from another EU-12 country are more likely to be young, females and are less likely to 
have completed higher education compared to their counterparts from the EU-15 countries. It 
is interesting to note that less than 10% of the movers from EU-12 countries to EU-15 coun-
tries are above 45 years old. In terms of their employment status, they are more likely to be 
employed and less likely to be inactive with a very small difference in unemployment rates. 
This suggests that the profile of movers from the EU-12 countries to the EU-15 is mainly rela-
tively low educated and young.  
The movers to the EU-12 countries differ in many respects compared to the movers to the 
EU-15, especially for citizens from another EU-15 country. The first main difference is re-
lated to the age distribution. About 35% of movers from an EU-15 country to an EU-12 are 
above 45 years old. The corresponding figure for EU-15 movers to another EU-15 country is 
about 20%. Moreover, 68% of EU-15 movers in EU-12 are males with a 45% of movers be-
ing inactive. In contrast, EU-12 movers in another EU-12 country are younger (50% between 
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25-34 years old), with higher employment rates but also higher unemployment compared to 
the EU-15 citizens. 
 
Table 1: Selected Characteristics of recently arrived immigrants from other EU15/EU12 Member States 
in the EU-15, EU-12, EU-27 – 2006 (in percent) 
  EU15  EU12  EU27 
  Country of Origin  Country of Origin  Country of Origin 
Selected Characteristics EU-151 EU-122  EU-153 EU-124  EU-155 EU-126 
Age Group               
15-24 21.2 27.9  14.5 21.7  21.0 27.7 
25-34 35.4 50.1  26.7 51.7  35.1 50.1 
35-44 23.1 13.9  22.7 14.3  23.1 13.9 
45-54 13.1 6.9  15.8 8.7  13.2 7.0 
55-64 7.2 1.2  20.3 3.6  7.6 1.3 
            
Sex           
Male 52.5 45.9  68.4 46.5  53.1 45.9 
Female 47.5 54.1  31.6 53.5  46.9 54.1 
            
Education           
Low 22.5 26.0  18.8 24.7  22.4 26.0 
Medium  40.3 57.8  45.8 56.4  40.5 57.7 
High 37.1 16.2  35.4 18.9  37.1 16.3 
            
Labour Market Status           
Employed 62.8 72.8  52.5 68.6  62.4 72.7 
Unemployed  7.8 8.0  2.3 4.4  7.6 7.9 
Inactive 29.4 19.2  45.2 27.0  30.0 19.4  
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results.  
1) EU-15 citizens resident for less than 5 years in another EU-15 country aged 15 to 64.  
2) EU-12 citizens resident for less than 5 years in another EU-15 country aged 15 to 64.  
3) EU-15 citizens resident for less than 5 years in another EU-12 country aged 15 to 64.  
4) EU-12 citizens resident for less than 5 years in another EU-12 country aged 15 to 64.  
5) EU-15 citizens resident for less than 5 years in another EU-27 country aged 15 to 64.  
6) EU-12 citizens resident for less than 5 years in another EU-27 country aged 15 to 64. 
 
2.3 Geographic Mobility Rates 
The figures presented above provide an overall description of the current state of geographic 
mobility with respect to the stocks of citizens who are living in another EU-27 country, which 
illustrates the trend in past migration between EU Member States. However, the analysis 
based on stocks has the disadvantage that the development of migrant stocks over time cap-
tures the impact of net rather than gross mobility flows and that stock data conceal the vintage 
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of migrant entry cohorts. Therefore, in order to address these issues one needs to examine 
changes of residence from one period to another.  
Geographic mobility flows provide a more direct picture of current mobility patterns in 
Europe. For cross-border mobility the definition that will be used is based on the number of 
individuals in a destination who changed location over a given time period relative to the 
resident population of the receiving country. 
In this section, cross-border and regional commuting will be also considered as a special form 
of geographic mobility. Commuting is a situation in which individuals do not change resi-
dence. Rather, the country or region of residence is not the same as the one of work. In other 
words, commuters substitute the geographic move by travelling longer distances to their work 
place on a regular basis. 
Annual Cross-Border Mobility from EU-15 to EU-27 
Using the information from the LFS on the country of stay during the previous year, we con-
struct cross-border mobility rates by obtaining the share of the resident population who has 
immigrated within two years relative to the population in the current country of residence. In 
particular, we observe the share of those who are living in the country today and were living 
in a different country the year before. It is worth mentioning that for a low frequency event 
such as cross-border mobility this measure is not reported for a number of countries due to 
reliability issues. This is especially the case for the New Member States. 
The average cross-border mobility rate within EU-15 countries is annually around 0.2% 
(0.1% if Luxembourg is not taken into account) (Table A7). The average inflow from EU-15 
countries to the new Member States is about 0.3% focusing on year 2006, which provides 
data for most of the countries. Excluding Cyprus, which shows the highest inflow rates from 
EU-15 countries, the average cross-border mobility rate from EU-15 to EU-12 is between 
0.1% and 0.2%. For the new Member States, mobility rates from EU-15 countries are increas-
ing in contrast to the mobility rates within EU-15 countries, which are relatively stable over 
time. 
Annual Cross-Border Mobility from non EU-15 to EU-27 
The average annual cross-border mobility from the new Member States to the EU-15 is 0.2% 
(Table A8). This is similar to the within EU-15 average cross-border mobility rate in Table 
A7. However, it exhibits substantial variation across individual countries. In particular, Spain 
shows the highest inflows relative to its population. In year 2006, the flow rate from non EU-
15 countries was 0.5%, starting from 0.1% in year 2000. A similar picture emerges for France 
in which the cross-border mobility rate from non-EU-15 countries is the second highest 
(0.3%) with an increase since year 2000. 
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For the new Member States data availability is limited for most of the countries. For Cyprus, 
similar to the cross-border mobility from EU-15 countries, we found a high annual inflow 
also from non-EU-15 countries. 
Regional Mobility 
While cross-border mobility rates in the EU have been relatively small, mobility between re-
gions within countries is much more pronounced. Regional mobility rates are constructed us-
ing the information on the region of residence in the previous year from the LFS for NUTS 2 
regions.4 Therefore, a mover is defined as someone who has moved residence within the 
country from one region to another since the year before. 
The average regional mobility rate of the total population in the EU-15 countries is 1% in year 
2006 (Table A9). Yet there are significant cross-country differences. In particular, the annual 
regional mobility rates are on average around 0.5% in the South European countries (Italy, 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal) and between 1.0 to 1.5% for Belgium, Germany, and Finland. 
For France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK regional mobility rates are around 
2%. Substantial differences over time are observed for Spain with an increase from 0.2% in 
1995 to 1.0% in 2006. 
For the new Member States the required regional information is available only for Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Overall, the regional mobility rates are of the order that we 
observe in South European countries. Nevertheless, there is still some cross-country variation 
with Hungary showing the highest mobility rate (0.4%). 
Cross-Border Commuting in the EU-27 
Cross-border commuting, which involves working in one country while residing in another, is 
analysed combining the LFS information on the countries in which an individual is living and 
working. That is, a commuter is defined as one who is working in a country different from the 
country of residence. We distinguish two types of commuters, those who commute to another 
EU-15 country and those to a non EU-15 country. 
The average cross-border commuting rate from one EU-15 country to another is 0.6% (Table 
A10). Focusing on the year 2006, Belgium shows the highest rate of cross-border commuting 
(2.2%) followed by Luxembourg (0.8%), France (0.7%), Austria (0.6%), Sweden (0.5%) and 
the Netherlands (0.4%). For Denmark, Spain, Italy, Greece and the UK, the cross-border 
commuting rates are between 0.1% and 0.2%. 
                                                 
4 “NUTS” stands for the “Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units” and is the common classification system 
for dividing the European Union’s territory in order to produce regional statistics for the Community. NUTS 
subdivides Member States into regions (NUTS 1 level) and each of these is then subdivided into regions at 
NUTS level 2 and these in turn into regions at NUTS level 3. 
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The average cross-border mobility rates for the New Member States to an EU-15 country are 
of similar magnitude (about 0.6%). Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia exhibit cross-
border commuting rates in the last available year of around 1.4%, which is higher compared 
to all of the EU-15 countries, expect Belgium. 
The cross-border commuting rates to a non EU-15 country in Table A11 are much lower for 
all countries with EU-15 and EU-12 averages about 0.2%. A notable exception is Italy in 
which the mobility rate to a non EU-15 country is 0.3% compared to 0.1% for commuting to 
an EU-15 country. 
We have no comparable international data on cross-border commuting rates. Given that the 
EU constitutes a labour market with (in principle) free movement of workers, cross-border 
commuting rates between US federal states might be a useful point of reference. These are 
fairly constant around 3.7 percent of the population. Measured by this yardstick, geographic 
mobility in Europe again appears to be low. 
Regional Commuting 
Regional commuting occurs when an individual is working in a different region from the one 
which is currently residing. The average regional commuting rate for the EU-15 countries in 
2006 based on the NUTS 2 level was 7.3%, while it was much lower (4.0%) for the EU-12 
countries (Table A12). Substantial differences exist across countries. Belgium shows for the 
year 2006 the highest regional commuting rate (21.7%) followed by the Netherlands (13.3%), 
Germany (11.9%) and Austria (11.1%). For the EU-12 the highest regional commuting rates 
are observed for Slovakia (10.1%), Czech Republic (5.2%) and Hungary (4.4%). 
Comparing Geographic Mobility in the EU to the US 
Putting geographic mobility in the EU in an international perspective is difficult. The level of 
mobility measured depends crucially on the definition of a region. For the US, regional mobil-
ity information refers to mobility between federal states. Annual interstate mobility in the US 
is in the range of 2% to 2.5% in the 2005 and 2006 (Table 2). Comparing interstate moves in 
the US with cross-border moves in the EU (of only about 0.1%) suggests that mobility in the 
EU is very low. However, such a comparison is problematic because of a number of differ-
ences between the EU and the US, such as language, culture, and labour legislation, the fact 
that the US is a federal state and that in the EU free movement is only a recent phenomenon.5
 
 
                                                 
5 It is hard to find relevant figures for Canada and Australia, but we have some evidence that regional mobility 
rates are in a range comparable to the US. 
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Table 2: Geographic Mobility in the United States 2005-2006  
(in Percent of Working Age Population) 
Year Different state, same 
Census Division 
Different Census 
Division, same 
Census Region 
Different Census 
region  
Different State 
  1 2 3 4=1+2+3 
          
2005 1.2 0.3 1.0 2.5 
2006 0.6 0.4 0.9 1.9 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/migrate.html 
 
To provide a better comparison for answering whether mobility rates in the EU are low it may 
be more appropriate to compare internal mobility rates in the US to regional mobility rates in 
the EU, that is, mobility from one region to another within EU States, which are around 1% 
(based on the NUTS 2 region from Table A9). Such comparison narrows the mobility gap 
suggesting that a large part of the difference between the US and the EU with respect to geo-
graphic mobility can be explained by the differences in language, culture and institutions. 
However, there still exists a considerable difference between interstate mobility in the US and 
regional mobility in the EU, which suggests there may be a potential for higher geographic 
mobility in the EU. 
Brief Summary of Current State of Geographic Mobility 
We wish to stress a number of points gleaned from this statistical analysis. First, in most EU-
15 countries foreign nationals from another EU-15 country comprise only a small share of the 
total population of foreign nationals. The largest part of the total population of foreign nation-
als consists of nationals from a non EU-27 country, as the share of EU-12 foreign nationals is 
relatively low. Second, the share of foreign nationals exhibits a significant increase during the 
last decade especially among the EU-15 countries, with notable cases Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
Denmark and the UK. Third, what really explains the observed increase in the overall share of 
foreign nationals in the EU-15 countries is the change in the share of foreign nationals from 
non EU-15 countries and, in particular, from non-EU-27. Fourth, cross-border mobility rates 
in the EU-27 are low. Fifth, regional mobility within EU-27 countries is much more pro-
nounced but still below the comparable interstate mobility rates in the US. Finally, although 
cross-border commuting exhibits some increase over the years it is clearly less important than 
regional commuting, which seems to be relevant for a number of EU-15 and EU-12 countries. 
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2.4 Cross-Border Mobility over the Past Decade 
The Eurobarometer wave 67.1 of 2007 contains information on the population share of citi-
zens who moved to another country in the last ten years. This information mixes two types of 
movers: Individuals who moved into a location from a foreign country, and nationals who 
moved abroad temporarily and have returned. 
 
Table 3: Mobility to Another Country Over Past Ten Years – Frequency and Duration 
Movers Short Term Medium Term Long Term Still in Country
EU 27 9.1 20.1 31.6 17.3 30.9
Region
EU 15 10.2 18.2 30.3 18.0 33.5
NMS 12 5.4 37.0 43.1 12.0 8.0
Gender
Women 8.6 21.0 31.7 16.5 30.8
Men 9.7 19.3 31.6 18.1 31.0
Age
15-29 10.8 26.4 28.7 13.8 31.1
30-39 12.3 16.5 30.8 15.5 37.2
40-49 8.4 21.8 40.5 14.4 23.3
50-59 7.4 14.4 35.7 18.1 31.8
59+ 6.9 16.7 26.0 30.8 26.5
Years of Education
15- 7.5 19.3 22.7 20.5 37.6
16-19 7.9 21.1 31.7 17.8 29.4
20+ 11.7 19.6 37.5 15.6 27.3
In Education 11.5 20.1 29.6 15.5 34.8
thereof:
 
Notes: Weighted averages. Source: Eurobarometer 67.1, own calculations. Column ‘Movers’ reports population share of in-
dividuals who have lived in another country at least once during the past 10 years. Duration of moves refers to last move. 
Short term moves refer to periods of living in another country of less than one year, medium term moves to periods of 1-5 
years, long term moves to periods of 5-10 years. 
 
Table 3 provides some summary statistics. On average slightly less than one in ten citizens of 
EU-27 has moved temporarily or permanently to live in another country. There is a clear re-
gional pattern. Residents of EU-15 are substantially more inclined to have made a cross-
border mover than residents of the twelve New Member States. The quota of movers (10.2 
percent) is almost twice as high in the former. As the pre-enlargement period falls into the ten 
year observation window, one explanation is that individuals from the New Member States 
did not have the possibility to move before their countries joined the EU.6
                                                 
6 A related argument is that recent movers are perhaps systematically underrepresented in the survey, which is 
conducted in the local language. Thus attrition bias may arise considering that mobility from the New Member 
States to EU-15 is a recent, post-enlargement phenomenon. 
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Notable exceptions among the New Member States are Lithuania and Cyprus, with population 
shares of individuals with recent cross-country mobility experience above the European aver-
age. The citizens most inclined to migration, live in Ireland where about 16 percent of the 
population have a recent migration experience. 
From a socio-demographic perspective we observe that age, education and gender determine 
mobility behaviour. Overall, the population share of citizens with recent geographic mobility 
experience decreases with age. This pattern is consistent with the individual propensity of 
moving declining over the life cycle. It seems logical that the population share of recent mov-
ers is rather low among the youngest respondents– some of them are too young to have had 
the full ten years available in which they could make independent mobility decisions. 
Another pattern is observed with regard to education: the better educated the citizens the more 
likely they are to have made a move over the past decade. The education effect appears espe-
cially strong among university graduates. 12 percent of European citizens with more than 20 
years of education, but only 8 percent of citizens with less than 20 years of education have 
made a move during the last decade. The figure is almost as high for those currently in educa-
tion (11.5 percent), which suggests that it is increasingly common to take (parts of) education 
abroad. Finally, we observe that among the recent movers, women are underrepresented. 
Some movers have crossed borders more than once. About 6.4 percent moved twice, and 
about 1.4 percent even moved three times. Thus the population share of high frequency mov-
ers appears very small. 
The Eurobarometer 2007 survey on mobility over the past decade also records the duration of 
stay in another country. We can distinguish between short-term, medium-term and long-term 
movers who lived in another country for less than one year, one to five years, and five to ten 
years.7 There is no censoring problem, as those who are still living in a country other than 
they are originally from are separately recorded. 
Throughout the EU, about one in five citizens who moved to live in another country over the 
past decade was a short-term mover. About 30 percent stayed for one to five years, and 
slightly less than one in five stayed for six to ten years. About one third of the citizens who 
have moved to another country are still living there.8
Concerning the duration of stay of different populations, we observe some noteworthy pat-
terns: (i) Citizens in the New Member States more often are short-term movers than citizens 
in the EU-15. Again, this probably reflects the short post-enlargement phase, rather than a 
specific aversion against longer term mobility in these countries. (ii) Overall, the age profile is 
                                                 
7 Among the multiple movers, the survey only records the length of the most recent move. 
8 This figure is somewhat difficult to interpret, since we do not observe when an individual in this category has 
moved. The category mixes individuals who have resettled permanently, but also temporary movers who have 
arrived in a foreign location just recently. 
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not especially clear. Among the youngest respondents, stays abroad of less than a year appear 
to be especially frequent. Besides, there could be an inverted U-shape pattern regarding me-
dium-term mobility, probably due to job-related moves. Consequently its share is strongest 
for individuals in prime working age (40-49). (iii) There appears to be a systematic influence 
of education. The importance of medium-term mobility grows with years of education, 
whereas the share of long-term mobility (which may turn into permanent mobility) falls with 
education. Thus the higher incidence of geographic mobility among the high-skilled seems to 
go along with shorter duration of stay at a location. 
2.5 Lifetime Mobility 
A useful indicator for the extent of geographic mobility in Europe is the individual lifetime 
mobility rate, i.e. the number of moves citizens make over the course of their life cycle. Com-
pared to the geographic mobility indicators above, this measure has certain advantages: 
• It shifts focus to the individual level: the level at which geographic mobility decisions 
are taken. Among others, this perspective allows detecting country-specific attitudes 
toward geographic mobility. 
• By aggregating geographic moves over a longer time horizon, it is possible to draw a 
distinction between the frequency of moving and the intensity of moving. This re-
quires separating high- and low- frequency movers. 
• A life-cycle perspective is also useful, as the reasons and the propensity of moving 
will systematically vary with age. 
Despite these advantages, the lifetime mobility perspective has not been frequently adopted in 
the literature so far. The main reason is lack of adequate panel data. However, the cross-
sectional Eurobarometer with special focus on geographic and occupation mobility contains 
suitable retrospective information on respondents’ mobility experience. Though the data does 
not contain full biographical information, like the timing and duration of each move, it is at 
least possible to observe how many times individuals moved after they first left the parental 
home to live on their own. 
If an individual has moved at least once afterward, also the distance of each move is recorded. 
One can identify whether individuals experienced a short-distance local move, i.e. moved but 
stayed in the same town or region, moved to another region in the same country, moved to a 
country in the European Union, or moved to a country outside the European Union. Multiple 
answers are feasible, so that the data may record different types of geographic mobility for a 
single individual. 
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Table 4: Share of Population by Type of Geographic Mobility 
Local Move Move in Country
Move Inside 
EU
Move out of 
EU Any Move
 AT 54.1 9.4 3.4 1.0 64.2
 BE 59.6 13.0 4.5 2.5 74.7
 CY 47.8 17.2 8.1 2.9 61.4
 CZ 41.9 8.2 1.6 0.3 50.4
 DE 59.4 18.1 4.9 3.7 77.2
 DK 62.6 36.2 7.5 5.4 89.9
 EE 50.5 23.4 1.1 1.7 68.2
 EL 34.7 16.4 4.4 1.5 47.8
 ES 46.6 9.9 4.5 3.0 57.9
 FI 64.5 34.7 5.1 3.0 87.4
 FR 58.2 28.8 2.6 3.3 81.8
 HU 47.5 9.9 0.7 0.7 56.4
 IE 44.5 18.8 14.5 4.8 63.8
 IT 43.8 7.9 1.6 0.1 52.8
 LT 57.4 7.4 0.7 1.2 66.4
 LU 53.8 19.4 13.2 2.8 74.1
 LV 44.2 22.5 2.0 2.4 66.1
 MT 27.6 6.2 2.7 2.4 37.8
 NL 55.0 21.6 4.4 2.7 80.0
 PL 40.6 7.1 1.0 0.1 47.1
 PT 41.7 8.6 4.2 2.0 52.9
 SE 65.9 41.8 7.1 4.6 85.0
 SI 38.2 9.6 1.6 1.4 49.6
 SK 34.2 5.8 1.4 0.1 40.5
 UK 52.3 23.7 6.6 5.7 79.1
 EU25 51.0 16.8 3.8 2.7 67.3  
Notes: UKD including Northern Ireland. Weighted averages. Multiple answers allowed. Therefore final column does not rep-
resent the sum of columns2-5. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Table 4 reveals substantial variation in lifetime mobility rates across Europe. The share of the 
population who has moved at least once ranges from around 40-90 per cent. The data suggest 
a regional pattern: over the life course, the propensity of geographic mobility is especially 
high in the North of Europe (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). These countries are followed by 
a group of western European countries (Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium) 
where mobility rates are lower, but still in the range of 70-80 percent. 
The lowest mobility rates (less than 60 percent) are observed in the Eastern European coun-
tries, excepting Latvia and Lithuania. These low rates are probably a heritage of the commu-
nist past, associated with little job reallocation, dysfunctional housing markets and restrictions 
on mobility. Naturally Eastern Europeans also had fewer opportunities to move abroad than 
Western Europeans. 
Next to Eastern Europe, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain show below-average lifetime mo-
bility rates. Low levels of job mobility (long job tenure) are also common in the Mediterra-
nean countries. 
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Figure 7: Correlation Between Job and Geographic Mobility 
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Weighted country averages. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
The strong association between job and geographic mobility is confirmed by Figure 7, which 
plots the propensity of completed mobility against the average number of voluntary and in-
voluntary job changes experienced over the life course after the first job. Each dot represents 
the country average of the two variables in the Eurobarometer. The observations from Eastern 
Europe are highlighted in red. By and large, these countries are located at the lower end re-
garding both dimensions of mobility. Clearly, job and geographic mobility are positively cor-
related. More frequent job changes are associated with more frequent geographic moves, and 
vice versa. 
Concerning the nature of geographic mobility, the survey of country results in Table 4 allows 
the following conclusions. More distant geographic moves occur at a much lower rate than 
less distant moves. This pattern holds almost without exception. 
Comparing the country results for each of the different types of geographic mobility, the re-
gional pattern found for the overall propensity to move reappears in the propensity to move 
locally and the propensity to move within the same country. Again, the Northern European 
countries exhibit the highest mobility rates, while the Mediterranean and Eastern European 
countries tend to occupy positions at the bottom end. Thus in general the propensities to move 
a shorter and to move a longer distance in the same country appear to be positively correlated, 
although there are some distinct exceptions from this rule (note, e.g., the case of Germany). 
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There is no apparent correlation between the size of countries in terms of area and the propen-
sity of in-country moves. 
In relative terms, the range of international mobility experience is quite large. As expected, 
the countries from Eastern Europe are located at the bottom end of the international mobility 
rates, as expected considering the long-existing legal barriers to out-migration. In the recent 
Member States, the share of the population who moved to another EU country is not consis-
tently larger than the share of the population who moved to a non-EU country.9 This may 
change in the future as access to other EU countries increases. 
For the remaining countries, the EU country mobility rate is usually about twice as high as the 
non-EU country mobility rate. There are some clear outliers though. On the one hand, the rate 
reported from Italy and Austria is rather low. On the other hand, Luxembourg and Ireland 
report extremely high rates. Luxembourg’s outlier status clearly reflects its special sectoral 
and occupational structure.10 Ireland’s status probably reflects the high level of inter-change 
between English speaking Ireland and the United Kingdom. To a certain degree, it may also 
reflect the truly exceptional recent influx of international migrants from the East of Europe. 
So far, we have analysed whether individuals moved and the types of geographic mobility 
which were experienced. We now turn to the intensity of individual geographic mobility, 
measured by the total number of moves made after leaving the parental home.11 Table 5 re-
cords the population share of movers who made no additional move, one additional move, 
two to four additional moves, more than four additional moves or are still residing at home. 
The numbers in Table 5 represent population shares. 
 
                                                 
9 Exceptions to this rule are the Baltic States and can be explained by the proximity to the Russian Federation. 
Other border countries also tend to have elevated extra-EU rates compared to intra-EU rates, but just not as se-
vere. 
10 In Luxemburg the European Union is the single largest employer, which makes it EU Member State with the 
highest proportion (about 30 percent) of residents from other EU Member States. 
11 The Eurobarometer does not allow combining the dimensions of mobility frequency and type of move. Hence 
we do not know, e.g., the share of local moves in total moves. 
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Table 5: Frequency of Geographic Mobility 
Still at Home No Move One Move 2-4 Moves > 4 Moves
 AT 16.0 19.1 24.1 33.4 7.2
 BE 13.2 11.8 18.9 42.0 14.1
 CY 20.9 17.7 16.8 33.6 11.0
 CZ 23.8 25.6 19.1 27.2 4.2
 DE 14.0 8.6 12.3 47.3 17.7
 DK 4.9 4.8 7.3 35.4 47.3
 EE 18.1 12.8 16.9 40.5 11.2
 EL 26.2 26.0 16.0 22.3 9.4
 ES 22.3 17.5 20.1 30.5 7.7
 FI 8.1 3.5 9.2 35.7 42.9
 FR 9.7 8.2 11.3 41.6 29.2
 HU 18.6 24.6 18.1 26.3 12.2
 IE 22.2 12.0 15.2 33.1 15.6
 IT 23.7 21.7 20.6 26.5 5.8
 LT 19.5 12.8 12.5 40.1 14.0
 LU 16.9 9.0 17.1 46.8 10.3
 LV 23.8 9.4 15.7 40.9 9.7
 MT 29.3 32.8 15.8 20.5 1.4
 NL 10.4 9.1 10.5 38.3 31.4
 PL 30.7 21.6 17.6 23.6 6.1
 PT 23.0 21.6 24.6 24.1 4.7
 SE 11.8 3.0 3.3 28.2 53.5
 SI 33.5 16.4 15.6 27.5 6.8
 SK 32.4 26.4 21.1 18.2 1.3
 UK 10.2 9.8 8.6 40.3 30.3
 EU25 17.5 14.3 14.9 35.1 17.5  
Notes: UKD including Northern Ireland. Weighted averages. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Throughout Europe, the typical situation is that individuals made 2-4 moves in the course of 
their lifetime; in 16 out of 25 countries, this category has the highest population share. The 
countries where this is not the case fall into two categories: countries where mobility is gener-
ally lower and countries where mobility is generally higher. The first group includes Slovakia, 
Malta and Poland, which have large shares of people who still live at home or have made no 
moves since moving out from their parents’ house. The highly mobile countries include Swe-
den, Finland and Denmark, where few people still live at home and many have made more 
than four moves since moving out. From this observation, it appears that the share of the 
population still living at home is a good predictor for the overall intensity of geographic mo-
bility in a country. To some extent, the demographic composition determines this share: In a 
population with a higher share of young individuals, we would expect a higher share of indi-
viduals to be living with their parents. Across Europe, however, the differences in the demo-
graphic structure are too small to explain the huge range in the fraction of individuals still at 
home (4.9-33.5 percent). 
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Figure 8: Correlation Between Home Leaving Age and Frequency of Moving 
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Weighted country averages. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
The measured shares reflect differences in the average home leaving age. In Figure 8 we show 
this negative relationship, which could be driven by varying propensity to migrate, or varying 
opportunities to migrate. In principle, it is possible to achieve a higher level of geographic 
mobility through shifting two different margins: an increase in the share of the population 
making at least one geographic move (the extensive margin) or an increase in the frequency of 
moves among the population already moving geographically (the intensive margin). From an 
empirical perspective, however, it appears that these two margins are strongly interrelated. 
Figure 9 reveals that in countries where the share of the population moving at all is larger, the 
share of the population who moves at a high frequency is also larger. Because the second 
group includes the first, a positive correlation is virtually guaranteed, however it could be 
enhanced by movers becoming more adept at or less afraid of moving. 
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Figure 9: Correlation between Propensity of Moving and Intensity of Moving 
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Weighted country averages. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Furthermore, if the population share of high frequency movers is large, it appears more likely 
that at least one of the moves not only occurs within country, but across border. At least, from 
the Eurobarometer data we obtain a statistically significant correlation between the population 
share of high-frequency movers and the population share of movers to or from another EU 
country. 
To summarize, one may develop the following chain of arguments: A lower home leaving age 
could lead to a higher share of the population moving at all. A larger share of the population 
moving at all could raise the share of the population making a larger number of moves. A 
larger number of moves could induce a higher share of individuals to move to another EU 
country. 
Overall, the variation in geographic mobility rates across Europe is quite striking. In the fol-
lowing, we will rely on econometric techniques (explained in the adjacent box) to estimate 
country effects. The idea is to show what part of the variance of aggregate mobility rates can-
not be explained by differences in individual level characteristics. 
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An interpretation of the estimated country-specific effects is that they represent the expected 
migration outcome, if we place an average European into a particular country. Suppose the 
predicted country effect is above the European average, even after controlling for demo-
graphic differences explaining variation in mobility outcomes, conditions in that particular 
country are more favourable for mobility than in the European average. These results also 
reveal how much of the variation in macro economic mobility rates across Europe is actually 
unexplained by individual determinants of mobility. 
Figure 10 summarizes the estimated country effects impacting on the propensity of completed 
moves at the local level (city or region), in-country, and across border.12
Empirical Estimation of Country Effects 
 
Conceptually, one may separate any cross-country difference in mobility rates into two components. The 
first is differences in characteristics of residents. For example, if age is positively correlated with com-
pleted lifetime geographic mobility, and if individuals in country A are on average younger than in coun-
try B, geographic mobility rates in country A should be systematically smaller. The second factor is gen-
eral country effects reflecting, for example, specific tastes and/or the impact of policies and institutions 
specific to a country. Due to country effects, it is possible that the geographic mobility rate in country A is 
different from that in country B, even if characteristics and the correlation between characteristics and 
outputs is the same in both countries. 
We proceed in two steps. First, we estimate linear probability models explaining the outcome of interest 
through a set of personal characteristics, and a full set of country dummies. Second, we use the estimated 
correlations to predict the average European mobility rate supposed (i) all individual characteristics were 
identical and equal to the average characteristics in the sample, and (ii) the general country effect esti-
mated for a particular country impacted on all Europeans. By making the first assumption, we control for 
demographic differences between countries affecting raw outcomes. The results obtained by making the 
second assumption indicate the level change in the average European mobility rate, if the specific forces 
in a country (preferences, institutions, tastes) were at work in the whole of Europe. 
                                                 
12 In estimating the linear probability model required at the first stage, we have only employed explanatory vari-
ables which do not vary over the lifetime, in order to avoid endogeneity problems. International mobility to EU 
and to non-EU countries is analysed together to maintain satisfactory sample sizes. 
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Figure 10: Country Effects Impacting Propensity of Completed Mobility 
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Notes: Country effects evaluated at the mean of observable characteristics impacting on the propensity to migrate. Controls include age, age 
squared, gender, education level, home leaving age, migration background as indicated by parents born abroad and parts of education taken 
abroad, and a full set of occupation and sector effects based on the occupation in the first job. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Looking at local mobility rates first, we estimate that supposed all EU citizens had the charac-
teristics of an average European, 56.4 percent of the population would be observed with at 
least one move at the city or region level. Regarding completed in-country mobility, the pre-
dicted average amounts to 16.3 percent. 
In both dimensions of within-country mobility, the European average would be much higher, 
if individuals adapted behaviour prevalent in Scandinavia. For example, if the estimated spe-
cific effects for Sweden impacted throughout Europe, the average local mobility rate would 
be 18.7 percentage points higher, and the average regional mobility rate would be 24.5 per-
centage points larger. This suggests that there is indeed substantial scope for raising European 
mobility rates, provided that the Swedish (or Scandinavian) mobility attitudes and institutions 
could be transferred to other countries. 
While the favourable ranking of the Scandinavian countries does not change whether analys-
ing raw mobility rates or country effects, a remarkable difference arises regarding the remain-
ing countries. Concerning completed local mobility rates, the Mediterranean countries tend to 
look worse than the Eastern European countries if judged by the country effects instead of the 
raw data. This implies that the observable characteristics impacting completed mobility are 
altogether less favourably distributed in the Eastern European than in the Mediterranean coun-
tries. 
IZA, NIRAS Consultants, AMS 40 
IZA Research Report No. 19  
Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Social and Economic Benefits  
This effect, however, is not present for regional mobility rates. In other words, very little of 
the variation in in-country mobility rates across Europe appears to be attributable to system-
atic variation in the observables.  
Looking at international mobility, Ireland stands out. If the entire population in the EU were 
as strongly attached to international migration as the Irish, our prediction suggests that 16.4 
percent of the population, instead of 2.6 percent, would have made at least one international 
move in the course of their lifetime. The high share of international movers in the Irish popu-
lation is poorly explained by a peculiar distribution of individual characteristics favourable to 
international mobility. It rather seems to reflect the very strong international migration history 
of the population in Ireland. 
At the bottom end, we find the countries from Eastern Europe, as in the raw data. This indi-
cates that the low international mobility rates are indeed not an effect of unfavourable socio-
demographic characteristics but of suppressed mobility in the communist era. Among non-
Eastern countries, Italy is the country least inclined to international mobility. If all Europeans 
had the behaviour of Italians, the international mobility rate at the European level would be as 
low as 0.9 percent. The country effect for Italy also appears peculiar if compared to those 
measured for the other Mediterranean countries, which are all positive. The estimated country 
effects probably pick up the fact that these countries have been regions sending guest workers 
to the north during the 1960s. 
A final result worth highlighting is the slightly negative country effect for Luxembourg, al-
though the country takes the top 2 position considering the raw international mobility rate. 
This confirms that the high level of international mobility is caused by the very special sector 
and employment structure in comparison to the rest of Europe. 
For a summary, Table 6 shows the country ranking in terms of specific propensities of com-
pleted moves. In many cases, the country ranking is very similar comparing within-country 
and cross-border moves, most notably in Italy, Poland, Denmark and Finland. Overall, how-
ever, the ranking positions are more strongly correlated for local and within-country mobility, 
than the ranking positions for within-country and international mobility. 
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Table 6: Ranking of Country Effects by Type of Completed Geographic Mobility 
Local Mobility In Country Mobility
International 
Mobility
 AT 11 16 17
 BE 5 14 1
 CY 16 10 8
 CZ 17 20 18
 DE 7 11 1
 DK 3 3 3
 EE 9 7 23
 EL 23 13 4
 ES 18 15 11
 FI 2 2 5
 FR 6 4 13
 HU 15 17 20
 IE 14 9 1
 IT 22 21 22
 LT 4 24 2
 LU 8 8 16
 LV 12 6 12
 MT 25 22 10
 NL 10 12 9
 PL 19 23 24
 PT 21 18 6
 SE 1 1 7
 SI 20 19 25
 SK 24 25 19
 UK 13 5 2
4
5
1
 
Notes: Countries ranked according to country effects shown in Figures 10 to 12. UKD includ-
ing Northern Ireland. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
2.6 Mobility Intentions 
The retrospective viewpoint adopted in the previous section smoothes short term fluctuations 
in mobility rates. However, it hides secular trend developments as well as level shifts due to 
permanent shocks. Clearly, neither the change in out-migration patterns in the Mediterranean 
countries since the 1960s, nor the rising opportunities for all types of mobility in Eastern 
Europe after communism are directly visible in the figures presented above. 
To obtain a picture of current mobility patterns, we now turn to mobility intentions. On the 
basis of the Eurobarometer wave 64.1, we analyze whether an individual believes that he or 
she is likely to move within the next five years. Although reported mobility intentions do not 
necessarily translate into actual mobility, they contain valuable information on prospective 
mobility, given a correlation between intended and completed mobility does exist and that it 
is sufficiently homogenous across Europe. 
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Table 7: Share of Population with Intention to Move by Type of Geographic Mobility 
Local Move Move in Country
Move inside 
EU
Move out of 
EU Any Move
 AT 12.7 2.5 2.3 0.9 16.9
 BE 19.6 4.5 3.2 0.8 26.7
 CY 16.2 3.3 4.1 0.1 22.8
 CZ 12.1 2.6 1.6 0.3 16.5
 DE 16.2 6.0 2.1 1.2 22.8
 DK 26.0 11.1 5.7 3.6 36.7
 EE 19.0 11.1 7.9 1.6 32.4
 EL 12.4 8.4 3.0 1.2 23.0
 ES 16.6 4.4 1.8 0.7 21.9
 FI 27.7 10.9 4.4 1.7 39.3
 FR 25.0 18.6 4.6 2.7 42.7
 HU 17.4 3.1 2.5 0.1 22.4
 IE 18.9 7.9 4.8 4.3 32.6
 IT 15.9 5.6 1.8 1.2 23.3
 LT 20.4 4.0 9.1 2.4 32.7
 LU 12.6 5.6 5.0 0.6 22.5
 LV 21.4 8.1 7.7 2.0 35.7
 MT 16.4 2.6 5.3 2.5 24.4
 NL 25.5 7.3 3.1 2.4 35.9
 PL 16.7 4.8 7.6 1.7 27.2
 PT 9.4 3.5 1.7 2.6 16.2
 SE 29.7 13.1 4.5 4.1 40.6
 SI 16.4 8.1 2.3 1.7 23.6
 SK 9.8 3.5 3.7 1.5 17.6
 UK 26.8 9.2 3.6 3.7 39.9
 EU25 19.3 7.7 3.3 1.9 28.8  
Notes: UKD including Northern Ireland. Weighted averages. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Table 7 contains the raw country averages of reported mobility intentions, measured by the 
respective share of the population expecting to move. As individuals are allowed to mention 
more than one type of the expected move, the registered propensity to move at all is system-
atically smaller than the sum of the propensities over the four types of moves considered. 
A number of patterns are evident: First, individuals more frequently expect to move over 
shorter distances than to move over longer distances. This expectation appears realistic given 
the role of geographic distance observed when looking at completed mobility. Second, the 
level of expected mobility to another region in the same country appears relatively low, in 
particular considering that this type of geographic mobility, according to the retrospective 
mobility measures, has had a relatively high share in completed mobility so far. 
Third, in-country mobility intentions appear positively correlated with the recent inter-
regional mobility rates recovered from the EU-LFS. Finally, a relatively large share of indi-
viduals expects to move across a national border, whether to an EU or to a non-EU country. 
In a large number of countries, the share of the population claiming that they expect to move 
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abroad is larger than the share of the population who made such a move in the past. This ob-
servation hints at a cohort effect facilitating cross border moves.13
 
International moving intentions are strong in Eastern Europe. This is especially true for the 
Baltic States and Poland where about ten percent of the population expect to move abroad 
soon. In these countries, the expectation to move outside the country is even stronger than the 
expectation to move in-country (outside the local region). In the other East European coun-
tries, the share of the population expecting to move abroad in the future is much weaker. This 
result seems to be a reflection of below-average intentions to move at all. Even in these coun-
tries, however, the expectation to move abroad is high relative to the expectation to make a 
long-distance move in one’s own country. This suggests that those East Europeans consider-
ing moving do not expect to find satisfactory opportunities in their own country, and therefore 
expect to move abroad. 
In view of the ongoing catching up process in the East European New Member States, we 
expect that mobility intentions would fall over time. In fact, there is some evidence from the 
Mobility Intentions in the Eurobarometer Survey 2007 
 
The waves 64.1 and 67.1 of the Eurobarometer survey respondents’ mobility intentions in the next five 
years. Also the expected type of move (local, within country, across borders) is recorded. Unfortunately, 
the questions asked are not exactly identical, which makes it impossible to create a consistent time series. 
It appears that the survey structure of the Eurobarometer 2007 leads to weaker reported moving intentions. 
This could be expected given that the newer survey strictly asks “Do you move at all…?”, whereas the 
earlier survey allows for a certain element of chance, asking “Do you think that … you are likely to 
move…?” The inconsistency appears to bias especially the responses with regard to within-country mobil-
ity intentions. The share of the population reporting the intention to move locally (within the country but 
not locally) drops from 19.3 (7.7) percent to 7.6 (2.9) percent. It appears unlikely that such massive swing 
could be attributed to a change in the economic environment, or even a time trend. 
Similar measurement problems may be present regarding the statements about intended cross-border mo-
bility. Still, the development in the Eurobarometer data seems more plausible. The share of the population 
reporting the intention to move within the EU (to a non-EU country) is fairly stable, changing from 3.3 
(1.9) percent to 3.0 (1.8) percent between the two waves. 
Looking at individual countries, we observe that, consistent with the expectations, moving intentions have 
declined mostly in the East European New Member States, especially in the Baltic States. Still they re-
main above the European average. Cross-border moving intentions are strongest in the two New Member 
States not covered by the 2000 Eurobarometer survey. In Bulgaria (Romania), 7.9 (7.4) percent of the 
respondents report that they intend to move to another EU country. 2.3 (2.0) percent intend to leave to a 
non-EU country. The economic disadvantage of these countries probably fosters mobility intentions. 
Judged by the evidence for the other East European Member States, these intentions may quickly level out 
after accession, however. 
                                                 
13 It could also indicate that it is less costly to intend to move than it is to actually move. 
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Eurobarometer 67.1 wave of 2007 suggesting that overall, intentions to move to another coun-
try rates are lower now than two years before. However, as explained in the box above, the 
data do not allow constructing an exact time series and therefore require cautious interpreta-
tion. 
The three non-Eastern countries with the highest expectations about future international mo-
bility are Denmark, Sweden and Ireland. In Ireland, as in Eastern Europe, moving abroad is 
more frequently reported as a mobility option than moving within the country. For Sweden 
and Denmark, in contrast, the high rate of international mobility intentions mostly appears to 
be associated with a high propensity to move at all. 
Proceeding as above and estimating the role of country-specific factors explaining differences 
in moving intentions has little effect on the country ranking. This suggests that much of the 
observed variation in mobility intentions across Europe is not due to variation in socio-
demographic structure due to but instead arises from specific attitudes related to tastes and/or 
institutions. Figure 11 summarizes the unexplained country-specific mobility intentions for 
the Member States, regarding all three types of mobility – local, within country and interna-
tional (within EU or out of EU). 
 
Figure 11: Country Effects Explaining Intentions to Move 
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Notes: Country effects estimated on the basis of linear probability model that explains intention whether to move or not by a set of socio-
demographic characteristics. Controls include age, gender, marriage status, education level, employment status, job tenure and a full set of 
occupation and sector effects for those currently employed, frequency and distance of past moves, home ownership status, current location (city). 
UKD including Northern Ireland. Weighted averages. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
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Judged by intentions to move locally, Ireland and Latvia represent the European average. Por-
tugal currently appears as the least mobile Member State. If all Europeans were endowed with 
the average observable characteristics of Europeans but behaved like the Portuguese, the pre-
dicted average mobility intentions rate would be 6 percent, whereas the prediction on the ba-
sis of the European average is 15.8 percent. In contrast, if entire Europe behaved like the 
Swedish, the propensity of future regional moves would be 11.4 percentage points higher. 
With the exception of the Scandinavian countries located at the top, it is hard to find a clear-
cut country pattern. While the Eastern European and Mediterranean countries generally ex-
hibit negative country effects, the regional clustering is not as prominent as with actual migra-
tion experience. In particular, we observe some countries from central Europe (Austria, Ger-
many and Luxembourg) among the group of countries less inclined towards local mobility. 
The country currently most inclined to within-country mobility is France. If all Europeans 
behaved like the French, the average European mobility rate would be 10.3 percent instead of 
4 percent. Two East European countries, Estonia and Slovenia, are among the countries where 
individuals have higher within-country mobility expectations than the European average. Fi-
nally, somewhat surprisingly considering the rather low level of reported moving intentions, 
Italy precedes even Denmark if judged by the country effect. Thus the distribution of observ-
ables impacting within-country mobility appears to be worse in Italy than in Denmark. 
At the bottom end, we observe once more most of the East European countries, but also Aus-
tria. If the Czech (Austrian) behaviour were the norm throughout Europe, the rate of intended 
mobility evaluated at the average characteristics of the Europeans would be as small as 1.1 
(1.3) percent. 
It appears that a country tradition of mobility has a certain role in predetermining expectations 
about future mobility. Figure 12 shows a strong positive correlation between country-specifics 
effects for completed migration in the past, and the country specifics regarding future mobil-
ity intentions, for geographic mobility at the local level. A similar strong positive correlation 
(not shown) is found between the specific country effects driving completed and intended 
mobility also in the domain of in-country mobility. This correlation may reflect learning ef-
fects or cultural norms, and supports the hypothesis that an established mobility tradition may 
encourage future mobility. Put differently, the development of mobility rates, at least to some 
extent, appears path-dependent. An established pattern is unlikely to change quickly. 
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Figure 12: Country Effects Regarding Completed and Intended Mobility – Local Mobility 
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Country effects evaluated at the mean of observable characteristics impacting on the propensity to migrate. Controls include age, gender, mar-
riage status, education level, employment status, job tenure and a full set of occupation and sector effects for those currently employed, frequency 
and distance of past moves, home ownership status, current location (city). Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
In the domain of international mobility intentions, patterns are very different. First, there is a 
huge gap between the six countries currently most inclined to migrate internationally – the 
Baltic States, Poland, Slovenia, and Malta – and the rest of Europe. If all Europeans’ inten-
tions to move were as strong as in these countries, the European rate of international mobility 
intentions evaluated at average sample characteristics would be more than twice as high. 
Clearly, the high positive country effects reflect the additional opportunities for moving into 
other EU countries opening up by entering into the European Union. This effect does not ap-
pear to be present in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
Among the countries least inclined to international mobility over the near future, we observe 
three large countries in terms of population: Spain, Germany and Italy. Just improving the 
readiness to move in these countries to the European average would increase the share of the 
European population with an intention to move by roughly one percentage point. 
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Figure 13: Country Effects Regarding Completed and Intended Mobility – International Mobility 
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8 East European Countries (CHK, EST, HUN, LAT, LIT, POL, SLK, SLN) highlighted in red. Country effects evaluated at the mean of observable 
characteristics impacting on the propensity to migrate. Controls include age, gender, marriage status, skill level, education abroad, current em-
ployment status, occupation and sector dummies for current occupation, home ownership, current location (city), migration history. Source: Euro-
barometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Figure 13 displays no clear-cut empirical correlation between countries’ rate of past interna-
tional mobility and reported expectations of future international mobility. This is true not only 
for the countries in Eastern Europe affected by economic transformation and accession to the 
European Union, highlighted in red, but also when considering only the rest of Europe where 
these peculiar effects are not present. 
Given that within-country shocks tend to be less dispersed than cross-country shocks, one 
explanation for the looser relationship between past and future international mobility levels is 
that cross border movements are more strongly affected by country-specific economic shocks. 
A good example in support of this hypothesis is the case of Ireland, a country experiencing by 
far the highest levels of international mobility in the past, but where the country effect ex-
plaining expectations to move abroad is much closer to the norm. It appears that the estimated 
country effect reflects international migration intentions falling due to the country’s enormous 
macro economic boom creating better opportunities at home. 
In summary, when looking at mobility intentions a few countries rank low no matter which 
type of geographic mobility is considered. Among this group are Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Germany and Portugal. On the other hand, five countries clearly stand out as high mobility 
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countries: Sweden, the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland), Estonia, Finland, and 
France, due to the top position in terms of in-country mobility intentions. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
This section has given an empirical picture of various dimensions of the current state of geo-
graphic mobility in the EU. We have measured geographic mobility in a number of dimen-
sions: stocks and flows; mobility at the local, regional, in-country and international level; as 
well as completed and intended mobility. 
The overall impression is, first, that the level of geographic mobility is fairly low in Europe. 
Second, mobility outside the residential area is even lower. Third, high mobility countries 
(e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden), and low mobility countries (e.g. Italy, Spain) co-
exist. This suggests that there might be some scope for increasing the average geographic 
mobility rate in the EU. However, at least with regard to within-country geographic mobility, 
behaviour appears to be relatively stable, which would make it harder to achieve quick suc-
cess with policy interventions to promote geographic mobility. 
In the following section, we attempt at clarifying whether raising the EU mobility rate from 
the current low level to a higher low level is indeed an appropriate policy target. We charac-
terize the optimal mobility rate, and discuss the potential benefits and costs associated with 
increased geographic mobility. 
In addition, we will aim at a better understanding of the factors driving the international dif-
ferences in geographic mobility behaviour. This is necessary to develop a basis for determin-
ing policy interventions suited to enhance mobility. Relevant and efficient policies would 
concentrate on those changeable factors that, empirically, are strongly associated with mobil-
ity behaviour, i.e. contribute to explaining the differences in mobility patters between coun-
tries and individuals apparent in the data. 
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3. OPTIMUM MOBILITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Studying the issue of optimum mobility requires both an economic and social perspective. For 
mobility to deliver its potential benefits over the long term, a balance must be struck between 
its economic and social affects, between mobility and stability. Though it is practically im-
possible to determine an exact optimum level of mobility, we can consider the effects of mo-
bility by weighing the potential benefits against the potential costs. These costs and benefits 
will have external affects – or externalities – on people besides those making the mobility 
decisions (actual and potential migrants).  
Because of these externalities, individual decision making may not yield the socially optimal 
level of geographic mobility, and government intervention may be appropriate. Two factors 
could prevent optimal outcomes. First, social externalities beyond the individual net benefits 
of migration may render the mobility rates too high or too low from a social planner’s per-
spective.14 Second, inefficient market or policy regulations may impose barriers to mobility so 
that individual net benefits from geographic mobility are not realised. 
We structure the discussion of the issue of optimum geographic mobility by giving answers to 
the following questions: 
• Why should people migrate? This adopts the perspective of a social planner (section 
3.2). 
• Why do people migrate? This adopts the perspective of the individual who weighs 
benefits and costs associated with geographic mobility (section 3.3). 
• Why do Europeans not migrate? Here we elaborate on the barriers to geographic mo-
bility as perceived by EU citizens (section 3.4). 
                                                 
14 The social planner is not personified in a single individual, but is understood as the combined political goals 
and efforts of a society. We assume that the social planner is benevolent and strives to maximize the net gains 
from geographic mobility for the society, by weighing benefits and costs. The planner calculating net gains does 
not only regard economic output, but also social aspects. The aim is not only to maximize output, but also to 
achieve a balanced distribution of welfare. We will not specify, however, any exact social welfare function. 
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A main result from our discussion will be that the net benefits for society from geographic 
mobility tend to be positive and larger than individual benefits. This is an important conclu-
sion, because implies that a benevolent social planner would want to introduce policies to 
foster migration. 
3.2 Social Benefits and Costs of Migration 
 
3.2.1 The Role of Externalities 
A social planner optimising geographic mobility needs to consider potential positive and 
negative externalities of geographic mobility. In our context, a supra-national perspective is 
necessary. The optimum level of geographic mobility has to be found for the entire EU, i.e. 
potential net gains in one region must be weighed against potential net losses in another. 
Both positive and negative externalities from geographic mobility increase with the level of 
mobility. However, one may expect that the positive externalities exhibit decreasing returns to 
scale: higher levels of mobility bring smaller additional social benefits. On the other hand, the 
negative impact of additional mobility is expected to increase with the level of geographic 
mobility, for example due to growing social tensions. 
In theory, the optimum level of geographic mobility is to be found, where the net benefits are 
at the maximum, i.e. at the level of geographic mobility maximising the distance between the 
level of total benefits (the sum of private benefits and positive social externalities) and the 
level of total costs (the sum of private costs and negative externalities). 
In practice, this optimum level of geographic mobility is impossible to determine. This would 
require exact quantification of the various possible externalities (as well as private benefits 
and costs), but the empirical evidence on the short- and long-term impact of geographic mo-
bility on the economy and the society is rather limited and difficult to generalise.15
Matters are complicated by the often dual nature of externalities: A positive externality in the 
receiving region may be associated with a negative externality in the sending region. In order 
to establish a need for mobility in a union of regions, as the European Union, it is necessary 
that the positive externality in the one region is larger than the simultaneous negative exter-
nality in the other. 
Further, the same factor that makes a positive externality under particular circumstances may 
result in a negative externality under different circumstances, depending on the socio-
economic and cultural circumstances in the sending and receiving regions.16 Also the individ-
                                                 
15 See for example Saxenian (2002). 
16 See for example Adams (2003); Kaba (2004); Mora and Taylor (2007); IMF (2005); Mattoo et al. (2005). One 
example is that migrants from different source country regions perform differently when moving into different 
IZA, NIRAS Consultants, AMS 51 
IZA Research Report No. 19  
Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Social and Economic Benefits  
ual socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants, affected by legislation and institutions, 
play a role.17
Under these circumstances, the task in assessing optimum geographic mobility is to describe 
the nature of the potential positive and negative externalities associated with mobility. Rather 
than to estimate the optimal level, this approach attempts to identify whether additional mo-
bility is likely to increase or decrease total welfare across Europe. In the following, to facili-
tate the presentation, we will separate economic, demographic and social factors though it is 
obvious that these are in fact closely interrelated. 
3.2.2 Economic Factors 
Some of the key arguments for increased geographic mobility are economic in nature. A use-
ful starting point is that of geographic mobility serves as an equilibrating factor between re-
gional labour markets. To the extent that mobility of capital and goods do not achieve conver-
gence of employment and real wages in open or integrated economies, mobility of labour may 
help balancing labour market outcomes. Furthermore, enlarging the relevant labour market for 
individuals may result in better skill matches. As a consequence, returns to human capital 
formation may increase, which changes the incentives to invest in human capital. Improved 
skill matches and accelerated human capital formation may foster economic growth across the 
continent. 
The reduction in labour market imbalances is probably the most frequently mentioned eco-
nomic rationale for increased geographic mobility in Europe. The need for geographic mobil-
ity as a balancing factor is evident when analysing differences in unemployment rates and 
purchasing power adjusted wages.18
Table 8 displays a matrix of unemployment rate differences in percentage points between 
Member States. In order to highlight imbalances between neighbouring states, the matrix is 
roughly sorted by geographic location. Thus numbers very different from zero adjacent to the 
matrix diagonal indicate strong imbalances in geographically close regions.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Western countries, and the differences in performance cannot be explained by differences in migrants’ personal 
characteristics. 
17 See for example Ho (2004); Bloom and Grant (2001); VTU (2005); Mora and Taylor (2007). 
18 The subsequent figures are based on harmonized Eurostat statistics. 
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Table 8: Unemployment Rate Differences in Percentage Points - 2006 
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 Cyprus 0.0 -4.3 -2.2 -2.7 -3.1 -3.9 -4.9 -3.6 0.7 -0.1 -3.8 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 0.2 -2.5 -3.1 -1.3 -2.2 -1.0 -9.2 -2.5 -8.8 -1.4 -2.9 -2.7 -4.4
 Greece 0.0 2.1 1.6 1.2 0.4 -0.6 0.7 5.0 4.2 0.5 4.2 5.0 3.6 4.5 1.8 1.2 3.0 2.1 3.3 -4.9 1.8 -4.5 2.9 1.4 1.6 -0.1
 Italy 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -1.7 -2.7 -1.4 2.9 2.1 -1.6 2.1 2.9 1.5 2.4 -0.3 -0.9 0.9 0.0 1.2 -7.0 -0.3 -6.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -2.2
 Malta 0.0 -0.4 -1.2 -2.2 -0.9 3.4 2.6 -1.1 2.6 3.4 2.0 2.9 0.2 -0.4 1.4 0.5 1.7 -6.5 0.2 -6.1 1.3 -0.2 0.0 -1.7
 Portugal 0.0 -0.8 -1.8 -0.5 3.8 3.0 -0.7 3.0 3.8 2.4 3.3 0.6 0.0 1.8 0.9 2.1 -6.1 0.6 -5.7 1.7 0.2 0.4 -1.3
 Spain 0.0 -1.0 0.3 4.6 3.8 0.1 3.8 4.6 3.2 4.1 1.4 0.8 2.6 1.7 2.9 -5.3 1.4 -4.9 2.5 1.0 1.2 -0.5
 France 0.0 1.3 5.6 4.8 1.1 4.8 5.6 4.2 5.1 2.4 1.8 3.6 2.7 3.9 -4.3 2.4 -3.9 3.5 2.0 2.2 0.5
 Belgium 0.0 4.3 3.5 -0.2 3.5 4.3 2.9 3.8 1.1 0.5 2.3 1.4 2.6 -5.6 1.1 -5.2 2.2 0.7 0.9 -0.8
 Netherlands 0.0 -0.8 -4.5 -0.8 0.0 -1.4 -0.5 -3.2 -3.8 -2.0 -2.9 -1.7 -9.9 -3.2 -9.5 -2.1 -3.6 -3.4 -5.1
 Luxembourg 0.0 -3.7 0.0 0.8 -0.6 0.3 -2.4 -3.0 -1.2 -2.1 -0.9 -9.1 -2.4 -8.7 -1.3 -2.8 -2.6 -4.3
 Germany 0.0 3.7 4.5 3.1 4.0 1.3 0.7 2.5 1.6 2.8 -5.4 1.3 -5.0 2.4 0.9 1.1 -0.6
 Austria 0.0 0.8 -0.6 0.3 -2.4 -3.0 -1.2 -2.1 -0.9 -9.1 -2.4 -8.7 -1.3 -2.8 -2.6 -4.3
 Denmark 0.0 -1.4 -0.5 -3.2 -3.8 -2.0 -2.9 -1.7 -9.9 -3.2 -9.5 -2.1 -3.6 -3.4 -5.1
 Untd. Kingd. 0.0 0.9 -1.8 -2.4 -0.6 -1.5 -0.3 -8.5 -1.8 -8.1 -0.7 -2.2 -2.0 -3.7
 Ireland 0.0 -2.7 -3.3 -1.5 -2.4 -1.2 -9.4 -2.7 -9.0 -1.6 -3.1 -2.9 -4.6
 Sweden 0.0 -0.6 1.2 0.3 1.5 -6.7 0.0 -6.3 1.1 -0.4 -0.2 -1.9
 Finland 0.0 1.8 0.9 2.1 -6.1 0.6 -5.7 1.7 0.2 0.4 -1.3
 Estonia 0.0 -0.9 0.3 -7.9 -1.2 -7.5 -0.1 -1.6 -1.4 -3.1
 Latvia 0.0 1.2 -7.0 -0.3 -6.6 0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -2.2
 Lithuania 0.0 -8.2 -1.5 -7.8 -0.4 -1.9 -1.7 -3.4
 Poland 0.0 6.7 0.4 7.8 6.3 6.5 4.8
 Czech Rep. 0.0 -6.3 1.1 -0.4 -0.2 -1.9
 Slovakia 0.0 7.4 5.9 6.1 4.4
 Slovenia 0.0 -1.5 -1.3 -3.0
 Hungary 0.0 0.2 -1.5
 Romania 0.0 -1.7
 Bulgaria 0.0  
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. Table is left to right. Example: the unemployment rate in Cyprus is 4.3 percentage points lower than in Greece. 
 
Current imbalances in unemployment rates across EU-27 are large, with Poland experiencing 
an unemployment rate more than three times larger than the member state with the lowest 
unemployment rate, the Netherlands. We also observe large imbalances between neighbour-
ing Member States. Especially striking imbalances, showing up as cluster of darker tinted 
cells around the matrix diagonal, can be found between Germany, the Benelux and surround-
ing states (with Germany having an unemployment rate about 4.5 percentage points higher 
than the Netherlands or Denmark), and between the new Member States of Poland and Slova-
kia compared to surrounding states, with the unemployment rate in Poland being 8.2 percent-
age points higher than in Lithuania. A similar picture emerges when studying employment 
rates 19
 
                                                 
19 The maximum difference in employment rates is 22.9 percentage points, between Poland (employment rate 
54.5%) and Denmark. Imbalances tend to increase with geographical distance of Member States, but strong 
imbalances also still exist in geographic close regions. For example, the employment rate in the Netherlands is 
13.3 percentage points higher than in Belgium. The difference between the Czech Republic and Poland amounts 
to 10.8 percentage points. 
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Table 9: Purchasing Power Adjusted Wage Percentage Differences - 2002 
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 Cyprus 0 -5 -22 -2 20 -18 -39 -38 -41 -46 -42 -27 -43 -48 -45 -33 -25 142 215 148 45 61 86 12 96 226 332
 Greece 0 -18 3 27 -14 -36 -35 -38 -44 -39 -23 -40 -46 -42 -29 -21 155 231 161 52 70 96 18 107 243 355
 Italy 0 25 54 5 -22 -21 -25 -32 -26 -7 -27 -34 -30 -14 -4 209 302 216 84 106 138 43 150 316 451
 Malta 0 23 -16 -37 -37 -40 -45 -41 -25 -42 -47 -44 -31 -23 148 222 154 48 65 91 14 101 234 342
 Portugal 0 -32 -49 -49 -51 -55 -52 -40 -53 -57 -54 -44 -38 101 162 106 20 34 55 -7 63 171 259
 Spain 0 -26 -25 -29 -35 -29 -11 -31 -37 -33 -18 -9 195 283 202 76 96 127 36 139 297 426
 France 0 1 -4 -12 -5 19 -7 -16 -10 10 22 296 415 305 136 163 204 83 221 433 606
 Belgium 0 -5 -13 -6 18 -8 -17 -11 9 21 292 409 301 134 161 201 81 217 427 599
 Netherlands 0 -8 -1 24 -3 -12 -6 14 28 313 437 323 147 175 218 91 235 456 637
 Luxembourg 0 8 36 6 -4 2 25 40 352 487 362 170 201 247 109 266 508 706
 Germany 0 25 -2 -11 -5 16 29 318 443 327 149 178 221 93 238 462 645
 Austria 0 -22 -29 -25 -8 3 233 333 241 99 121 156 54 170 348 494
 Denmark 0 -10 -4 18 31 325 452 335 154 183 227 96 244 472 658
 Untd. Kingd. 0 6 30 45 370 510 381 180 212 261 117 280 532 738
 Ireland 0 22 36 341 473 351 163 193 239 104 257 494 687
 Sweden 0 12 261 369 270 115 140 178 67 192 386 544
 Finland 0 223 320 231 93 115 149 49 162 335 477
 Estonia 0 30 2 -40 -33 -23 -54 -19 35 78
 Latvia 0 -21 -54 -49 -41 -64 -38 4 37
 Lithuania 0 -42 -35 -25 -55 -21 32 74
 Poland 0 11 29 -23 36 126 199
 Czech Rep. 0 16 -31 22 102 168
 Slovakia 0 -40 5 75 132
 Slovenia 0 75 192 286
 Hungary 0 66 120
 Romania 0 33
 Bulgaria 0  
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. Table is left to right. Example: the purchasing power adjusted wage in Cyprus is 5 percentage points lower 
than in Greece. 
 
Taken alone, differences in employment and unemployment rates across Member States are 
no conclusive argument for fostering labour mobility within the EU. Differences in employ-
ment rates across Member States might not reflect inefficiencies in the labour market, but 
different preferences regarding the trade-off between work and leisure. Differences in unem-
ployment rates might be generated by generous unemployment benefits in some countries that 
impel individuals to claim looking for a job in order to claim benefits. Such differences would 
not be affected by increased geographic mobility. However, as unemployment rates are 
strongly negatively correlated to employment rates, we are confident that high unemployment 
rates in some Member States are at least partly explained by an insufficient amount of jobs, 
and labour mobility might lead to a more balanced allocation of jobs and workers in the EU.  
Support to the existence of large imbalances on the European labour market is added by 
cross-country differences in purchasing power adjusted wages across Member States. Table 9 
shows that the percentage differences in average pre-tax PPP (purchasing power parity) 
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wages20 are large even within EU-15, with wages in the UK being over twice those in Portu-
gal. Differences in PPP wages between directly neighbouring states of the EU-15 tend to be 
much smaller, especially between the middle and north European countries. These differences 
rarely exceed 20 percent. A different picture emerges among the new Member States, with 
differences in PPP wages up to 286 percent and differences up to 75 percent between 
neighbouring states. Differences in PPP wages between new member and EU-15 states are as 
high as 738 percent. 
 
Figure 14: Employment Rates and Population Share with Move across EU 
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Source: Eurostat, Eurobarometer, own calculations. Dispersion in regional employment rates for population of age 15-65. 
 
There is also scope for increased geographic mobility within countries as an equilibrating fac-
tor. Figure 14 shows the relation between regional labour market imbalances and internal mo-
bility rates across the EU. Clearly, those countries with a low internal mobility rate experience 
larger regional imbalance in their employment rates (or unemployment rates). 
Although the labour market imbalances across the EU suggest that geographic mobility 
could play a role as an equilibrating factor, a frequent argument in the debate about migra-
tion is that it increases competition in national labour markets, puts downward pressure on 
                                                 
20 To compute pre-tax PPP wages, we combine Eurostat statistics on mean hourly nominal wages with compara-
tive price levels across the European Union. In view of the magnitude of differences between Member States, we 
can neglect the influence of differences in taxation. 
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wages, and hence reduces well-being of the incumbent population. Another fear is that im-
migration could be a burden to the welfare state either because the labour market does not 
absorb the migrant workers, or because of an increase in unemployment rates in the incum-
bent population. These arguments, however, are only concerned with the necessities of the 
destination labour market. If they are valid, there should be opposite effects in the sending 
labour market. From a supra-national perspective, one must demonstrate that the losses in the 
destination are smaller than the gains in the origin for these arguments to imply a negative 
net effect of mobility 
At a conceptual level, it is far from clear that such welfare losses in the destination would 
indeed arise. The positive or negative impact of migrants on the labour market outcomes of 
the incumbents depends on the degree to which the arrivals are economic competitors of the 
incumbents. 
The simplest model is that of a closed economy with perfect competition, homogeneous la-
bour and capital-labour complementarity.21 In this economy, if immigrants supply capital that 
makes labour more productive, or if they raise demand for manufactured products as consum-
ers, native wages may grow. However, the effect diminishes, as soon as the migrants also 
supply labour, because the labour market can only absorb the higher supply of workers if the 
price of the production factor falls. In this case, overall income in the economy increases: mi-
grant workers and capital owners experience an income gain, whereas native workers may 
face an income loss. If labour supply is elastic and native workers respond to the wage decline 
by withdrawing from the labour market, this negative income effect becomes stronger.  
The analysis gets more complex in a scenario with a rigid labour market, yielding involuntary 
unemployment, which means that the current wage exceeds the market-clearing wage and is 
downwardly rigid. In this labour market, unemployment may rise by exactly the change in 
labour supply associated with migration. Whether this leads to income losses of native work-
ers depends on whether immigrants actually replace them in production. In the extreme case, 
none of the immigrants finds employment and, therefore, the income of the native workforce 
would not change. If immigrant workers substitute for natives, however, natives necessarily 
experience an income loss. Their total wage bill declines by exactly the amount of wages 
earned by immigrants. 
However, in this setting, an immigrant inflow may also yield more favourable outcomes, as 
immigration may put pressure on seemingly rigid wages. In this case, the impact on the in-
come of native workers is ambiguous. On the one hand, insiders in the labour market before 
immigration took place are worse off due to the lower wage. On the other hand, those native 
workers who are no longer unemployed as a result of the wage decline benefit from immigra-
tion. 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Zimmermann et al. (2007). 
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These models can be extended to incorporate different types of labour, in order to analyse the 
particular impact of high- and low-skilled immigration. The results of these models can be 
summarised as: (i) An increase of the workforce as a result of immigration generally increases 
national income. (ii) The national income gain will be the smaller, the more rigid the labour 
market. (iii) Those native workers who are most dissimilar to the immigrant workers obtain 
the highest income gain. Those native workers who are most similar to the immigrants lose 
the most. (iv) Capital owners generally gain independently of the degree of complementarity 
or substitutability between native and migrant workers. 
While these aspects are conceptually relevant, a key question is whether they are quantita-
tively important. Many studies have directly estimated the impact of migration shocks on the 
wages and employment of natives. These studies suggest that there is generally little relation-
ship between the immigrant share and wages or employment of natives. If there is indeed a 
negative causal effect, as substantiated by few studies, it appears to be small.22 The largest 
adverse effect is found in a study by Borjas (2003) for the United States. His results suggests 
that an increase in the immigrant share in a labour market, defined by education and labour 
market experience, by one percentage point could reduce native wages by 0.4 percent.23 How-
ever, a replication study by Bonin (2005) suggests that this strong result does not transfer to 
the European situation. 
Another overall positive externality of geographic mobility, when speaking of labour market 
effects, concerns the possibility of better skill matches through an expanded labour market.24 
In general, imperfections in the information available in the labour market entail the simulta-
neous presence of unemployed persons and vacant jobs. This is the origin of frictional unem-
ployment. These imperfections are even more important when vacant jobs are located in dif-
ferent regions or countries. To the extent that the skills required by the vacant jobs differ from 
the skills available in the local labour market, skills mismatch might arise. This skills mis-
match will be persistent if neither workers nor jobs are fully mobile.  
Therefore, enhancing geographic mobility will lead to regional labour markets adjustment and 
to a better match between the demand and supply of skills. If geographic mobility enhances 
the quality of job matches, individuals can make a higher return on their human capital. This 
increases incentives to invest in education. 
On the other hand, for a worker, the search for a job that fits his or her requirements and skills 
is a process that takes time. Likewise, when a firm wants to recruit new workers, it often 
chooses to devote substantial resources to the selection of suitable individuals. Therefore, 
mobility entails costs which in most cases are irreversible. This implies that excessive mobil-
                                                 
22 See Altonji/Card (1991), Hunt (1992), Card (2001), Card/Lewis (2005) and Dustmann et al. (2005) for exam-
ples. 
23 It bears emphasis that these effects were limited to the workers directly competing with the migrants. Gener-
ally, the effects on the wages on other workers are either insignificant or positive.  
24 See Helsley and Strange (1990) and World Bank (2006). 
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ity could increase the cost of vacancy posting on the side of the firms, or search costs on the 
side of the workers.25 However, most of these additional costs are borne voluntarily by indi-
vidual workers and firms. There have been no empirical studies which have been able to 
document external aspects of these costs.  
From an empirical perspective, it appears that better skill matches do work for most migrants. 
Ho (2004) observes a drift to lower skilled jobs among Australian immigrants, which is espe-
cially pronounced among women. An interpretation is that mobility of high-skilled couples 
may result in better matches for men, but worse ones for females.26
Overall, it appears that the direct economic gains made by free circulation of human capital 
are quite large. This impression emerges from different American, Canadian and European 
simulation studies,27 and from the literature seeking to predict the potential migration and 
welfare gains (or losses) associated with the EU enlargement.28 Factors which make mobility 
more economically beneficial are complementarities on the labour market, improved skill 
matching, and externalities through educational choices or human capital formation. The fis-
cal effects of immigration in the long run are generally believed to be positive, although in the 
shorter run much depends on the nature of the migration (see attached box). 
Free geographic mobility furthermore helps allocating the innovation and entrepreneurial po-
tential incorporated in individuals to the environment where they can achieve the highest re-
turn. The impact of educated immigrants on technological and scientific progress is likely to 
affect future growth rates of income per capita, as innovation increases total factor productiv-
ity. This dynamic effect of a “brain gain” on the rate of scientific and technological innova-
tion of a country has indeed been captured by several empirical studies.29 Updating the previ-
ous work in this field measuring patented innovation, Wasmer et al. (2007) even conclude that 
“…ultimately and in the long run this may very well be the most important effect of the for-
eign-born on the US economy.” 
 
                                                 
25 Such aspects are covered, e.g., by Straubhaar et al. (2000), and especially in a volume edited by Padoa-
Schioppa (1991). 
26 Mincer (1978) argues that, when talking about migration in a family context, women can be characterised as 
“tied movers”. Consult also Bevelander (2007) who discusses the phenomenon of “double disadvantage” in 
relation to female migration.  
27 See for example Bloom and Grant (2001); European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (2006); Saxenian (2002); Sekretariatet for ministerudvalget for Danmark i den Globale Økonomi 
(2005); Kaba (2004). 
28 See, for example, Alvarez-Plate et al. (2003). 
29 See Branstetter (2001) and Peri (2005) for examples. 
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Even if the total economic gain from geographic mobility is positive, the effects are probably 
not equally distributed between destination and origin of migrants. Clearly the back side of 
the direct income gains in the area with a growing labour force due to immigration is direct 
income losses in the area with a shrinking labour force due to emigration. The gain of innova-
tive brains in the receiving region means a brain drain in the sending region, which could 
generate a permanent reduction of per capita income growth there.30
From a conceptual perspective, in order to make a case for geographic mobility, it is sufficient 
that a supra-national social planner could compensate the losses of the one region with the 
income gains of the other. Because free mobility of labour will tend to draw people to where 
they can be happier (e.g. earn more), it is likely that such compensation is at least theoreti-
cally possible. As it is practically difficult to implement such compensation, the distributive 
consequences of geographic policy cannot be ignored. 
In this context, it is important to note that geographic mobility may also yield a range of posi-
tive economic externalities in the emigration region. 
Geographic Mobility and Public Finances 
 
An economic externality associated with cross border geographic mobility is growth effects through mi-
grants’ contribution to public finances. A positive (negative) contribution in effects leads to a lower 
(higher) tax rate compared with the situation of no mobility. If taxation distorts economic decision mak-
ing, this goes along with efficiency gains (losses). 
The literature distinguishes three different fiscal contributions of migrants: (i) the current fiscal contribu-
tion, as the age distribution and labour market attachments of immigrants and residents generally differs, 
(ii) the lifetime contribution, considering the individual aging process, and (iii) the share in the burden due 
to a long-term adjustment of tax rates required in order to maintain sustainable finances in a changing 
demographic environment. 
Whether fiscal externalities are positive or negative is an empirical question. The answer depends on cir-
cumstances specific to the country: positive externalities tend to rise with (i) with education level and 
labour market integration of immigrants; (ii) the more severe the demographic aging problem; (iii) the 
more fiscal policy leans to redistribution from younger to older generations, for example through pay-as-
you-go pension schemes, and (iv) the less social transfers are related to earnings. 
Fiscal externalities from geographic mobility arising in the destination country of immigrants must be 
weighed against the simultaneous externalities arising in the source country. The balance is a priori in-
definite. On the one hand, when immigrants move from a poorer country to a richer one, the overall fiscal 
net gain tends to be positive. That is, combined tax revenue in the two countries will tend to increase more 
than total transfer payments. This implies that there is scope for the receiving country to compensate the 
sending country. On the other hand, if geographic mobility occurs from a country with little income redis-
tribution to a country with high income redistribution the total fiscal net gain tends to be negative. 
                                                 
30 See, for example, IMF (2005) and Kaba (2004). 
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First, migrants often remit part of their income to their family in the home region. There is 
empirical evidence, surveyed by the World Bank (2006), that remittances are a substantial 
source of income in the sending country, and that there is a direct link between remittances 
and factors driving economic growth, such as investment in education and start up of capital-
intensive businesses. The positive impact of remittances probably increases with the income 
differential between destination and origin areas. Thus, remittances are less important in the 
context of intra-EU-15 mobility, yet may play a positive role in the economic development of 
the New Member States. 
Second, an important dimension of geographic mobility, especially in the intra-EU context, is 
brain and youth circulation. Many younger migrants do not move permanently but temporar-
ily (e.g. to study). After returning home, they bring along extra skills including language and 
cultural skills, which allow them to handle more internationally-oriented jobs.31 Secondly, 
they frequently bring home a migrant partner, also well educated. Thirdly, positive spin-offs 
through remittances, as explained before, may result in better child schooling. Thus brain and 
youth circulation may result in a threefold brain gain in the long run.32
Third, migrants who choose not to return home may serve as middlemen linking businesses in 
the destination and origin.33 Navigating between both regions, they often function as major 
catalysts for expanding knowledge, businesses and venture initiatives, and as a consequence 
enhancing the cross-border knowledge transaction and trade in general and possibly increas-
ing FDI in the origin country.34
In summary, geographic mobility may indeed be a win-win situation in economic terms for 
the sending and receiving country. Positive externalities mainly stem from positive growth 
effects associated with free movement of human capital reducing labour market imbalances, 
improved skill matches in an integrated market, higher investment into education, and a 
higher level of innovation and entrepreneurship. Negative externalities are primarily pecuni-
ary or fiscal, and these negative effects in the destination country are at least partially off-set 
by corresponding positive effects in the sending region. The efficiency gains, however, are an 
unambiguous gain for Europe. 
Still, the issue of redistributing (parts of) the economic gains from the receiving to the sending 
region may arise, especially if the context of brain drain (i.e. not brain circulation). Permanent 
out-migration of highly productive and well educated persons may hamper long-term income 
growth in the origin. The danger of a brain drain appears especially relevant in situations of 
                                                 
31 There is some evidence that experiences of homecoming students get wasted due to recognition failure. This 
would constitute a target for rethinking existing systems of skill recognition. 
32 See Dabelsteen (2007); Wiers-Jenssen (2007); World Bank (2006) 
33 See Saxenian (2002) 
34 See Teferra (2004); Kaba (2004); Sekretariatet for ministerudvalget for Danmark i den globale økonomi 
(2005) 
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large income differentials between destination and origin. In the EU context, brain drain may 
affect some of the Eastern European new Member States. 
3.2.3 Demographic Factors 
A second rationale for increased geographic mobility frequently mentioned is the demo-
graphic development in Europe. Two demographic trends are especially salient: population 
decline and population ageing. Over the longer term, replacement migration of young people 
could be seen as a way to counteract the negative consequences of these trends. 
Figure 15: Population Share Aged 20-64 – Projection 2005/2020 
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Source: Eurostat, EuroPOP2004 (No migration variant), own calculations. 
 
Since all the EU-27 countries have fertility rates well below the replacement fertility rate, the 
scope of intra-EU migration in cushioning demographic ageing appears limited. Still, one may 
argue that intra-EU migration could serve as an equilibrating factor in face of diverging rates 
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of population decline and ageing. A closer look at Eurostat population forecasts reveals that 
the demographic prospects within EU-27 are not entirely uniform.35 Figure 15 shows a com-
parison of the population share aged 20-64 (as an approximation of the labour force) in 2020, 
and the development of the share between 2005 and 2020 for EU-27.  
Figure 16: Old-Age Dependency Ratios – Projection 2005/2020 
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Source: Eurostat, EuroPOP2004 (No migration variant), own calculations. 
 
While imbalances in the level of the labour force share among Member States might not be 
large in 2020, the direction and magnitude of the development in Member States varies con-
siderably. Demand for replacement migration may increase especially in EU-15. At least in 
                                                 
35 In this section we analyse the Eurostat EuroPOP2004 population projection for the year 2020. In particular, we 
use the ‘zero-migration’ variant scenario, in which the projection is calculated under the assumption that no 
(equilibrating) migration takes place between Member States. 
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some new Member States, the development is more favourable, with even a growing working 
age population share. 
Larger imbalances are observed when comparing projected old-age dependency ratios in 2020 
(Figure 16), the ratio between the population aged 65+ and the population aged 20-64. While 
the dependency ratio will increase in all Member States, the magnitude of the increase varies 
considerably. Additionally, the resulting level of the dependency ratio in 2020 varies much 
more among Member States than the level of the population share aged 20-64. 
At the same time as demographic development might lead to large imbalances across Euro-
pean Union Member States in 2020, the potential supply for equilibrating labour mobility will 
decrease, as the share of young, mobile workers in the total population will decrease through 
2020. In a scenario without external migration into the European Union, the share of the 
population aged 20-29 on the total population will decrease from 13.3 to 11.1 percentage 
points, a decrease of almost 20 percent. Figure 17 shows that the share in European regions 
will mostly decrease and converge. Thus within-EU mobility probably can only play a modest 
role in reducing demographic imbalances across Europe.  
 
Figure 17: Population Share Aged 20-29 – Projection 2005/2020 
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The share of the strongly mobile population aged 20-29 from East Europe will decrease the 
most. The development reflects current fertility patterns: birth rates are lowest in the former 
Eastern European countries and the Southern European countries and highest in the Northern 
European countries. In effect, if the high economic growth of the Northern European coun-
tries continues to exert high demand on labour, and thus attracts migrant workers from the 
South and East of Europe, the positive effects of the replacement migration into these coun-
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tries might easily be out weighed by the accelerated population decline in the countries that at 
the present time have a labour surplus. 
This trend appears already to be a reality in many of the Eastern European countries. If East 
Europeans realised their strong intentions to move abroad (compare section 2.5), geographic 
mobility would enhance the demographic problems caused by trends in fertility and mortality 
parameters. However, even if rates of outward migration from the high mobility new Member 
States remain relatively high, there is no need to dramatize the demographic impact. It is gen-
erally true that realistic levels of cross-country mobility cannot substantially change the age 
structure in a population, since flows are relatively small in relation to stocks. The main im-
pact then is on population size, and population decline does not necessarily imply welfare 
losses in per capita terms. 
Notwithstanding the need not to dramatise labour outflow from the new EU Member States, 
to counter the demographic problems in the high mobility new Member States, an intensified 
focus on how to integrate older people into the labour market as, reflected in the Lisbon and 
Stockholm employment targets, can be helpful. Hence, this kind of integration appears to be 
relatively unsatisfactory in the new Member States due in part to various myths regarding 
older workers. At first, this requires a deeper awareness among employers about the need to 
apply existing models or develop new practices of age management in order to extend work-
ing lives and postpone people’s exit from the labour market. Secondly, to support the aware-
ness and integration, more research on the situation and requirements of older people in the 
labour market is necessary.36
Indirect demographic consequences of increased mobility could arise if it fosters postponing 
family formation. Moving is associated with economic and social instability for the individ-
ual, and hence may reduce the propensity of marriage. Whether later family formation or 
moving have lasting negative effects on fertility, and thereby constitutes a negative demo-
graphic externality, depends on whether these factors result in either childlessness or a lower 
family size. Some evidence indicates that young and “globalised” Europeans do intend to 
have smaller, not just later, families (Hantrais et. al., 2006). 
3.2.4 Social Factors 
Besides economic and demographic aspects, a number of social aspects are strongly con-
nected to mobility. At the macro level, it is related to European integration; at the meso-level, 
it is related to network effects. 
A frequent argument for the case of increased inter-EU mobility is that it will bring about 
stronger integration of Europe. The European integration process is premised on the free 
movement of capitals, goods, services and persons. Since the Treaty of Rome of 1957, a higher 
mobility of individuals among Member States has been seen as the catalyst of this process. As a 
                                                 
36 See OECD (2007b) and Mandl et. al (2006). 
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by–product of migration and everyday interactions, it is supposed that a more mixed European 
society will emerge, wiping out the image of fellow Europeans as ‘foreigners’.37
If mobility fosters socio-cultural integration EU internal movers should feel more “European” 
than non-movers. Ethnographic studies based on slices of the moving population have found 
high levels of Europeanisation and Euro-enthusiasm among them.38 However, studies are 
typically limited either in geographical scope or in occupational variation, dealing for exam-
ple with large companies and international organisations, Erasmus students, cross–border 
commuters, and ethnic businessmen. 
Some indirect evidence on the correlation between intra-EU migration and European integra-
tion comes from the 2005 Eurobarometer data, which has the advantage of being representa-
tive. Table 10 shows the marginal effects obtained from of a regression explaining the pro-
pensity of individuals thinking that moving across regions and countries within the European 
Union is “a good thing for European integration” on a full set of individual characteristics 
including indicators of past migration experience. 
 
Table 10: Factors Impacting Positive EU Integration Attitudes 
Marginal Effect
Age -0.001
Female* -0.015
Married* -0.041
Low education* -0.181
Iintermediate education* -0.099
Lives in city* 0.023
Has moved in EU* 0.053
Has moved outside EU* 0.072
Has studied in another EU country* 0.027  
Notes: Results from probit regression including full set of country, sector and occupation dummies. Sample 
weights applied. Variables statistically significant at least at the ten percent level highlighted in blue. 
* attached to a variable name indicates an indicator variable. For these variables the estimated coefficient 
represents the percentage point change in the outcome for the discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1. 
in Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
The results indicate that besides socio-demographic characteristics, notably education, own 
experiences with moving abroad substantially affect the view on geographic mobility as a 
factor fostering European Integration. In fact, individuals who moved at least once in their 
                                                 
37 Thus, for example, the ‘Action Plan for Mobility’ states that ‘the mobility of citizens […] encourages the shar-
ing of cultures and promotes the concept of European citizenship as well as that of a political Europe’. See the 
resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council of 14 December 2000 concerning an action plan for mobility’, Official Journal C 371, 
23/12/2000.
38 See Tarrius (1992), King and Ruiz–Gelices (2003). 
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lifetime within the EU are 5.3 percent more likely to answer that mobility is good for integra-
tion, than comparable individuals without such a move. If movers have indeed become more 
internationalised, this experience may shape their answers to this question.39 The data also 
show that any cross-border move, whether within-EU or outside EU, has this positive effect. 
Having taken part in education in another EU country has no additional effect over and above 
the effect of moving. 
A range of potential positive or negative externalities of geographic mobility are related to 
networks. According to Massey (1993), migration networks are sets of interpersonal ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas. They 
work through kinship, friendship and shared community origin. Positive social externalities of 
migration networks exist if the utility of newly arrived immigrants and previous immigrants 
grows in response to an increase in the number of newcomers. One example of positive com-
munity network effects is access to and supply of ethnic capital. Chiswick (2006) estimates 
the value of this factor by estimating the compensating wage differentials arising when mem-
bers of an ethnic group move from communities with a stronger ethnic network to communi-
ties with a weaker ethnic network. The results point to a positive value of the ethnic network. 
Carrington et al. (1996) distinguish two types of network effects: (i) community effects which 
increase the utility of a community, and (ii) family effects, which only increase the utility of 
friends and relatives. Pedersen et al. (2004) analysing gross migration flows in 27 OECD 
countries provide empirical evidence that both effects indeed exist. The first effect is the more 
relevant from a social planner’s perspective. Individuals deciding about whether to migrate or 
not would probably take into account the possible outcomes on friends and relatives. Thus the 
individual mobility optimum incorporates family effects. 
There may also be negative externalities stemming from a higher concentration of non-
nationals, notably due to reduced social cohesion of migrants and natives. According to Rec-
chi and Nebe (2003), conflict between natives and newcomers is quite common. Among im-
migrants, the retention of ethnic culture and traditions in the face of the dominant culture’s 
habits and values allows them to reassert communal bonds, sustain their own status and main-
tain their identity. Among natives, the presence of aliens stirs once latent ethnic pride. Immi-
grants can thus be stigmatised as a threat to national homogeneity and integrity. Some indige-
nous populations exhibit xenophobia. Right-wing movements may gain in strength capitalis-
ing on and encouraging the ethnic suspicions. 
Prejudice rather than facts may drive the negative response of the majority population. Dust-
mann und Preston (2006) present empirical evidence based on European data about attitudes 
toward migrants suggesting that irrespective of the economic circumstances and potential la-
                                                 
39 The data do not allow ruling out reverse causality. Perhaps individuals move within the EU because, among 
other things, they think that this is good for European integration. 
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bour market effects of immigration, the majority population is more hostile towards immi-
grants if the share of immigrants in the population is larger.  
Geographic mobility could also affect social cohesion through its impact on family structures. 
Viewing families as groups related by kinship or close emotional attachments, the relationship 
to the family members staying behind the movers necessarily changes character: the close 
emotional attachments transform into more distant kinds of relationships. On the other hand, 
the migrants settling down in new areas have the possibility of creating new relationships and 
families, while maintaining some connection to the origin, thus widening social networks. 
Another negative externality could arise from tensions between those who are mobile and 
those who are not. Bauman (1998) argues that individuals’ different relations with space 
would represent an increasingly important aspect of social stratification. This stratification is 
likely to enhance the ‘parochial–cosmopolitan’ divide by increasing divergences of interests, 
lifestyles and orientations among Europeanised and non–Europeanised EU citizens within 
Europe. 
Social externalities of geographic mobility also have a spatial dimension.40 As immigrants 
tend to cluster in certain regions, especially the cities, geographic mobility is frequently re-
garded as an urban issue. The rise of minority groups is believed by some to endanger cohe-
sion, and to challenge economic and social stability.41 Reactions like xenophobia or social 
disintegration naturally threaten the process of urban development, a process that potentially 
can lead to a weakening of the urban system and to the sustainability of a multi-cultural 
Europe. Thus it is in the cities – and usually a small number of major cities – that the integra-
tion work of individuals, social groups and institutions needs to be undertaken. 
Such doomsday scenarios are improbable since, historically, the dynamics of urban growth 
and development are closely associated with the dynamics of migration into cities. These ar-
eas serve as growth engines through the concentration of new labour resources, and through 
the benefits of increased cultural diversity. Some thinkers, such as Gasper (2003) see the de-
velopment of the European urban system unfolding through migration, especially in the 
dominant cities. They see this system as the fundamental building block of the European edi-
fice and the primary source of the concept of “the European.” 
3.2.5 Conclusions 
While the theoretical prediction that the optimal level of geographic mobility occurs when net 
social benefits are maximised is quite precise, the task of identifying this level is practically 
impossible. Nevertheless, in this concluding section, we attempt to weigh the potential posi-
tive externalities against the potential negative externalities of mobility, and thereby evaluate 
the net benefit to society of increased mobility. 
                                                 
40 See for instance Ray (2003). 
41 See World Bank (2007) 
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Geographic mobility carries in it a major positive effect of bringing about economic growth in 
countries with labour deficits and prosperity in countries with labour surpluses. Thus, the flow 
of workers (like the flow of capital, goods and services) is beneficial for both the receiving 
and the sending country. 
In a world with market imperfections, one can not rule out that mobility away from countries 
with a present excess of labour supply could have a depress productivity growth, and thereby 
trap countries in a downward economic spiral (brain drain). From the perspective of a supra-
national social planner, the key question then is whether the positive growth effect in the win-
ning country is sufficiently large as to allow compensation – in theory, at least – of the nega-
tive spill-over. 
A more mobile labour force and expanded labour market have the potential of sustaining eco-
nomic growth by promoting human capital’s access to physical capital. As the labour market 
functions through search and matching, openness to geographic mobility will improve skill 
matches in the European labour market. Employers can choose from a larger pool of appli-
cants, and workers can screen a larger number of job offers. If it is possible to fill vacancies at 
a higher rate, or if the average quality of job matches improves, employers may in fact post 
more jobs, thereby reducing frictional unemployment. 
The positive effects of the broader labour market are dampened somewhat y increasing search 
costs, but the net effect will be positive since firms and workers still have the option of con-
ducting more local searches. Lack of recognition of formal credentials and informal skills 
acquired in foreign countries may prevent the labour market from reaching optimal matching 
efficiency. 
Geographic mobility has the potential to stimulate entrepreneurship and thereby increase pro-
ductivity, in both the sending and receiving countries. These effects stem partly from the short 
term educational based mobility (brain circulation), and partly from the potential of bringing 
about new Europe-wide interpersonal ties, thereby creating networks which sustain entrepre-
neurship. Another benefit for the receiving country is additional income through remittances, 
which if used for investment, may further enhance economic growth. 
The direct growth effects of geographic mobility may be enhanced through better fiscal situa-
tions, yielding less deadweight loss associated with distortionary taxation and wasteful spend-
ing. 
In sum, from an economics perspective, we see positive effects of geographic mobility in the 
sense that a higher level raises combined income of the sending and receiving country due to 
efficiency gains. The distribution of these gains both within and across countries is an impor-
tant facto in the political feasibility of continued efforts to increase intra-European mobility. 
Changes create winners and losers, and losers will seek to prevent or reverse change. An om-
niscient social planner will be able to use the efficiency gains to compensate losers so that 
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changes benefit everyone. In our more limited capacities we must attempt to see the classes 
who are vulnerable (low skilled natives) and try to make sure that they are provided the re-
sources to come through the changes no worse off than before. 
The externalities stemming from demographic and social aspects of mobility are somewhat 
blurred. Regarding demographics, in the concrete context, there is limited scope for geo-
graphic mobility within-EU alleviating the impact of aging and population decline since al-
most all Europe faces similar problems. Compensating the low fertility rates by replacement 
migration would probably at best be a zero sum externality at the European level due to the 
rapid ageing process in all the European countries. Solutions to these problems lay more in 
the ken of immigration from without Europe and the rationalisation of retirement and other 
social benefits. 
Regarding the social consequences of geographic mobility, the empirical knowledge is still 
rather unsatisfactory. Nevertheless there is some evidence for increased mobility fostering 
socio-cultural integration in the European Union, and strengthening European identity and 
inter-cultural networks. Positive externalities from migration are related to gains from cultural 
and ethnical diversity, urban growth and development, depending on successful integration of 
newcomers. 
The downsides of socio-cultural integration are the decline of more local cultures and social 
frictions. At present several European metropolitan regions are experiencing tensions between 
ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. Whether these tensions prove to be similar to the 
transitional growing pains experienced by other attractive migration destinations in the past, is 
an issue that remains to be seen. Altogether, it seems as if there is a potential for positive ex-
ternalities of geographic mobility in the form of social-cultural integration, but to capitalise on 
this effect it is paramount that the challenges to the social cohesion be dealt with.  
Thus, it is not possible to give a definite answer at this point that the positive externalities of 
geographic mobility in general outweigh the negative externalities. However, as the economic 
effects are clearly positive, the demographic effects are nil and the social effects are mixed 
(with the negative effects primarily arising out of people’s basest instincts), it seems reason-
able to suspect – indeed, one might be quite confident – that increased intra-European mobil-
ity would increase the welfare of the vast majority of Europeans. As mobility within Europe is 
starting out at such low levels, our confidence in this suspicion is increased.  
In order to understand how mobility might be increased, we seek a detailed answer to the 
question of who is mobile in the following section. Understanding the driving forces of geo-
graphic mobility is relevant for designing geographic mobility policy suited to reap the bene-
fits of increased mobility. In analysing the factors impacting geographic mobility, we switch 
from the social planner’s perspective on geographic mobility to the individual perspective. 
We first look at the key drivers of mobility (section 3.3), and then turn to key barriers to mo-
bility (section 3.4). 
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3.3 Determinants of Mobility 
 
3.3.1 The Migration Choice 
An undisputed finding of the socioeconomic literature on migration is the existence of sys-
tematic differences between migrants and non-migrants. Migration literature specifies several 
factors that are likely to affect the decision to move. These can be classified as determinants at 
the individual and aggregate level. 
On a conceptual level, the simplest way to conceptualise the migration decision as an invest-
ment decision.42 Individuals compare the discounted value of expected utility in the origin to 
that in a possible destination. They decide to migrate if the expected utility of moving is 
higher than the expected utility of staying, net of migration costs. 
In formal terms, this interpretation of geographic mobility decisions means that an individual 
will migrate from region A to region B if: 
UiA (EiA, DiA, SiA, MA) < UiB (EiB, DiB, SiB, MB) - CiA→B (f, di, ci) 
where Ui  represents expected utility of individual i living in A or B. Utility depends on several 
aspects: socio-economic aspects (Ei) such as the labour market status or education; demographic 
aspects (Di) such as the household composition and ethnicity; social and cultural aspects (Si) 
such as social ties or language; and how these are valued in the two regions A and B.. 
A final factor is specific to countries, not persons: the macro-economic and societal aspects 
M, such as the general labour market and economic situation. 
C represents the costs to migration for individual i. These consist of monetary expenses or out 
of pocket costs f equal to all individuals, costs related to the distance of the move di, and psy-
cho-cultural costs ci. The latter two are specific to each individual and comprise psychological 
costs caused by separation from the origin. 
All things equal, the propensity to migrate increases with the expected utility level elsewhere 
and decreases with the expected utility level in the origin, and the level of migration costs. 
Individuals’ assessment of the benefits and costs of migration will depend on socio-
demographic characteristics, such as human capital endowment and transferability of skills to 
the destination, but also on personal preferences and expectations. Therefore, the human capi-
tal framework shows that migration between countries is not only a function of aggregate 
measures, such as differences in GDP per capita, unemployment rates or relative remunera-
tion of skills. On the contrary, heterogeneity between individuals is an important factor. Dif-
                                                 
42 Models of the migration decision and relevant empirical studies are reviewed in Stark (1991), Greenwood 
(1985), Massey (1993), Molho (1986), Shields/Shields (1989) and Bauer/Zimmermann (1998). Bauer and 
Zimmermann (2003) collect essential theoretical and empirical studies of the migration decision and immigration 
policy. 
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ferent individuals in the same sending country exhibit different propensities to migrate and, 
moreover, prefer different receiving countries depending on transferability of human capital 
and tastes. From the perspective of the receiving countries, this means that each country faces 
a specifically structured group of potential immigrants.  
The analytical framework presented above is expressed in terms of expected utility rather than 
expected income so that it takes account of more than just narrowly “economic” factors like 
income. This is desirable because survey evidence suggests that migrants have a variety of 
motivations for moving. This is illustrated by Table 11, which summarises the reasons for the 
last move and the factors that could encourage a future geographic move stated by respon-
dents in the 2007 Eurobarometer wave 67.1. 
Table 11: Factors Influencing Decision to Move 
EU15 NMS12 EU27
Job-Related 40.5 58.6 42.3
Education-Related 14.7 12.2 14.5
Family-Related 32.2 16.6 30.6
Other 12.6 12.6 12.6
Work and Income 47.9 84.7 58.7
Social Network 52.8 37.3 48.3
Housing and Local Environment 71.2 57.0 67.1
Public Facilities 17.2 18.2 17.5
Reasons for Past Move
Factors Encouraging Future Move
 
Notes: Percentage of respondents mentioning a certain factor. Regarding the reasons of the last move, job-related rea-
sons comprise “found a new job”, “did not have a job but looked for a new one”, “were transferred by employer”; educa-
tion-related reasons comprise “went to study, train, or learn a new language abroad”; family related reasons comprise 
“accompanying partner or family”, “went to be with family already living in new country” and “change in relation-
ship/marital status.” Regarding factors encouraging future mobility, work and income related factors comprise “to have a 
higher household income”, “to have better working conditions”, “to have shorter commuting time”; social network related 
factors comprise “to be closer to family and friends”, “to meet new people” and “receive better support from family and 
friends”; environment related factors comprise “better local environment and amenities”, “better housing conditions”, 
“discover a new environment” and “better weather”; public facilities related factors comprise “better health care”, “ac-
cess to better schools”, “better public transport”. Respondents are allowed more than one answer. Source: Euro-
barometer 67.1, own calculations. 
 
Employment related factors play an important role.43 Nevertheless family and network related 
factors, but also housing and local environment conditions often seem to affect migration de-
cision. In contrast, education and public facilities related factors are mentioned rather little. 
An explanation for this result is that these factors matter strongly only for a limited part of the 
surveyed population, notably the younger age groups at the start of their working life. 
We note that work and income related motivations are especially strong in the New Member 
States. Almost 60 percent of past movers in the New Member States did change location be-
                                                 
43 See also Karppinen et al. (2006). 
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cause of job related reasons, whereas only about 40 percent of movers in the EU-15 mention 
this factor. More than four in five respondents in the New Member States claim that work and 
income related factors could encourage them to move in the future. This answer is given only 
by one in two EU-15 citizens. 
The next section focuses on the economic aspects of the geographic mobility decision. We 
discuss a number of push and pull factors and distinguish between macro economic and micro 
economic aspects of geographic mobility. In the discussion, we incorporate an empirical 
analysis of the key drivers of mobility in Europe, as identified in the special Eurobarometer 
2005 Survey. 
3.3.2 Macroeconomic Determinants  
This section deals with the macro economic (or nation level) factors entering into the individ-
ual migration decision. As the mobility decision rule sketched above involves a comparison of 
two monetary streams, the starting point is cross-country differences in levels of expected net 
income corrected for differences in purchasing power. As individuals account for income, not 
only wage earnings, i.e. the product of wage levels and employment or unemployment pro-
pensities, play a role, but also other determinants of income, notably public transfers and 
taxes.  
Empirical studies carried out by Pedersen et al (2004) tend to confirm that a gross income 
advantage of the receiving country over the sending country (measured by the GDP per capita 
differential) is a pull factor. In the same way, it has been demonstrated that higher unem-
ployment in destination countries has a dampening impact on migration rates. Further, a 
higher level of per capita growth in the destination country is likely to yield higher immigra-
tion rates because potential immigrants expect to experience better income opportunities. 
In contrast, it is generally difficult to establish an empirical link between the generosity of the 
welfare state in the destination country (measured for example by the share of transfer spend-
ing in GDP) and migration flows.44 Also the results of the Eurobarometer shown in Table 11 
do not support sentiments that migration is primarily motivated by access to welfare payments 
or better public services. The motivation to achieve a higher income and better working con-
ditions appear to matter much more.  
Unsurprisingly, economic push factors in the source countries closely mirror those derived 
from the analysis of pull factors. At the macro level, a higher income has a dampening effect 
on emigration rates. 
The effect of GDP per capita growth in the source country may be more mixed. Studies have 
found a “hump”-shaped relationship between source-country GDP and emigration, see Hatton 
and Williamson (2002). At very low levels of GDP, emigration is low because people are too 
                                                 
44 See Zavodny (1997) and Pedersen et al. (2004). 
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poor to pay the migration costs. At higher income levels, migration increases, and when GDP 
levels increase further, migration may again decrease because the economic incentives to mi-
grate to other countries decline. 
The correlation between the unemployment rate and emigration is more difficult to establish 
empirically. Higher unemployment is expected to push people to other regions, but this rela-
tionship is borne out neither for intra- no inter-national moves. In an international context, this 
result may reflect mobility barriers set up by destination countries. Low out-migration rates 
might also be causing high unemployment in origin areas. Finally, unemployed workers may 
not have the financial means to pay for the costs of moving to another destination. 
This last possibility suggests a more sophisticated economic interpretation of low mobility 
flows across countries: capital market imperfections, which are highlighted by Bertola et al. 
(2006). 
In a world in which financial markets are perfect and individuals can borrow without con-
straints, mobility is optimal whenever it increases the expected present value of labour income 
net of mobility costs. However, with capital market imperfections the incurred mobility costs 
translate directly into lower consumption. Hence, consumption will be lower when the worker 
decides to move. Because current consumption is more valued than future consumption, the 
worker will move less than with perfect capital markets. 
An illuminating approach to the mobility choice interprets the forward-looking decision to 
forsake current consumption in exchange for a higher expected future wages and consumption 
stream as akin to purchasing a risky asset. The wage gain that makes such an investment at-
tractive is an increasing function of the worker’s risk aversion. Intuitively, larger wage gains 
are required to trigger forward-looking mobility decisions by poor workers who finance mo-
bility out of current consumption rather than out of accumulated assets. 
The predictions derived from these arguments is that emigration rates from countries with less 
developed financial markets should be lower, and that immigration rates into countries with 
more developed financial markets should be higher. 
Above, we have explained that there is no clear positive empirical correlation between the 
generosity of welfare schemes and immigration rates. The discussion of “welfare magnet” 
effects, however, has a second dimension, namely whether generous welfare programmes 
affect the composition of migrants.  
The standard economic model to describe selection among (potential) international migrants 
is the Roy model adapted by Borjas (1987, 1991, 1994). This model may explain positive as 
well as negative self-selection of immigrants with regard to observable and/or non-observable 
characteristics. The specific outcome depends on the return to these characteristics in the re-
ceiving country relative to that in the sending country. In particular, if observable skills ob-
IZA, NIRAS Consultants, AMS 73 
IZA Research Report No. 19  
Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Social and Economic Benefits  
tained at home are more highly rewarded in the destination country than in the country of ori-
gin (which implies that human capital must be transferable between countries) the Roy model 
predicts that potential immigrants will be positively self-selected in the sense that their aver-
age skill level will be higher than the average skill level in the population of the sending 
country. Likewise, potential immigrants will be negatively self-selected if observable skills in 
the destination country pay relatively less than in the sending country. 
The same line of reasoning also applies to selection on the basis of unobservable characteris-
tics, like commitment to work or willingness to take risks. Provided that these characteristics 
receive a relatively higher remuneration in the destination country, they will be more preva-
lent in the pool of potential immigrants than in the population of the sending country as a 
whole. A common indicator for the returns to unobservable characteristics in the labour mar-
ket is the variance of earnings. If the income distribution is more dispersed, this may be inter-
preted as unobservable characteristics obtaining a higher reward. As a consequence, if the 
earnings distribution is wider in the receiving country than in the sending country, the pool of 
potential immigrants will be positively self-selected. In particular, the receiving country will 
attract individuals who are more risk-loving or motivated than the average agent in their home 
country. In contrast, if the receiving country exhibits a relatively egalitarian earnings distribu-
tion, for example due to a redistributive tax and transfer system reflecting social preferences, 
potential immigrants will be negatively self-selected. The receiving country will attract rela-
tively risk-averse or unmotivated individuals, since in case of poor economic performance it 
offers enhanced income security compared to the country of origin. 
As the generosity of welfare schemes, the degree of redistribution through public policies, and 
pre-tax income inequality vary across the Member States, self-selection issues may indeed be 
an issue considering within-EU geographic mobility. The empirical evidence for self-
selection at work in the composition of migrants is somewhat mixed, however. Estimation 
results obtained by Borjas (1999) indicate that selection mechanisms may be relevant for lo-
cation choice of immigrants to the United States. In the European context, Boeri et al. (2002) 
examine, whether the welfare dependency is larger in countries with more generous benefit 
systems. Their findings are consistent with the view that welfare benefits distort the composi-
tion of immigrants, both in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics. They argue 
that although the effects are quantitatively moderate, some of the most generous countries 
seem to act as welfare magnets.45
However, the selection argument has been criticised. On theoretical grounds, Chiswick (2000) 
argues that migration costs constitute huge barriers to migration especially for low-skilled 
people from poor countries characterised by an unequal income distribution. Therefore, there 
could very well be a positive selection from countries with an unequal income distribution. In 
favour of this argument, Urrutia (2001) observes that the relative costs of migration present 
                                                 
45 See also to Hatton and Williamson (2002) for studies on the UK and Fertig and Schmidt (2001) for studies on 
Germany. 
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the main explanation of migration patterns. Countries with relatively low fixed costs, e.g. due 
to geographical distance, are more likely to send immigrants from the bottom of the distribu-
tion of abilities – and vice versa. 
At the macro level, in addition to economic factors, social and cultural factors could deter-
mine individual migration choices. In particular, social networks of migrants (ie. the total or 
relative number of individuals from one’s own ethnic group in the country of destination) 
create a strong pull for potential migrants. “Network effects” could consist of a number of 
possible mechanisms: as proxies for family reunification, or as indicators of faster access to 
the labour market in the new country. 
The presence of network effects in international migration flows has been empirically docu-
mented in many studies. They seem to be somewhat stronger for immigrants stemming from 
low-income groups compared to immigrants from high-income groups.46
Another pull factor for potential immigrants is cultural similarities between the sending and 
the receiving country. Linguistic distance and past colonial ties to the destination country are 
consistently found to have a positive impact on migration flows. These factors help provide 
better information and knowledge of a potential destination country and thus lower migration 
costs.47 Similarly, trade patterns between countries may help establish links facilitating ex-
change of information and create business links that reduce the mobility costs and therefore 
raise migration flows. Note however, that in principle exchange of goods is an economic 
equilibrating factor and thus rivals exchange of workers as an equilibrating factor. Neverthe-
less empirical studies at the macro level, like Pedersen et al (2004), confirm the positive cor-
relation between trade volume and migration flows. 
Finally, in international empirical migration studies, the extent of political pressure in the 
source country also often turns out as a relevant push factor to influence mobility rates. In the 
within-EU context, however, we can obviously rule out that this is a relevant factor in ex-
plaining geographic mobility patterns. 
3.3.3 Microeconomic Determinants 
Individual and household characteristics are by far the most important determinant of mobil-
ity. This is documented by a vast empirical literature. In the following we will discuss the 
most relevant individual or household characteristics established in the literature by referring 
to our own econometric regression based on Eurobarometer data. We explain the propensity 
of the reported expectation of moving within the same village/city or region, i.e. local mobil-
ity, of moving outside the own region but in the same country, and of moving to another 
country within or outside the European Union, i.e. international mobility. 
                                                 
46 See again Pedersen et al. (2004), Zavodny (1997) and Hatton and Williamson (2002) 
47 See Antecol (2000) for a further discussion on the effect of “cultural” characteristics. 
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Clearly, the intention to move is not a perfect predictor of actual mobility, especially where 
long-distance moves are concerned, but Böheim and Taylor (2002) and Gordon and Molho 
(1995) show that the intentions to move have a strong predictive value for future behaviour. 
Many migration studies48 make use of mobility intention measures. Using migration intention 
data has several advantages. Firstly, migration models often deal with migration incentives, not 
migration itself. Secondly, intentions are observed for those who do move and those who do 
not, which limits self-selection effects. Thirdly, migration intentions, and the factors influencing 
these intentions, are highly and directly relevant from a policy perspective. 
The estimated marginal impacts of the most relevant explanatory individual and household 
characteristics are summarised in Table 12. They results are generally in line with the theoreti-
cal expectations and confirm previous empirical findings in the literature. Note that the analysis 
does not make strong claims on causality. In other words, some “impacting factors” may indeed 
be endogenous to individuals’ propensity of expecting future geographic mobility.49
Age is an obvious factor to explain geographic mobility patterns. The theoretical expectation 
to be drawn from the above investment model of migration is an inverse relationship between 
age and mobility rates. This is because older movers have a shorter time horizon to reap the 
economic returns to mobility. Our empirical estimates are in line with this expected relation-
ship. Propensities of expected mobility decline in age for all three types of migration and the 
negative marginal impact of age is statistically significant at conventional levels.50  
 
                                                 
48 For recent examples see Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) and Burda et al (1998). 
49 A more structural approach would incorporate the income change due to migration. This would be useful to 
separate the factors impacting on geographic mobility through expected returns and from the factors working 
through changes in the cost of mobility. However, as we deal with moving intentions, the net gains from immi-
gration are not observed in our data. 
50 To obtain a better fit, the regression includes a polynomial in age. The age parameters are jointly significant in 
all three cases. 
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Table 12: Factors Impacting Moving Intentions 
Local Mobility In-country Mobility International Mobility
age -0.004 -0.009 0.002
age squared/100 -0.008 0.017 -0.005
age cubic/10000 0.010 -0.011 0.003
female* 0.009 -0.008 -0.007
married* -0.054 -0.017 -0.013
number of children younger 10 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010
number of children age 10-14 -0.027 -0.010 -0.008
number of household members older 14 0.010 0.000 0.000
in education* -0.038 0.080 0.035
low skilled* -0.030 -0.017 0.002
intermediate skills* -0.017 -0.001 -0.001
retired* 0.015 -0.010 0.000
unemployed* 0.040 0.017 0.014
permanent work contract* -0.005 -0.008 -0.009
commuting distance 0.011 0.016 0.003
home owner - no mortgage* -0.089 -0.018 0.000
home owner - mortgage* -0.097 -0.026 0.004
resident of city* 0.022 -0.018 0.011
age left home -0.001 0.000 0.000
number of past moves 0.019 0.009 0.001
distance of past moves -0.021 0.012 0.008
migration background* 0.002 -0.011 0.010
part of education abroad* 0.054 0.007 0.017
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Results from probit regressions. Sample weights applied. Variables statistically significant at least at the ten percent level highlighted 
in blue. * attached to a variable name indicates an indicator variable. For these variables the estimated coefficient represents the percentage 
point change in the outcome for the discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1. in Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
If younger cohorts are more mobile than older cohorts were at their age, we will also observe 
an inverse relation between age and mobility rates– even if the younger cohorts continue to 
remain more mobile in the future. Taking a closer look at completed mobility data (see sec-
tion 2.5), we observe that the 25-34-year olds have already made as many moves in their rela-
tively short lives as older cohorts have in their comparatively long ones. This indicates that 
there may be a general, EU-wide increase in mobility taking place. However, the life cycle 
interpretation that economically induced mobility mostly occurs earlier in life still pertains. 
Though starting at a higher level, mobility rates are expected to decrease over the life course 
of the current younger cohorts even if they will not fall to the level observed for current older 
generations. Since the age distribution in Europe is becoming more elderly, the age factor 
implies that the average mobility rate in Europe could decline even though the younger co-
horts are more mobile than their predecessors. 
Gender effects also help explain mobility. Women have a 0.8 percentage point smaller pro-
pensity to move within their country, and a 0.7 percentage point smaller propensity to move 
internationally, than otherwise comparable men. This could be because expected income 
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gains from geographic mobility may be smaller for women than for men. As women in most 
European countries are less attached to the labour force than men, this interpretation seems 
plausible. This implies that the trend of rising labour force participation of women in Europe 
may bring about a higher average rate of geographic mobility. 
Turning to household structure, we see that being married decreases the propensity to migrate. 
Married individuals are between 1.3 and 5.4 percentage points less likely to report a moving 
intention than observationally identical, unmarried individuals. This is probably the case be-
cause couples face higher moving costs. Either the moving partner has to set up a second 
household, or, if the entire household moves, there is a necessity to obtain a suitable job for 
the partner. There is a risk of the second earner experiencing an income loss, which just an-
other form of moving cost. 
Moving costs are also the key factor in explaining why the presence of children in the house-
hold lowers the propensity to migrate. Physical moving costs tend to be larger when size of 
the household is larger. More importantly, however, the social costs of moving increase, as 
child care relies on functioning special networks, which are different from the occupational 
networks perhaps relevant in determining the income gain from migration. Furthermore there 
are adaptation costs, for example, due to exposure to a different schooling system.  
Regarding the impact of education on mobility, in theory, we expect a positive correlation for 
two reasons: education may raise gross returns to mobility; and it may reduce the costs to mo-
bility. The first effect is rather obvious: education has an effect on earnings. Suppose workers 
receive job offers in a wage distribution where workers with a higher level of education have 
access to proportionally better paid jobs than uneducated workers. Some of these job offers 
imply a geographical move. If mobility costs are independent of education, educated workers 
will therefore be more likely to move. 
The second mechanism is usually disregarded, but it is perhaps equally important. Higher 
education is associated with general skills, adaptability of individuals and, in the case of 
higher education, some experience of studying in another city or region. Many studies report 
that, conditional on many observable characteristics, the migration probability increases with 
previous mobility experience (e.g., Axelsson and Westerlund, 1998). Individuals with higher 
education are more likely to have studied elsewhere, they were confronted with classmates 
from other sub-regions or areas, raising the ability to exchange and communicate. Overall, 
higher education may reduce psychological costs to mobility. 
Our regression results appear somewhat in contrast to these predictions, and to the standard 
empirical finding that the better educated have higher mobility rates. In fact, this empirical 
association is also present in our data. It does not show up strongly in the estimated parame-
ters because we include a full set of sector and occupation dummies for those individuals in 
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employment, which wipes away most of the variation associated with education.51 Still, even 
after controlling for occupation and sector, the least-educated are significantly less likely, 
between 1.7 and 3.0 percentage points, to move within-country than the reference group of 
high-skilled individuals. 
Turning to employment status and job characteristics, our regression results are somewhat 
mixed, but altogether in line with the expectations. First, we confirm the theoretical expecta-
tion (and empirical regularity) that unemployment of an individual raises the willingness to 
move. This is clear given that the expected earnings gains from mobility should be systemati-
cally larger for the unemployed. The effect appears stronger for local mobility (4 percentage 
points) than for longer-distance mobility (1.5 percentage points). 
We can also conclude that individuals in more stable employment relationships tend to move 
less. Individuals working on a permanent contract less frequently report intentions to move 
than individuals without such a contract (individuals in fixed-term work relationships).52 This 
result is fairly intuitive since people with strong preferences against moving will seek out 
such long-term contracts, and the uncertainty associated with searching for a new position in a 
new location will be especially unattractive for those workers who already have secure em-
ployment. Current commuting costs appear to have a positive impact on the propensity to 
move. This is probably because individuals with long commutes seek to move to reduce the 
costs of commuting. 
The correlation of home ownership status and geographic mobility works through moving 
costs. To move, homeowners need to sell their home in the current location and acquire a new 
one in the new location. This involves transaction, search, and psychological costs as well as 
uncertainty. Furthermore, systematic housing price differentials may play an important role. 
Housing prices in regions offering good employment and income opportunities tend to be 
higher than housing prices in regions with weaker economies. In our reduced form approach, 
these aspects are difficult to capture. Furthermore the established correlations are likely to be 
affected by reverse causality. Individuals who know that they are mobile will not buy homes 
because they are aware of the costs that will arise when they are moving. This effect probably 
explains why we do not find any correlation between home ownership and international mo-
bility rates. Regarding within-country mobility, the effect is negative and significant, as ex-
pected. The negative association between home ownership rates and the propensity to migrate 
appears particularly strong for shorter-distance moves. Home owners are almost ten percent-
age points less likely to move than renters. 
Finally, we study the association between previous mobility experience and mobility inten-
tions. In the human capital framework, mobility experience may positively affect relative re-
                                                 
51 In regressions not controlling for occupation and sector, the positive association between skill level and mobil-
ity is always present and statistically significant. 
52 The type of contract effect wipes out most of the variation associated with job tenure. Thus this variable has 
been excluded from the specification. 
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turns to moving. Having learned how to integrate into a new environment may speed up the 
integration process after future moves, helping to become fully productive in shorter time. 
Previously mobile persons also may have acquired skills (notably language) or networks di-
rectly relevant for production. Besides, past mobility experience is likely to reduce the psy-
chological costs of mobility. Finally, as there is a lot of circular migration in Europe, having 
moved away from home may increase the chances someone is considering an international 
move back to their origin.  
In line with previous empirical results (Vandenbrande et al. 2006), we obtain evidence that 
past mobility experiences indeed have an overall positive impact on geographic mobility. We 
can look at different dimensions of past mobility, and all seem to play a role. (i) Individuals 
who have already made a larger number of moves during their lifetime are significantly more 
likely to expect to move again, at least within their country. (ii) Individuals who have moved 
over longer distances in the past are more likely to plan a longer distance move in the future. 
(iii) Individuals who have a migration background (were born abroad or have at least one par-
ent born abroad) are more likely to have an international moving intention. (iv) Individuals 
who have taken part of their education abroad show stronger propensities to migrate. 
This section has considered a wide range of macro and micro factors that are relevant to ex-
plain why individuals might decide to move from one region to another. In the following sec-
tion, we reverse the question and will ask, which factors can explain why mobility in Europe 
is so low. Thus, we will focus on the hurdles to geographic mobility. 
3.4 Key Mobility Hurdles 
While individuals deciding to migrate will seek to maximise their own well-being, the returns 
and costs on which their decision is based do not only reflect personal benefits and costs, but 
also institutional hurdles. That is, legal and administrative barriers can decrease the individual 
benefits and increase the individual costs of migrating. 
According to the High Level Task Force (2001), these hurdles include administrative delay and 
variation in the level of payments of social security benefits, incomplete transferability of (sup-
plementary) pensions, legal and administrative problems through the interaction between the 
taxation systems of the Member States, wide variation in health care systems between countries, 
and limited cooperation between education systems and recognition of qualifications. 
The purpose of this section is to study the role of such hurdles relative to other barriers to mo-
bility at the individual level. To the extent that frictions of this nature are empirically relevant, 
there is scope for European harmonisation measures fostering geographic mobility, although 
such interventions would not directly be in the realm of geographic mobility policies. 
To tackle the issue, we provide empirical evidence about the potential weight of such frictions 
compared to individual-based factors impeding migration. We rely on perceived migration 
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hurdles in the context of international migration, as reported in the Eurobarometer 2005 on 
geographic mobility. The survey asks about the most important difficulties that respondents 
believe they would face in case of moving to another European Union country. 
In the following, we argue that the perceived hurdles are at least a monotonic function of ac-
tual hurdles. In any case, according to the theory of reasoned action by Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975), beliefs about the consequences of moving should directly impact the intentions to 
move. We can thus learn from the correlation between the propensity to migrate and the re-
ported hurdles which factors importantly impede migration. The individual propensity to mi-
grate is approximated by the reported intention to move to another country in the European 
Union within the next five years. 
For the analysis, we consider eight different types of hurdles: Lack of language skills (lan-
guage), finding a job for oneself or for the partner (job), access to child care, education, health 
care or other social benefits (access to facilities), problems of having educational and profes-
sional skills recognised, problems of transferring pension rights, problems of finding suitable 
housing, problems of obtaining a residence or work permit, and problems of adapting to a 
different culture. 
 
Table 13: Perceived Difficulties Impacting on Expected Future Mobility 
Marginal Effect
Language -0.012
Job -0.009
Access to Facilities 0.001
Recognition of Qualification -0.004
Transferability of Pension Benefits -0.001
Finding Suitable Housing 0.001
Residence/Work Permit 0.003
Cultural Adaptation -0.008  
Results from probit regression including controls for age, gender, family status, education level, migration 
background and mobility history, as well as a full set of country, sector and occupation dummies. Sample 
weights applied. Variables statistically significant at least at the ten percent full set of country, sector and 
occupation dummies. Sample weights applied. Variables statistically significant at least at the ten percent 
level highlighted in blue. * attached to a variable name indicates an indicator variable. For these variables 
the estimated coefficient represents the percentage point change in the outcome for the discrete change in 
the variable from 0 to 1. in Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Table 13 shows the estimated partial correlation between reported moving hurdles and the 
propensities to migrate conditional on a full set of personal characteristics and a full set of 
country, sector and occupation dummies. The result indicates that only three of the potential 
hurdles have significant independent power in explaining expected future mobility: language, 
culture and job hurdles. The impact of the remaining factors is statistically not different from 
zero, if one controls for the relevant socio-demographic and household characteristics affect-
ing the migration decision. 
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Individuals reporting potential problems with language have a 1.2 percentage point lower 
probability of having a moving intention, compared to individuals who do not. Perception of 
job- and cultural-adaptation-related hurdles reduce the propensity to migrate by 0.9 and 0.8 
percentage points, respectively. The magnitudes of these significant effects are all at least 
twice the magnitude of the effects of the other hurdles. 
These results suggest that the primarily barriers to international mobility in Europe lie in the 
domain of the individual (employment, language, culture), rather than institutional or market-
related frictions. On average neither housing market problems, nor transferability issues 
(qualification, pension rights), nor legal issues (work/residence permits), nor access problems 
(health, education, social institutions) appear to prevent individuals from planning to move. 
The empirically relevant factor related to market imperfections is worries about finding a suit-
able job in the area of destination. This could point to imperfect information about opportuni-
ties, uncertainties about the appropriate job searching strategies, or an increased risk of unem-
ployment in an alien environment due to lack of job-related networks. However, the variable 
might also pick up an actual problem with transferability of human capital and occupational 
skills from one labour market to another. Note that imperfect transferability is not a market 
imperfection, unless it is due to recognition failure. 
In the following, we identify how much the three perceptions of the three primary mobility 
hurdles are related to observable differences in individual characteristics, and to what extent 
they are country specific. As in previous sections of this report, we derive country-specific 
effects regarding perceptions of mobility hurdles on the basis of the estimated linear probabil-
ity models.  
Table 14 shows the obtained marginal effects of possible impacting factors on the mobility 
hurdles. They generally show the expected sign and are statistically significant. We observe a 
significant age pattern implying that older individuals are more likely to perceive the hurdle. 
In our single cross-section it is not possible to separate age effects from cohort effects. How-
ever, regarding job hurdles it is plausible to assume that the age effect is due to increasing 
difficulties of obtaining a suitable job over the life cycle. At least, we expect that older indi-
viduals have acquired more location- and firm-specific advantages, which are difficult to 
transfer to another labour market, so that the job hurdle becomes indeed higher in the course 
of the working life. 
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Table 14: Individual Characteristics Impacting on Perceived Key Mobility Hurdles 
 Language Hurdle Job Hurdle Cultural Adaptation Hurdle
age -0.019 0.019 -0.013
age squared/100 0.048 -0.034 0.028
age cubic/10000 -0.037 0.006 -0.018
female* -0.027 0.036 0.011
married* 0.030 0.035 0.011
in education* -0.086 0.070 0.008
low skilled* 0.124 0.019 -0.020
intermediate skills* 0.102 -0.001 -0.008
unemployed* 0.100
permanent work contract* 0.040
commuting distance 0.020
resident of city* -0.007 0.018 -0.010
number of past moves -0.007 0.015 0.007
distance of past moves -0.022 0.005 -0.014
migration background* -0.055 0.051 -0.034
part of education abroad* -0.133 0.013 -0.032  
Results from probit regression including a full set of country, sector and occupation dummies. Sample weights applied. Variables statistically 
significant at least at the ten percent full set of country, sector and occupation dummies. Sample weights applied. Variables statistically significant 
at least at the ten percent level highlighted in blue. * attached to a variable name indicates an indicator variable. For these variables the estimated 
coefficient represents the percentage point change in the outcome for the discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1. in Source: Eurobarometer 
64.1, own calculations. 
 
Regarding the language and cultural hurdles, in contrast, the age profile is probably more due 
to a “cohort effect” rather than a true ageing affect. We would expect that language or cultural 
capital, once acquired, does not depreciate at too high a rate over the life cycle, or, at least, 
that the capital could be re-acquired at relatively low cost if necessary. 
Concerning the language hurdle, the cohort interpretation of the age effect is backed by the 
strongly negative parameter obtained for those still in the education system, which can be 
seen as a reflection of the growing foreign-language literacy of the younger generations in 
Europe. According to the Eurobarometer 2001, 68% of European people between 15 and 24 
are able to keep a conversation in a language different from their native one, while only 57% 
of people between 25 and 39, and 45% between 40 and 54 can. Thus, if language differences 
pose a handicap to mobility, the spread of linguistic skills through cohort aging could improve 
geographic mobility rates in Europe. 
Besides age, education level and migration experience are relevant factors shaping the lan-
guage hurdle. Not surprisingly, high-skilled individuals (the reference group) report about 10 
percentage points less often concerns about language. Regarding migration background, hav-
ing taken education abroad yields a substantial improvement in language capacity. Individuals 
who studied abroad are 13.3 percentage points less likely to report a language hurdle. Having 
a migration background or having moved abroad in the past, also significantly reduce the lan-
guage hurdle. 
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Regarding the job hurdle, factors characterizing the current employment situation have a pe-
culiar role. Unemployed individuals much more frequently perceive a job hurdle going 
abroad. An interpretation could be that foreign employers perceive unemployment as a nega-
tive signal, which worsens job prospects in the destination country. Such workers may also be 
more pessimistic about the chances of finding employment anywhere.53 Individuals on a per-
manent work contract more frequently perceive problems of finding a suitable job. This is 
because it is a bigger sacrifice than giving up temporary employment. There is a risk that an 
equally favourable employment contract is unavailable abroad. 
Interestingly, migration background if anything seems to increase perceptions about job hur-
dles. This might be a learning effect, as individuals who moved in the past could have experi-
enced problems in finding a job after moving. An alternative explanation would be that mi-
gration background captures a specific labour market disadvantage of the affected individuals, 
probably related to human capital.54 The disadvantage explanation also seems relevant for 
women, who perceive job hurdles at a higher rate than men. 
Turning to the cultural adaptation hurdle, it appears difficult to explain by observables. The only 
significant impacting factor besides age appears mobility experience. Individuals with a migra-
tion background or having studies abroad are about 3 percentage points less likely to report a 
cultural adaptation hurdle. 
As a final step, we investigate the impact of specific country effects in explaining differences in 
perceived mobility hurdles across Europe. Figure 18 presents the country-specific differences 
(controlling for individual characteristics) in the prevalence of these hurdles being perceived. 
Very substantial variation in perceived mobility hurdles across countries is unexplained by ob-
servable individual factors. The variation is most extreme considering the language hurdle. If all 
Europeans showed the behaviour of individuals from Luxembourg or Malta, the fraction of the 
population reporting language as a migration hurdle would be about 30 percentage points lower. 
These are extreme cases are clearly the result of the specific structure of these countries, but 
they still indicate that there would be substantial scope for language learning to foster geo-
graphic mobility. Quite interestingly, English native speakers do not necessarily perceive the 
language hurdle less frequently. Rather on the contrary, when considering moving to a Euro-
pean country, the population in Ireland and the UK perceive language problems much more 
frequently than the European average. 
 
                                                 
53 A similar interpretation could pertain to the commute variable. 
54 Skill level is measured by years of education, however, the labour market may value years of education differ-
ently depending on the country where they are acquired. 
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Figure 18: Country Differences Regarding Perceived Mobility Hurdles 
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Country effects evaluated at the mean of observable characteristics impacting on the propensity to migrate. Controls include age, gender, mar-
riage status, skill level, education abroad, current employment status, occupation and sector dummies for current occupation, current location 
(city), migration history. Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, own calculations. 
 
Overall, the country ranking with regard to perceived cultural adaptation hurdles is very simi-
lar to that concerning language hurdles. Communication capacity is an important prerequisite 
of cultural adaptation. Country effects with regard to culture are less spread out than with re-
gard to language. The countries ahead of the European average in terms of language tend to 
be less far ahead in terms of cultural adaptation capacity. At the same time, the countries be-
hind the European average when it comes to language tend to be even further away from the 
European average when it comes to cultural adaptation. Still, in face of the apparent correla-
tion of country effects, reducing language hurdles could be a key to reducing the cultural hur-
dles as well. 
Looking at job related hurdles, a completely different picture emerges. The individuals who 
perceive job related hurdles as an obstacle to move abroad more frequently than the European 
average come from the Mediterranean (Greece, Cyprus) and the New Member States (Slove-
nia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary), but also include Austria, Sweden, Finland and Ireland. 
This suggests that the country-specific job hurdle perception actually comprises two effects: 
(i) a labour market adaptation problem for individuals coming from economically less ad-
vanced countries, and (ii) a problem of finding an adequate, i.e. at least as good job, for indi-
viduals coming from countries with very good labour market conditions. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
Weighing the possible positive and negative economic and social externalities, from a social 
planner’s perspective, geographic mobility is too low in Europe. While it is practically impos-
sible to determine what would be the optimum level, it appears that the current situation is 
sub-optimal. In view of the still substantial imbalances, there seem to be unexploited, mostly 
economic gains of geographic mobility as a balancing factor in an integrated labour market. 
At the same time, mostly social costs associated with increased intra-EU migration are proba-
bly not too large considering the low level of current geographic mobility rates in Europe. 
From a long-term demographic perspective, as the population share of the age groups most 
inclined to migration will decline, pro-active geographic mobility raising individual propensi-
ties to migrate could serve to counteract falling mobility rates within an ageing Europe. 
When deciding to move, individuals optimise over the expected private gains from changing 
location, net of mobility costs. There is a twofold role of geographic mobility policies aimed 
at increased mobility rates: (i) enlarging the expected utility gains, and (ii) reducing mobility 
costs for the individual. 
To obtain a handle on promising policy interventions, a sound understanding of the driving 
forces behind the mobility decisions of European citizens is relevant. Overall, the empirical 
evidence presented in this chapter suggests that improvement of their economic situation, em-
ployment or income, is still the key target of European citizens at least when considering 
permanent migration decisions. This implies that mobility rates may fall in the process of 
convergence of European economies. In particular the strong mobility intentions in the New 
Member States would level out as these economies catch up to EU-15. 
At the individual level, education is a key factor to reap the full benefits from migration. 
Hence education policy is an important mobility policy. Moreover, geographic mobility is in 
part a chain phenomenon – after the first move, additional moves become more likely. Hence 
fostering mobility early in life, especially during people’s studies, is a candidate for a good 
mobility policy. 
Overall, our analysis of the hurdles to within-EU mobility perceived by citizens underpins the 
hypothesis that language and cultural barriers are extremely important when explaining the 
limited level of geographic mobility in Europe. While the capacity of acculturation, a process 
of re-socialisation involving changes in attitudes, values and identification, is a rather difficult 
target for government intervention, the empirical evidence suggest two policy targets. First, 
promotion of language capacity could foster geographic mobility. The effect of language is 
direct and indirect. Directly, it reduces the language hurdle negatively associated with cross 
border mobility propensities. Indirectly, it appears to reduce the cultural barriers preventing 
migration. Second, promotion of education abroad could foster geographic mobility. The ef-
fect could work through both reducing language and cultural barriers. 
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The key mobility hurdle besides language and culture perceived by Europeans is related to 
worries about finding a (suitable) job. This observation points toward the necessity to support 
information and transparency of international job opportunities in order to establish an envi-
ronment creating opportunities for mobility. Put into a more general context, it establishes a 
need for flexible labour markets. An environment facilitating reallocation of labour creates 
better opportunities for outsiders, including those coming from a distant labour market. 
The persistence of national forms of labour market and housing market organization, welfare 
state and fiscal systems could constrain intra-EU mobility. Although our empirical evidence 
suggests that EU citizens do not generally perceive these as the most essential mobility barri-
ers by European citizens, harmonisation is certainly relevant in designing effective mobility 
policies. Legal, recognition, portability and access barriers in these areas yield mobility costs 
for the individual, reducing migration propensities. 
Finally, empirical analysis of country effects highlights that much of the variation in geo-
graphic mobility rates across EU Member States, and that much of the variation in the atti-
tudes toward migration is not easily explained by structural differences regarding the observ-
able factors influencing mobility behaviour. This observation shows that national tastes and 
preferences, which are not easy for policy to affect, are a very relevant driver of mobility 
rates. It also demonstrates that there is ample scope for raising mobility rates at the EU level. 
Among the EU, the Scandinavian countries clearly stand out as the area of high mobility. It 
thus seems worth studying the association between their policy model – flexicurity – and geo-
graphic mobility. 
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4. ASESSMENT OF GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY POLICIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Our discussion of optimum geographic mobility has shown that all things considered, the cur-
rent level of mobility in the EU is perhaps too low considering the net benefits of migration 
for the economy and the society. Thus there seems to be scope for government intervention 
aimed at raising the current low levels of geographic mobility. However, there is also the pos-
sibility of government or policy failure. From a conceptual perspective, it is therefore neces-
sary to demonstrate that the situation achieved through government intervention is an im-
provement upon the laissez faire situation. 
A fundamental criterion in assessing government policies is to check whether they are effi-
cient from an economic perspective. In our context, the efficiency criterion demands that a 
policy is indeed capable of raising geographic mobility rates, and that it does so without creat-
ing unwanted side-effects in other areas of the economy or the society. But this is only a nec-
essary condition – efficient policies also need to be cost-efficient in the sense that they 
achieve their effect is in a reasonable relation to resources spent on their implementation. 
A pre-requirement for policies to be efficient is that they are relevant. The relevancy criterion 
is that a policy sufficiently targets the factors that prevents from achieving a solution via lais-
sez faire. In our context, thinking of geographic mobility as an investment choice, this means 
that relevant policies to increase geographic mobility need to raise the expected individual 
gains from changing location, or reduce the mobility costs for the individual. A somewhat 
stricter interpretation of this criterion is that relevant policies adequately target the key mobil-
ity barriers identified in the previous chapter: labour market, language, and cultural adaptation 
barriers. 
The efficiency criterion assesses government intervention in strictly economic terms. For po-
litical decision makers, it is clearly insufficient. Social welfare also depends on the distribu-
tion of resources in an economy. It is necessary to judge government policies also by a fair-
ness standard. An assessment on the basis of the fairness criterion demands to answer ques-
tions like: Is a policy beneficial to all citizens or does it make certain groups in the society 
made worse off? Do citizens have equal access to a policy measure? 
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In the following, we will apply these criteria to assessing policies and initiatives that have a 
potential to affect decisions about geographic mobility at the individual level. To obtain a 
concise picture, we concentrate the assessment on policies that have been implemented at the 
EU level. Since our goal is to learn from best practice, we also highlight a number of policies 
with sufficiently clear mobility target implemented at the national or local level. 
Before discussing the specific policies relevant for workers mobility, such as active and pas-
sive labour market policies, education and training policies, integration policies, information 
policies and harmonisation policies, the European Action Plans and overall initiatives to pro-
mote mobility are briefly presented. 
4.2 Workers Mobility on the EU Policy Agenda 
During the last decade(s) workers mobility has been among the key issues at the EU policy 
agenda.  
 
• The adoption of the Commission’s Job Mobility Action Plan in December 2007 repre-
sents the latest step in a long line of initiatives to promote workers mobility. Based on 
a process launched in February 2001 by the Commission’s Communication on the 
New Labour Markets, the conclusions of the Stockholm European Council of March 
2001 and the work of the High Level Task Force on Skills and Mobility, the Commis-
sion adopted in February 2002 an Action Plan for Skills and Mobility. Among the 
proposals in the 2002 Action Plan was the designation of 2006 as the European Year 
of Worker’s Mobility. 
 
The Commission's Job Mobility Action Plan following the debates launched during the Euro-
pean Year of Workers’ Mobility highlight the impact of remaining obstacles to mobility 
within the EU and a number of actions to promote mobility are proposed. Actions include: 
• Improve existing legislation and administrative practices regarding worker mobility 
• Ensure policy support for mobility from authorities at all levels 
• Reinforce EURES as the one-stop instrument to facilitate mobility of workers and 
their families 
• Foster awareness of the possibilities and advantages of mobility among the wider pub-
lic 
 
As it appears, the European Commission has a strong focus on the broad spectre of various 
initiatives and policies relevant for the promotion of workers mobility. In the following, these 
policies, along with a number of others, will be presented and discussed in further details.  
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4.3 Active and Passive Labour Market Policies 
Labour market policies play an important role in relation to labour market flexibility in gen-
eral, and geographic mobility in particular. At least at the national level, active and passive 
labour market policies appear as core factors in explaining observed occupational and geo-
graphic mobility patterns. 
Passive labour market policies concentrate on providing income security especially in the 
case of unemployment or underemployment. By providing more or less income security, in-
come replacement schemes can create weaker or stronger push factors in the decision about 
geographic mobility. Active labour market policies attempt to improve the labour market 
prospects of participants. By enhancing employment security (rather than job security) they 
reduce the risk involved in changing occupation and thereby the risk involved in changes of 
location over longer distances, which in general involve a change in occupation. 
4.3.1 Passive Labour Market Policies 
Important examples of passive labour market policies affecting geographic mobility incen-
tives are wage coordination, employment protection legislation and the unemployment insur-
ance system. 
The degree of wage coordination, whether wages are bargained at a centralized or at the local 
level, may influence geographic mobility rates, since wage bargaining at the national level 
tends to reduce regional wage differentials. Likewise, strong trade unions in industrial rela-
tions or the existence of minimum wage legislation may foster regional wage equalisation. 
However, the existence of regional wage disparity is a core driver of mobility – it immedi-
ately affects the expected income gains associated with a change of location, which are neces-
sary to compensate the migrants for mobility costs and cost-of-living differentials. 
Employment protection has an impact on geographic mobility, as it creates labour market 
rigidities. Higher firing costs, on the one hand, increase the number of individuals staying in 
their job. Both the number of involuntary and voluntary quits from a firm, prerequisite to 
most geographic moves, is reduced. On the other hand, rational employers tend to respond to 
firing costs by hiring less. Thus entering a new job becomes more difficult to outsiders in the 
labour market in general. This includes the unemployed, but also geographic migrants who 
leave their local labour market to enter a different one at a new location. In short, employment 
protection by reducing reemployment probabilities tends to reduce the expected income gains 
to be made through a geographic move, and thus tends to reduce geographic mobility rates. 
Finally, it has been argued that the generosity of the unemployment insurance system can ex-
plain the low regional mobility in Europe.55 It is obvious that the incentives to move to regain 
employment are weaker, the higher the level of labour income replacement in case of unem-
                                                 
55 See for example Hassler et al (2005). 
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ployment for insured workers. However, unemployment insurance might also create incen-
tives enhancing geographic mobility both at the worker and the firm level.56
At the worker level, more generous unemployment insurance may enhance the productivity of 
the search process by relaxing liquidity constraints. Relaxation of liquidity constraints en-
hances employment opportunities especially at the national level where search costs are 
higher than at the local level. Bertola et al. (2006) argue that liquidity constraints can directly 
affect the mobility choice as the incurred mobility costs translate into lower consumption. 
Receiving unemployment benefits allows smoothing consumption and finance mobility costs 
and thus raises the propensity to move. 
In fact, Tatsiramos (2007) provides cross-country evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
receiving benefits while unemployed increases the probability to move. Furthermore, the ef-
fect depends on the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme: Recipients of benefits 
are significantly more likely to move compared to non-recipients in countries with more gen-
erous unemployment insurance systems. However, the exportation of unemployment benefits 
(i.e. to receive unemployment benefits while residing in another Member State is fairly lim-
ited under Regulation 1408/71 (in principle only 3 months) and it is for the individual Mem-
ber State to decide whether or not to be more flexible in this respect and continue payment for 
a longer period of time to an unemployed worker who has moved abroad to find a job in an-
other Member State 
Unemployment insurance besides providing a search subsidy might also reduce the risk in-
volved in making a move due to the probability of a future layoff. The reduction in risk is 
equivalent to a reduction in mobility costs, which raises the propensity to migrate. 
Focusing on firm behaviour, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) argue that unemployment insur-
ance with risk-averse agents improves the level of output and the composition of jobs. Re-
ceiving unemployment insurance induces workers to search for higher wages. Firms respond 
by creating high-wage, high-quality jobs. In this regard, unemployment insurance has the role 
of correcting the distortions introduced by uninsured risks. 
Higher productivity jobs may carry with them a higher risk of layoff to the extent that they are 
located in more volatile, innovative activities, or require workers with more specific skills so 
carry greater risk of job mismatch. In this context, generous unemployment benefits could 
allow the unemployed to risk future layoff by taking a higher productivity job (potentially in a 
different geographic location). Earnings-related benefit systems can also increase the quality 
of matches as employees know that, if they were laid off in the future, they would be sup-
ported by a safety net that reflects prior earnings and does not provide flat-rate benefits only. 
Firms might therefore be more likely to offer such jobs, increasing the share of high-
productivity jobs and the aggregate level of productivity. 
                                                 
56 See for example the discussion of this issue in OECD (2007b).  
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Although the beneficial effects of unemployment insurance are well recognised, there is still 
the risk that high or long-lasting unemployment benefits reduce job reallocation incentives, 
including geographic mobility incentives. That is, the disincentive effects might dominate 
over the incentive effects. 
4.3.2 Active Labour Market Policies 
In response, over the past few years strategies to activate the unemployed with the help of 
high-quality employment services have loomed larger in the policy debate. Such activation 
programmes, if they are well designed, can help to ensure that benefit recipients have a better 
chance of obtaining employment. At the same time, they increase the expected gains from 
geographic mobility provided that chance of obtaining employment is larger searching on the 
national or national labour market than searching on the local labour market. 
The essence of activation strategies, highlighted by the OECD (2007c), is to encourage job-
seekers to become more active in their efforts to find work and/or improve their employabil-
ity. These activation strategies include: (i) early intervention by the Public Employment Ser-
vices in the unemployment spell and a high contact density between jobseekers and employ-
ment counsellors; (ii) regular reporting and monitoring of work availability and job-search 
actions; (iii) direct referrals of unemployed clients to vacant jobs; and (iv) referral to active 
labour market programmes prevent loss of motivation, skills and employability as a result of 
longer-term joblessness. These programmes range from continuing vocational training to pub-
lic job creation programmes. 
Recent evaluation studies have shown that job-search assistance and monitoring can have a 
sizeable impact on re-employment rates.57 Job-search obligations coupled with a credible 
threat of benefit sanctions can partially offset disincentives generated by generous unem-
ployment benefits.58
As for the active labour market policies, substantial cross-country differences persist in both 
the overall level of spending and in their composition. A number of recent cross-country stud-
ies suggest that higher spending on these policies speeds up reemployment for benefit recipi-
ents and other jobseekers. Micro-econometric studies have identified the relative returns to 
various types of programmes: surveys by the OECD (2005b, 2006b) suggest that overall pub-
lic job creation schemes have disappointing effects, whereas job-search assistance and con-
tinuous vocational training work quite well. 
In sum, there is a clear role for passive labour market policies providing income insurance for 
mobile workers, and activation policies that manage to improve employability or to encourage 
job search activities, in raising geographic mobility rates. 
                                                 
57 See Borland and Tseng (2007); Graversen and van Ours (2006); Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006). 
58 See Boone, J et al. (2004). 
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In the EU active and passive labour market policies are generally designed at the national 
level. In the realm of active labour market policies, however, some relevant initiatives have 
been taken at the supra-national level, notably the European Social Fund and the European 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund. 
 
Celebrating its 50th anniversary in 2007, the European Social Fund (ESF) is an important pol-
icy tool with the aim of creating more and better employment opportunities in Europe, as well 
as promoting skills and job chances of (mainly) marginalised groups. 
The key objective of the ESF is to even out welfare differences across Europe. If this objec-
tive contributes to employability of marginalised social groups and helps to finance mobility 
in a world of imperfect credit markets the ESF contributes, as a by-product, to geographic 
mobility. Raising the educational level of the workforce has shown to be a key factor regard-
ing the promotion of geographic mobility. However, to the extent that the ESF indeed suc-
cessfully reduces inequality of welfare in Europe, it may also reduce geographic mobility, as 
there is a risk of weakening the push and pull factors of migration. Equalizing the economic 
differences between the European regions, by upgrading and qualifying the workforce, may 
result in less incentive for citizens to search for employment elsewhere in the EU, since the 
economic prosperities and opportunities in the different EU regions have become more alike.  
Due to its broad approach and targets, the efficiency of the ESF as an active labour market 
policy, and as an indirect geographic mobility policy in particular, is difficult to judge. There 
might be a conflict between promoting geographic mobility while at the same time supporting 
disadvantaged regions with structural and social funds money. To avoid this possible conflict 
– and to increase the probability for positive mobility related by-products from the ESF – the 
European Commission should consider whether geographic mobility (to a higher extent than 
today) could be included as a specific priority in the ESF. For instance, more funds within the 
programme could be earmarked for projects having regional and/or international mobility for 
workers as a specific target.  
In direct comparison, The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) appears to be a 
more targeted policy also complementing the Lisbon Strategy. The EGF was launched in 
2007 and focuses on workers made redundant as a result of changing global trade patterns. 
The aim is to help these workers to find another job as quickly as possible through active la-
bour market policies. The fund provides means to support, for example: 
• Job-search assistance, occupational guidance, tailor-made training and re-training includ-
ing IT skills and certification of acquired experience, outplacement assistance and entre-
preneurship promotion or aid for self-employment; 
• Special time-limited measures, such as job-search allowances, mobility allowances or 
allowances to individuals participating in lifelong learning and training activities;  
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• Measures to stimulate in particular disadvantaged or older workers, to remain in or return 
to the labour market. 
As it is a recent initiative, no evaluation of the EGF has yet been carried out59. Any overall 
assessment will be practically difficult, given that the fund serves as an umbrella for a wide 
range of policy measures designed and implemented at the decentralised level. From a con-
ceptual viewpoint, considering that employment opportunities and geographic mobility are 
complements, it is clear that the EGF could increase the mobility potential inasmuch as it 
manages to draw resources into the effective types of active labour market policies.  
To the extent that the EGF will be used as a means to improve labour market opportunities of 
workers in general, an enhancement of geographic mobility is a mere by-product. However, 
the EGF also provides for active labour market measures that directly target factors relevant 
for the mobility decision, e.g. mobility allowances. These measures to a high extent enhance 
the impact of the programme as a geographic mobility policy.  
The EGF is assessed to be fairly cost-efficient as it creates benefits through an improved func-
tioning of the labour market in general. Positive externalities through improved geographic 
mobility rates come at little or no additional cost. Of course, the positive efficiency assess-
ment requires that the EGF will indeed support only efficient active labour market policies. 
This demands correct identification of employment opportunities in the local, national and 
European labour markets, in order to take the right activation measures. 
Turning to national active and passive labour market policies, we observe a range of policy 
models throughout the EU. One extreme position is taken, broadly speaking, by the South 
European countries. They rely on a combination of strict employment protection legislation 
combined with limited unemployment insurance and active labour market measures. The high 
level of job protection combined with little support for the unemployed suggests itself as a 
key to explaining the relatively low level of geographic mobility in these countries. 
 
                                                 
59 However, the EGF regulation specifies that a mid-term evaluation should be carried out December 2011. 
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A common feature of the activation policies discussed so far is they approach the goal of geo-
graphic mobility only as a by-product. However, there are also examples of national active 
labour market policies designed to tackle the issue of geographic mobility as an equilibrating 
factor more directly. These policies typically combine job-search monitoring with mobility 
requirements, often combined with a mobility allowance to overcome liquidity constraints. 
An example is Germany where recent labour market reforms have strengthened mobility re-
quirements of jobseekers so that a move can be required from unmarried jobseekers after four 
months of unemployment. Otherwise benefits can be cut. At the same time, the German pub-
lic employment service supports a move that is necessary to take up a new job and end unem-
ployment through an allowance of up to EUR 300 per month. Similar arrangements also exist 
in France, Austria and other EU Member States. 
In principle mobility requirements on the unemployed in combination with mobility allow-
ances appear as effective measures to raise mobility in a system with developed unemploy-
ment protection. The obligation to move in order to take up an open position elsewhere count-
ers the disincentive effects of transfer benefits. 
Empirical evidence on this issue is extremely limited, however. Westerlund (1998) analyses 
the effect of direct migration subsidies that are part of the Swedish active labour market pol-
The Danish Labour Market Model 
 
In Denmark, labour market reforms in 1994 lead to re-calibration of the labour market policy as to the 
weighting of social disciplining (the stick) and social integration (the carrot). On the one hand, the eligi-
bility period for unemployment benefit was reduced, availability and mobility rules and sanctions were 
tightened, the right to re-qualification for eligibility was abolished and the duty of activation reinforced. 
On the other hand, there was a massive focus on initiatives for adult vocational training and skills upgrad-
ing for the unemployed. Individual action plans and activation courses were introduced much earlier and 
much more intensively during unemployment spells. 
Regarding organisation and steering, the labour market policy was regionalised and the position of the 
labour market organisations in policy implementation was markedly strengthened. 
As the labour market indicators developed favourably after the reforms, the Danish policy model, often 
labelled as flexicurity, has caught a lot of attention abroad. 
Early evaluations of the reform, see Larson and Langager (1998), suggest that it improved efficiency in 
the supply of labour, raised employment following both education and training and public job placement, 
and increased occupational and geographic mobility. In fact, as many as close to a quarter of workers is 
affected each year by unemployment and receives unemployment or cash benefits. But the majority of the 
unemployed manage to find their own way back into a new job, to a considerable degree also in a differ-
ent region. Thus the Danish combination of labour market flexibility and social protection appears as a 
prime example of an efficient mix of active and passive labour market policies fostering geographic mo-
bility. 
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icy model. These subsidies are rather generous, including replacement of travelling costs, fur-
niture transportation, starting assistant grants, free travel to job interviews, and to a limited 
extent even redemption of private housing in depressed areas. Nevertheless, an empirical 
evaluation of the programme suggests that a change in the level of subsidies would not lead to 
a significant change in geographic mobility. If it is possible to generalise this result, the effi-
ciency of this type of policy is in doubt, although it addresses a relevant barrier to mobility. 
Hence provision of this type of mobility subsidies must be justified purely on equity or fair-
ness grounds. 
4.4 Education and Training Policies 
The empirical evidence clearly suggests that education and occupational skills are important 
drivers of geographic mobility. Policies promoting human capital formation and skills upgrad-
ing are potentially highly effective: they hit all three of the main barriers to mobility identified 
in the previous chapter. 
Most importantly, educational advancement in general raises the expected net gains from 
geographic mobility. For individuals with more specialised skills it pays more to invest into 
search on a wider labour market, as the chances for a better job match improve. Provided that 
workers can appropriate part of rents associated with the better match, they can expect a 
higher wage. Thus the expected gain from geographic mobility tends to get larger with the 
level of education. 
Furthermore, the risk associated with finding suitable employment in a new location is lower. 
The more highly educated individuals are generally more employable, and they generally 
have more portable skills. The reduced risk in making a move is equivalent to a reduction in 
mobility costs, which raises the propensity to migrate. In this regard education policies are 
very closely related to active labour market policies fostering employment security, allowing 
lower job security. 
Supposed that general education contributes to promotion of language learning, it directly 
targets the important communication barrier. Education in foreign languages (for natives) or 
the host-nation language (for immigrants) obviously reduces the costs associated with migra-
tion into a different language area. 
Finally, one may expect that education also reduces the costs associated with adaptation to 
new cultures. The better educated tend to be more flexible in terms of adjusting to new cul-
tures (especially if they have some familiarity with the new language). For immigrants and 
their children, educational experiences in the receiving country offer exposure to the host cul-
ture, which lowers the costs of acculturation. 
The positive impact of human capital formation on geographic mobility rates is expected in-
dependent of whether the education process itself involves geographic mobility or not. How-
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ever, the empirical evidence suggests that mobility enhancing effects of education are espe-
cially strong if it is combined with a move into a different environment. Clearly, having 
moved already reduces the psychological costs of later moves. Education taken in a different 
country supposedly reduces language and acculturation barriers in future, job-related moves, 
by a wide margin. 
It appears that individuals who move to a new location for educational purposes frequently 
remain in that location after graduation. This means an initial temporary move turns into a 
more permanent, often job-related move. The impact of universities, schools and vocational 
training centres as focal points for cross-regional or cross-border recruitment of employees 
through job postings or head hunters on geographic mobility can be large. Westerlund and 
Lindgren (2007) have shown that in Sweden, vocational training promotes geographic mobil-
ity more than any other of the measures used by the employment service. 
In summary, from a conceptual perspective, we would expect that policies which are effective 
in promoting acquisition of human capital and vocational skills are efficient geographic mo-
bility policies. They are especially relevant and effective, if they do not only provide general 
education, but combine education with measures tackling the language and cultural barriers. 
In the tendency, educational policies as geographic mobility policies are also cost-efficient. 
The geographic mobility effect can be interpreted as a positive externality stemming from the 
induced human capital formation, which is beneficial for economy and society already in its 
own. Put differently, there is a large return to educational policies in addition to the pure geo-
graphic mobility effect, which justifies higher expenses. 
Whether educational policies promoting geographic mobility also meet the fairness criterion 
depends strongly on how they are implemented. Thus we now turn to some concrete exam-
ples. 
At the EU level, the most important initiatives in the realm of education promotion are the 
Action Plan on Adult Learning (2007), the Action Plan Promoting Language Learning and 
Linguistic Diversity (2003) and the umbrella Lifelong Learning Funding Programme. These 
initiatives are set against the background of the overall Education and Training 2010 strategy. 
Education and Training 2010 has a very wide scope, targeting both welfare and educational 
systems in the Member States. To achieve the ambitious goals of the Lisbon Strategy, it was 
set up as a 10-year work programme to be implemented through the open method of coordina-
tion that seeks to make Europe a world leader in terms of the quality of its education and 
training systems. Obviously, if the programmes initiated in areas such as education and train-
ing of teachers or language learning will help to achieve this ambitious goal, this framework 
will also help to foster geographic mobility. 
Naturally the EU strategy has to be implemented in national settings in order to become a 
fully effective mobility driver. Most Member States indeed strive for education policies in-
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creasing the productivity of their labour force. The current direction of these policies, in gen-
eral terms can be characterised as skill upgrading throughout the entire life. The fact box be-
low presents, as a typical example the nucleus of the Danish life-long learning strategy. 
Clearly such a strategy, if transformed into efficient national educational policy, indirectly at 
the same time promotes geographic mobility. 
 
A more specific initiative at the EU level is the Action Plan for the Promotion of Language 
Learning and Linguistic Diversity,60 which directly concerns geographic mobility as is attacks 
the key language barrier. It proposed a series of actions to be taken at the European level in 
2004-2006 with the aim of supporting actions taken by local, regional and national authorities 
to promote language learning and linguistic diversity. Specifically, the Action Plan is de-
signed to take actions regarding (i) the extension of the benefits of life-long language learning 
to all citizens, (ii) the improvement of language teaching, and (iii) the creation of a more lan-
guage-friendly environment. 
This programme is clearly relevant in the context of enhancing geographic mobility not only 
due to its general theme – language – but also through the wide range of appropriate specific 
actions covered. One example is the declared ambition to teach European citizens their 
mother tongue plus two other languages, and to make an early start in this. Capacity in more 
than one foreign language would contribute much to improve the opportunities to cross-
border mobility. Evidence on skill acquisition suggests that the costs involved in language 
acquisition are indeed greatly reduced if training occurs early in life. 
However, this example also shows that education policies might require quite a long time 
span to change geographic mobility patterns. Another example is the targeting of adults, 
National Life-long Learning Strategies – The Danish Example 
 
In Denmark life long learning strategies are seen to be vital in order to ensure the continual adaptability 
and employability of workers, particularly the most vulnerable. 
 
The overall aims of initiated educational reforms are that: 
1. All children shall have a good start in school. 
2. All children shall achieve good academic knowledge and personal skills. 
3. 95 per cent of all young people shall complete a general or vocational upper secondary education 
by 2015. 
4. 50 per cent of all young people shall complete higher education by 2015. 
5. Everyone shall engage in lifelong learning. 
 
The ambition is that life-long learning is promoted in the many settings in which people acquire new 
knowledge and gain useful skills. This applies in education, at work, in liberal adult education and in 
association and leisure activities. 
                                                 
60 European Commission (2003). 
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which concerns both language training for those who have not acquired a (second or third) 
language and maintenance of active language skills acquired during youth. This strategy is 
designed to unfold a more immediate effect on geographic mobility rates, and may contribute 
to increase the especially low rates among elderly cohorts. In general, long term initiatives 
mentioned in the Action Plan should be combined with short focused training, e.g. vocational 
training, intensive language courses prior to postings etc. Such initiatives, as often seen within 
multinational companies preparing their staff on expatriation, should be developed further and 
promoted among a wider audience.  
Overall the Action Plan appears as a low key intervention, at least on the European level. The 
actions proposed only use resources available in existing Community programmes and activi-
ties; none of them requires additional budgetary resources to be allocated to the Commission. 
Therefore the Action Plan is probably a cost efficient initiative to promote language skills, and 
in the longer run levels of geographic mobility. But there is a risk that the impacts turn out to 
be small, depending on how well authorities in the Member States will deal with their respon-
sibilities for implementation of initiatives under the Action Plan. 
At the EU level, the education policy achieving the most direct impact on geographic mobility 
is the various funding programmes complementing the European Commission’s policy work 
in the field of education and training. These programmes give financial and technical support 
to organisations, institutions or individuals to run or participate in projects all over the Euro-
pean Union and beyond. An overview is given in the below fact box. In the following, we will 
focus on the Erasmus programme as a prominent example. 
 
EU Funding of Education and Training Strategies 
 
The Lifelong Learning Program is the flagship European funding program in the field of education and 
training. It covers the period 2007-2013, and is the successor to the Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci and 
eLearning programs. Learning opportunities from childhood to old age are covered by a single program.
The Lifelong Learning Program has a budget of € 7bn to support projects and activities that foster inter-
change, cooperation and mobility between education and training systems within the EU, so that they 
become a world quality reference. It is built on five pillars: 
 
1. The Comenius program (pre-school) 
2. The Erasmus program (higher education) 
3. The Leonardo da Vinci program (vocational education and training) 
4. The Grundtvig program (adult education) 
5. The Jean Monnet program (higher education institutions) 
 
Other EU-supported education and learning program include Erasmus Mundus, a program promoting the 
European Union as a centre of excellence in learning around the world, and Tempus, an aid scheme for 
restructuring of higher education systems in central and Eastern Europe. 
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The Erasmus programme, an important pillar of the EU Lifelong Learning Programme, seeks 
to enhance the quality and reinforce the European dimension of higher education by encour-
aging trans-national cooperation between universities, boosting European mobility and im-
proving the transparency and full academic recognition of studies and qualifications through-
out the Union. The programme consists of several different activities: student and teacher 
exchanges, joint development of study programmes (curriculum development), international 
intensive programmes, thematic networks between departments and faculties across Europe, 
language courses and the European Credit Transfer System. 
The Erasmus programme appears highly effective regarding geographic mobility. According 
to a recent econometric evaluation study by Parey and Waldinger (2007), it increases the per-
centage of students who spend some time of their studies abroad.61 Furthermore students who 
spend some time at a foreign university have a 15-20 percent higher propensity to work in a 
country different from their home country later on. As the Erasmus programme serves as a 
stimulator for studying abroad (in another European country), it is thus clear that it also 
causes greater mobility of university graduates. 
The Erasmus programme not only is an efficient stimulus for geographic mobility, it also 
seems to perform well if judged by a (narrow) fairness standard. Parey and Waldinger (2007) 
provide evidence that among the target group, especially students with limit credit possibili-
ties, usually those with less favourable socio-economic background, are positively affected by 
the programme. 
Neither on grounds of a wider fairness standard can the Erasmus programme be criticised 
seriously. Its target group is individuals in tertiary education who are in a rather privileged 
economic and social position. However, as illustrated in the previous fact box, a number of 
other EU funding programmes are directed towards target groups such as pre-schools through 
to upper secondary schools (The Comenius programme), vocational education and training 
(The Leonardo da Vinci programme), adult education (The Grundtvig programme), and 
higher education institutions (The Jean Monnet programme). 
An example of a concrete mobility initiative within vocational training is the French Départ 
project, funded by the European Year of Workers’ Mobility.62 This project aims to promote 
the value of mobility during an apprenticeship by raising awareness of both the benefits of 
gaining work experience elsewhere, and the opportunities available. The focus of the project 
is on information; there is no funding providing income support for mobile apprentices. A 
programme of this type certainly has a much weaker impact on actual mobility behaviour, 
compared with the generous Erasmus programme. 
                                                 
61 The study is based on a German data set containing cohorts from 1988-2001 
62 Départ (Develop Europe through apprenticeships and trans-national networks) is coordinated by Centre Inffo, 
an information centre for vocational training, and On-isep, which runs an information website for young people.  
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Finally, also ERA More, a mobility programme for European researchers, should be men-
tioned. ERA More is a joint initiative of the European Commission and the 33 countries par-
ticipating in the EU Framework Programme for Research. The purpose of the initiative is to 
create a more favourable environment for researchers’ career development. The assistance to 
the researchers is provided in two ways; through The Researcher's Mobility Centres, who 
operates by the universities, offers free customised assistance and information to researchers 
who are planning to pursue research in other countries in Europe. The about 200 Mobility 
Centres assist researchers in all matters relating to their professional and daily lives. The sec-
ond support is The Researcher's Mobility Portal who provides all the relevant information on 
research opportunities, grants and fellowships, general and practical information required for 
the mobility of researchers. 
In summary, the EU strategies and programmes contributing to the development of skills in 
the European labour force also promote geographic mobility. This externality is especially 
large for policies involving language and cultural human capital. But even successful educa-
tion policies can raise the skill level of the work force only very gradually. Thus they are less 
suited than adjustments in active or passive labour market policies fostering labour market 
flexibility to achieve short-term success in boosting geographic mobility rates. 
In this context, it is important to stress the clear success of the Erasmus programme, as it 
demonstrates two points. First, it is possible to design specific educational policies that im-
mediately impact geographic mobility. It appears that the scope of such policies still has to be 
fully explored, given that they are currently accessible for only a minority of the population. 
Second, the success of EU level funding schemes shows that there is scope for successful 
geographic mobility policies through education exchange programmes beyond the national 
level. In fact, in view of the well-functioning Erasmus programme, it is plausible to assume 
that it has crowded out some funding and initiative at the national level.  
4.5 Integration Policies 
The labour market and education policies discussed so far had a focus on outward mobility. 
Broadly speaking, the intention was to increase employability, to make job search more inten-
sive and overcome financial constraints. This contributes to improving the possibilities to gain 
an income in another location. In this section, we shift focus to inward mobility, and look at 
policies that increase the attractiveness of the new location, from the perspective of potential 
migrants. In various forms, these policies seek quickening economic and social integration of 
subsequent to arrival. 
Integration policies in the destination receiving migrants might have two different purposes. 
On the one hand, the intention can be to pull migrants into the country, in order to make some 
direct welfare gains. On the other hand, facing a certain level of immigration, the purpose can 
be to avoid some economic or social costs associated with lack of integration. 
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Conceptually, one might distinguish between passive and active integration policies. Passive 
policies only set a general frame providing conditions for equal treatment of immigrants and 
natives and thus promote social inclusion. Active policies take explicit action to bring immi-
grants, for example in terms of knowledge about the host country, language, education or 
housing conditions, to the level of natives. 
In the realm of passive integration policies, some EU Directives set up a general frame for the 
integration of mobile workers and their families, both for third country and EU country na-
tionals, by combating discrimination at the work place and in social life in general.63 Also the 
designation of 2007 as the European Year of Equal Opportunities has demonstrated that social 
inclusion, raising awareness of the right to equality and non-discrimination and increased par-
ticipation in society of groups exposed to discrimination are high priority issues for the Euro-
pean Commission. 
The appropriate kind of support provided by active integration policies is highly context de-
pendent. Therefore relevant policies are in general implemented at the local level. Such poli-
cies often explicitly include an education element. For many immigrants, taking some kind of 
general or vocational education in the destination is especially efficient as an integration 
measure. It does not only help improve portability of human capital from the origin, but also 
promotes language acquisition and acculturation in general. Through provision of locally-
valued job-specific training, information about working rights and attempts to facilitate em-
ployee-employer communication education initiatives can also directly help migrants to find 
suitable jobs.  
In general, regions seeking immigrant workers should provide an appropriate social, cultural 
and physical infrastructure, as well as a welcoming attitude towards newcomers. Attention 
should also be directed towards the integration of family members of migrant workers.  
In Gainsborough, UK, a very recent initiative has been launched to help integrate West 
Lindsey's growing migrant worker population. A cultural event is being held at the Trinity 
Arts Centre in Gainsborough including entertainment and food as well as important commu-
nity and employment information. Information about the availability of conversational Eng-
lish classes will also be available. The event is being publicised through posters and at work 
places where the migrants are known to be employed and a good attendance is to be expected. 
The efficiency of such programmes as drivers of geographic mobility will depend considera-
bly on how they are administered. Integration programmes are designed for workers who have 
already migrated and they aim to retain migrants in the host country. For such programmes to 
encourage further mobility, information about them must filter back to sending countries, so 
that potential migrants know about them, and know that they are operating to increase the 
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expected net gains from geographic mobility. This information flow is most likely achieved 
through circular migration, and networks, although there is potentially some role for informa-
tion campaigns in sending countries. 
Programme efficiency will also depend on what kind of instruction or support is offered. In 
this case, relevance to the local economic and social context is extremely important. The kind 
of instruction and support needed by immigrants in large cosmopolitan cities likely differs 
from the kind of support needed in smaller manufacturing, agricultural or tourist areas. It is 
also likely to depend on the specific social, demographic and economic characteristics of the 
immigrant population. The appropriate kind of policy will vary considerably from location to 
location, and even within locations for various populations and industries. 
Flexibility offered by local provision (private or public) of such services is thus highly desir-
able, and higher level governments should probably limit themselves to the support of these 
initiatives rather than the direct provision of them. 
The fairness of educational policies related to integration is determined to a large extent by 
availability. A considerable part of this availability depends on matching to the target popula-
tion (in terms of language and relevancy of training), but there is also a cost component when 
a price is charged, and a spatial component depending on the location of instruction. In large 
cities, efforts located in the central areas may be difficult to reach for busy immigrants who 
are often forced to live in the city’s outskirts. To assess whether integration support is being 
delivered in a fair manner, we would need information not only on what kind of support is 
offered where, but also information on the spatial distribution of populations and unmet needs 
for such support, which is even harder to obtain. 
Appropriate housing conditions are an often overlooked aspect of integration. The role of 
public housing policy with regards to promoting geographic mobility is somewhat different 
than that of education policies. Governments have become increasingly involved in the regu-
lation and provision of housing, but thus far, there is little evidence which suggests that the 
government is better at providing these services than the private sector. Most evidence sug-
gests that in terms of economic efficiency, straight transfers to needy families or other forms 
of support would strongly dominate public provision. If information of housing subsidies 
makes its way back to origin countries, it could increase inward mobility. One way to spread 
such information is web portals, like the UK Migrant Gateway, a website including legal in-
formation on workers’ rights to housing as well as specific information on mortgages, and 
how to rent and buy apartments. 
Some additional issues come to the fore when we consider housing: location and flexibility. 
With regard to location, whether housing support encourages integration (and thus mobility) 
                                                                                                                                                        
63 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation and Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of 
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will depend on the extent to which immigrant populations tend to cluster in their own com-
munities in European cities. If such ethnic communities are important, they could decrease 
integration while at the same time easing the costs of assimilating to a new culture through the 
provision of social networks, and space to “take a break” from the demands of living and 
working in a foreign environment. Such reduced costs should increase mobility. 
Thus, to some extent, there is a tension between assimilation and mobility when it comes to 
housing policy: should the government provide housing for immigrants in ethnic communities 
to encourage mobility or integrate such assistance to encourage assimilation? 
To the extent that national and local housing regulations make the housing market inflexible, 
unaffordable or unattractive, such policies may affect mobility. However, regulations making 
housing less affordable or less attractive should also encourage outward mobility. Housing 
regulations which reduce the flexibility of housing markets probably decrease mobility. How-
ever, since immigrants exist in highly fluid financial and social situations, flexibility is at a 
premium. To the extent that local housing regulations prevent the market from serving people 
with the need for such flexibility, it will discourage mobility system-wide. 
While the specific regulations vary from place to place, they are invariably quite complex, 
and are beyond the scope of this report. Suffice it to say that flexible housing markets are an 
important component of the ability of people to change residences. 
In sum, well managed integration policies may serve as valuable social measures comple-
menting the more administrative social security provisions such as unemployment benefits. 
They provide immigrants with additional income security, but more generally, also with secu-
rity in terms of living conditions (housing, social stability). An integration perspective reduces 
risks in the new location and thereby minimises the personal costs of mobility. 
4.6 Information Policies 
Individuals might miscalculate the expected individual net welfare gains that enter their geo-
graphic mobility decision, because of incomplete information. It is possible that they are not 
fully aware of the actual employment opportunities in the destination, or that they overesti-
mate the costs involved in moving. And even if the information to calculate the expected net 
gain is in principle available, its acquisition imposes a (psychological or actual) cost on the 
individual, which must count as a moving cost. Provision of better information or provision of 
relevant information at a lower cost for the individual, therefore constitutes relevant geo-
graphic mobility policies. 
Information can be spread through public (or private) organizations. Normally one would ex-
pect that the collection of information benefits from certain economies of scale, so that proc-
                                                                                                                                                        
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin are especially relevant in this regard. 
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ess is more efficient if organised on a larger scale than if organised at the individual level. At 
least, this is true as far as more general information is concerned. To the extent that the indi-
vidual requires personalised information, collection at the individual level tends to be more 
efficient. Still, there might be a role for public information networks facilitating providing 
personalised services. 
Considering that difficulties to find a new job is perceived as a key mobility barrier, informa-
tion platforms concerning career opportunities and portability of qualifications are especially 
relevant initiatives in the realm of public information policies. If they function, such portals 
are efficient in a sense that they can serve as consolidated job-markets reducing job search 
costs for both employees and employers by a substantial margin. Due to the advances in in-
formation technology (e.g. the internet), this service can be provided in a cost-efficient man-
ner. However, this only considers the distribution of information. Gathering of relevant con-
tent can still be costly. 
Considering the fairness criterion, web portals as information platforms fare quite well in the 
days of broad and cheap access to the internet. Nevertheless one should be aware that there 
are still systematic differences in access to web-based information, due to different computer 
literacy, but also due to language barriers unless portals are available in several languages 
(increasing their costs). 
EURES – The European Job Mobility Portal – is perhaps the most prominent example of a 
web platform promoting an integrated European labour market. EURES is a co-operation 
network between the European Commission and the Public Employment Services of the EU 
countries plus Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein Switzerland, and other partner organisations. 
The EURES network offers services to workers and employers. Registered employers have 
the opportunity to post vacancies offered to foreigners, and job seekers have the possibility to 
post CVs to work abroad on a website. This web portal is designed as a platform for job 
search on the integrated European labour market. It provides a one -stop-shop access to all 
vacancies available from national public employment services (PES) and updated information 
on living and working conditions in the EURES network countries. It complements the web 
portals run by the PES, which generally target their national labour markets. A speciality of 
the EURES portal is that it is closely linked to the Europass initiative which offers a co-
ordinated portfolio of transparent documents that facilitate the transferability of qualifica-
tions.64
The efficiency of job search-related web portals in improving geographic mobility is difficult 
to judge. A preliminary evaluation of the EURES network conducted in 2005 concludes that 
EURES, through the development of particularly the internet services, has improved the 
                                                 
64 Europass was adopted in December 2004 and launched in February 2005. It operates through a European 
internet portal and a network of National Europass Centres. 
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transparency and information exchange as well as the exchange of CVs and vacancies on the 
European labour market. However, a quantitatively formal assessment of the impact of 
EURES is lacking and appears as difficult to achieve.65
In this study of 2005, the internet services provided by EURES have been judged to be mod-
erately good. This also was mentioned for the quality of the services provided by EURES 
advisers. In addition, more than 60 per cent of the clients classify the self-service facilities at 
least as good. These results will be a basis for a coming assessment in 2008-2009. Since 2005, 
many improvements were achieved as regards the portal and the advisors service network. 
Participating countries have well implemented most of the EURES Guidelines 2004-200766. 
They are now working towards the implementation of EURES guidelines 2007-2010. 
On the other hand, it appears that the number of jobseekers that actually found a job through 
EURES portal is not quantifiable since Jobseekers are not identified. At present,67 the EURES 
portal reports more than 1.300.000 vacancies accessible from national PES. More than 
300,000 CVs of job seekers are posted to express their willingness to find a job abroad and 
about 15 000 employers are registered. It is a good sign that these numbers are growing con-
stantly. These figures suggest that few employers are aware that EURES services to employ-
ers are available to recruit abroad. One of the key problems is achieving the full integration of 
EURES into the national public employment services vice versa. Still the contribution of the 
EURES job mobility portal is mitigated by the fact that the higher educated and researchers in 
particular, as well as their employers, tend not to use public employment services. 
One should expect that the effectiveness of the job matching process achieved through portals 
facilitating mobility like EURES could be improved, if more people were actually involved in 
the job-seeking process at the EU level. Thus actions aimed at furthering and promoting 
rather than facilitating mobility are likely to increase the impact. In the area of information 
policies, initiatives satisfying this target are various information platforms explaining educa-
tion, working and living conditions in Europe. Some web portals help to solve issues related 
laws and regulations of countries for the workers and business.  
In general, these platforms cater to the special information needs of specific groups in the 
labour market. Examples are given in the fact box below. The specificity of these platforms 
implies that they can take less advantage of economies of scale, which could hamper their 
efficiency. On the other hand, the platforms may be justified when acquisition of specialist 
information by the individual is (prohibitively) costly. 
                                                 
65 Evaluation of the EURES programme, ECORYS-Nederland BV, for the European Commission, October 
2005. The evaluation included an ex-post assessment of the period 2000-2003 and an ex-ante/interim evaluation 
of the period 2004-2007. This evaluation does not apply rigid evaluation principles, i.e. does not solve the coun-
terfactual question of how many job matches would have occurred without existence of the EURES portal. 
66 Synthesis note on the evaluation of EURES, published by The European Commission, March 2006. 
67 Date of reference: 07/03/08. 
IZA, NIRAS Consultants, AMS 106 
IZA Research Report No. 19  
Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Social and Economic Benefits  
 
 
Beyond web portals, information relevant to foster geographic mobility can be distributed 
through other channels. In the following, we elaborate on two examples, namely awareness 
campaigns and cultural exchange. 
Awareness campaigns seek to put the opportunities associated with geographic mobility into 
people’s minds. In a sense, this strategy might be interpreted as reducing the psychological 
costs attached to mobility. To the extent that awareness campaigns provide the opportunity to 
interact with people from other countries and different cultures, they should also be consid-
ered relevant as they target the barrier of cultural adaptation. 
Both at the EU and at the national level, numerous awareness activities are taking place. A 
corner stone in recent times has been the launch of the 2006 European Year of Workers’ Mo-
bility by the European Commission. The purpose of this initiative was to raise public aware-
ness and open up the debate on the real benefits and challenges of working abroad or chang-
ing job, including the advantages, costs, impacts and rights of working in another country. An 
example of the campaigns sponsored during this year is given in the fact box below. 
Specific Information Platforms 
 
The Ploteus portal offers special information for individuals considering education abroad. It offers spe-
cial information on national education schemes and opportunities for students, as well as general informa-
tion on living conditions.  
 
The European Researcher's Mobility Portal is a joint initiative of the European Commission and the 34 
countries participating in 7th Framework Program. It gives advice to researchers seeking to advance their 
careers by moving abroad. The portal comprises specific information on training and job opportunities, 
but also a wealth of practical information on living, working and relaxing in the European countries. 
 
An example of a web portal at the national level is the Europa-Mobil Portal. The site aims to go one step 
further than providing general information (on job opportunities, social security, education etc.) by pro-
viding a personalized service thanks to a team of experts who respond to questions posted online. 
 
The Website for Women’s Mobility has been launched to promote geographic mobility for women, 
particularly those in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions. The website provides information on mobility 
policies and related topics such as the reconciliation of work and family life. It aims at raising awareness 
of the business opportunities in the EU and to prepare women to be an integral part of it. 
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A related campaign is the European Job Days held in September 2007. During the days em-
ployers and employees could meet at more than 500 events in 300 European cities. Many of 
the events were held together with EURES.  
It can be stated that these campaigns have accomplished the aim of raising awareness, based 
on the numbers of persons who participated in one way or another. It also appears that the 
goal was achieved in a cost efficient manner considering the fairly limited financial resources 
involved. However, evidence also suggests that the psychological costs related to the migra-
tion decision very much depend on experiences within one’s own personal network – leaving 
the specific impact of such campaigns unclear. 
Moreover, the very broad target of such campaigns may hamper their efficiency with regard 
to increased geographic mobility. Campaigns directed at specific population groups inclined 
to migrate, such as the young, might have relatively stronger effects, though exclusion of cer-
tain population groups always raises fairness concerns. Further, the EU level campaigns re-
quire coordination with the diverse policies pursued also at national level.  
Another way to provide information relevant for the geographic mobility decision is cultural 
exchange. The relevancy of cultural exchange initiatives is evident considering the cultural 
adaptation barriers to mobility. Thus an initiative like the 2008 European Year of Intercultural 
Dialogue might also have an effect on geographic mobility. The Year aims at encouraging 
intercultural dialogue involving cultural diversity inside and between Member States. It fo-
cuses on the youth, a group more inclined to geographic mobility than the average, which 
should raise its efficiency. 
More long-term oriented, and thereby probably more successful, is the Youth in Action Pro-
gramme 2007-2013, a key instrument in providing young people with opportunities for non-
formal and informal learning with a European dimension. One of the specific aims of the pro-
gramme is to promote a European citizenship and foster social cohesion among young people 
in the European Union. Thus, the programme could directly lower the cultural adaptation bar-
riers for the next generation of workers. 
In general, while cultural policies promoting intercultural dialogue and fostering a European 
identity have a significant potential to increase labour mobility, they will develop their posi-
A Typical Awareness Campaign 
 
The European Year of Workers’ Mobility was used to fund a radio project. Over July and August 2006, 
Radio Krakow gave a real focus to the issue of mobility, broadcasting 45-minute programs five days a 
week. The programs presented the stories of mobile workers and encouraged listeners to discuss and par-
ticipate. Reporters followed the lives of Polish workers abroad in different EU countries and presented the 
day-to-day reality of new experiences and occasional difficulties. Listeners got a better idea of what it is 
really like to work abroad in the EU. The program offered the audience the possibility to call in and ask 
for advice related to issues of geographic mobility. 
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tive impact over the long run. Like integration of migrants, cultural policies are likely to re-
duce the social costs of mobility by providing a sense of unity and security among citizens 
across regions and Member States. Nevertheless, given the inertia of cultural institutions, the 
efficiency of these policies is virtually impossible to measure. One of the difficulties in man-
aging cultural barriers to mobility is the reconciliation of the preferences for cultural diversity 
with the need for a labour market without major cultural barriers and frictions. Only fair and 
consistent cultural policies respecting the needs of all social groups can potentially succeed in 
such reconciliation. 
4.7 Harmonisation and Coordination Issues 
If one follows the empirical evidence reported in chapter 3, citizens do not perceive issues 
related to European harmonisation as substantial barriers to geographic mobility. However, 
this observation made in the context of mobility intentions does not allow us to conclude that 
harmonisation issues would play no role in the mobility process. As harmonisation touches 
upon difficult legal problems concerning portability and international recognition of rights, 
individuals may grasp its importance only when they are actually on the move.  
In any case, it is fairly obvious that lack of harmonisation or coordination can lower the geo-
graphic mobility potential across countries. One consequence is that the potential expected 
gains cannot be fully realised without harmonisation or coordination. Another consequence is 
that non-harmonisation imposes a direct cost on individuals changing location. 
In the following, we briefly consider three different areas where immediate issues of Euro-
pean harmonisation and coordination arise – free movement of workers, recognition of quali-
fications and portability of supplementary pensions and the exportability of social security 
rights. 
4.7.1 Free Movement of Workers 
Of course, open borders are the fundamental precondition for workers’ mobility. And of 
course, the general principle of free movement of workers is well established within the EU. 
The strongest deviation from this principle affecting mobility within EU is the transitional 
arrangements that restrict labour movements from the new Member States to the other Mem-
ber States. Restrictions can be imposed on workers from the EU-8 countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) as well as on those from 
Bulgaria and Romania, ensuring that they will not displace local employment. At the same 
time the new Member States have the possibility to put reciprocal barriers in place68. The re-
strictive measures should in principle be lifted after five years after the entry of new Member 
                                                 
68 Malta and Cyprus have full free movement of workers in the EU, but Malta has the possibility to invoke a 
safeguard clause in case it experiences, or foresees, serious disturbances of the labour market. If accepted, it 
could restrict the access of all EU workers to Malta. 
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States into the EU but at the latest in May 2011 for EU-8 countries and December 2013 for 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
Among EU-15, ten countries have now completely opened their labour markets.69 Of the re-
maining five Member States, four have maintained the work permit requirement, but have 
simplified procedures or eased restrictions in some sectors and professions in which there are 
labour shortages, like care services, transport and construction (Denmark, Belgium, France 
and Germany).  
The table below illustrates how most of the EU-15 Member States have now opened their 
borders to workers from the new Member States, while a few countries still impose restric-
tions. 
 
Table 15: A Number of EU-15 Countries Still Impose Restrictions on Workers from New Member States  
 Entry of  
EU-8 workers 
Entry of  
EU-8 workers 
Entry of workers  
from Bulgaria  
and Romania70
 May 2004 
to April 2006 
May 2006 
to April 2009 
2007-2008 
Austria Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Belgium Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Denmark Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Finland Restricted Open Open 
France Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Germany Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Greece Restricted Open Restricted 
Ireland Open Open Restricted 
Italy Restricted Open Restricted 
Luxembourg Restricted Open Restricted 
Netherlands Restricted Open Restricted 
Portugal Restricted Open Restricted 
Spain Restricted Open Restricted 
Sweden Open Open Open 
United Kingdom Open Open Restricted 
 
Source: OECD (2007b:160 updated version of table 8.3) 
 
After the enlargement on 1 January 2007 ten EU-25 Member States (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden) have liberalised 
access of Bulgarian and Romanian workers to their labour markets under national law. In 
Finland, Cyprus and Slovenia, workers from these countries must register for monitoring pur-
poses. 
                                                 
69 United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden liberalised their access to their labour markets under national law al-
ready from the beginning, Spain, Finland, Greece and Portugal opened their labour market on May 1, 2006, and 
Italy on July 26, 2006. On 1 May 2007 the Netherlands followed and lifted all restrictions, as did Luxembourg 
on 1 November 2007. 
70 Bulgarian and Romanian workers also face restrictions in Hungary and Malta. 
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The remaining EU-25 Member States have maintained work permit systems, albeit sometimes 
with modifications and simplified procedures. For instance France and Hungary apply simple 
procedures for a number of occupations without considering the job situation, or without a 
labour market review71 and Denmark issues work permits for work of at least 30 hours/week. 
This is governed by a collective labour agreement or complies with normal standards for the 
sector/profession. Where employers have prior approval, workers may start work upon regis-
tration of employment with the Immigration Service without first obtaining a work permit. 
 
The heterogeneity of admission schemes to national labour markets clearly prevents from 
reaching an efficient level of geographic mobility. It reduces the economic gains from cross-
border migration both from an individual and from a societal perspective. Possibilities of find-
ing the best match between the skills endowed in workers and the needs of employers on a 
fully integrated labour market are wasted. 
Countries often justify the imposed restrictions on fairness grounds. The argument is that im-
migration inflows would put pressure on native workers’ wages and employment opportuni-
ties. As we have seen in the discussion on optimum geographic mobility, however, these ar-
guments have little empirical substance. Moreover, adopting a broader fairness perspective, 
implementing different rules for different countries and even for different sectors or catego-
ries of workers can not be evaluated as just. 
4.7.2 Recognition of Qualifications 
A prerequisite for improved skill matches through geographic mobility on an integrated la-
bour market is transferability of human capital between regions. Lack of recognition of formal 
and informal skills acquired abroad wastes growth opportunities.  
 
A number of European legal rules are already guaranteeing the mutual recognition of profes-
sional qualifications between Member States. These rules are developed in order to help make 
the labour markets more flexible and overcome obstacles with national regulations which only 
recognise professional qualifications of a particular jurisdiction.  
 
European legal rules mainly concerns:  
• A harmonisation of training requirements which allow for automatic recognition of pro-
fessional qualifications primarily in the health sector (doctors, nurses, dentists, midwives, 
veterinary surgeons, pharmacists and architects).  
• Mutual recognition which applies to all the professions for which Member States require a 
qualification, with a few exceptions.  
• Automatic recognition of professional experience for professions of craft, commerce and 
industry sectors.  
• Recognition of qualifications concerning activities in the fields of commerce and the dis-
tribution of toxic substances.  
                                                 
71 150 occupations in case of France. For Hungary it concerns 245 occupations. 
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• Coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial 
agents which harmonises civil law on the relationship between agent and principal.  
 
The EU has recently reformed the system for recognition of professional qualifications, in 
order to help make labour markets more flexible, further liberalise the provision of services, 
encourage more automatic recognition of qualifications, and simplify administrative proce-
dures. 
A new Directive (2005/36/EC), which has come into effect on 20 October 2007, consolidates 
and modernizes 15 existing Directives covering all recognition rules, except for those appli-
cable to lawyers, activities in the field of toxic substances and commercial agents. This is the 
first comprehensive modernisation of the EU system since its introduction over 40 years ago. 
Despite the EU legislative framework hurdles remain for mobile professionals. While some 
professions have their diplomas recognised immediately (architects, doctors, nurses, mid-
wives, pharmacists, veterinaries and lawyers), others face administrative difficulties when 
applying for a job in another member state as they have to obtain recognition from the host 
country. Further, they can be asked to exercise their profession under the supervision of a lo-
cally qualified professional for a period of up to three years.  
Thus, there is certainly still a role for policy intervention concerning the international recogni-
tion of formal and informal skills.72 One way of facilitating the mobility of all professionals 
would be to extend the regime of immediate recognition of qualifications and diplomas. This 
would require unanimity among the 27 EU Member States on agreed minimum training con-
ditions for each profession, which however appears to be unlikely for any of the regulated 
professions.73
Taking a broader look most fundamentally, the Bologna process aiming at harmonisation of 
educational systems, quality assurance, and qualification recognition is a tool to simplify as-
sessment and recognition of skills acquired abroad. Another efficient policy seems to be coor-
dination of vocational training across borders, as can be seen from German-speaking coun-
tries’ shared vocational standards, which yield increased portability of skills. Standardization 
processes in academic and vocational training will unfold their impact on geographic mobility 
only over the longer term. The skill composition of the work force develops only slowly, 
starting from the bottom of new entrants. 
In the meantime, useful initiatives to achieve skills recognition are information platforms such 
as the Europass initiative described above. Another area of initiative to be taken is abolishing 
or at least reconsidering formal qualification requirements or licence schemes for certain oc-
cupations, in particular those affecting mobile professionals. These are often used to protect 
                                                 
72 See Bloom and Grant (2001). 
73 See OECD (2007b). 
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the incumbents against competition, both from within the national labour market (license 
schemes) and from abroad (qualification requirements). 
Such harmonisation effort can be considered cost-efficient. It is expected to produce rather 
strong positive effects on geographic mobility while producing rather low costs associated 
with information provision and removal or reduction of excessive qualification standards set 
by national legislation. Obviously, universal recognition of qualification is also fair, since it 
treats individuals with equal qualifications acquired in different locations equally. 
4.7.3 Portability of supplementary pensions and the coordination of social security rights 
Another area of concern in the realm of harmonisation and coordination of social protection is 
the coordination of social security rights and the portability of supplementary pension rights. 
Community legislation has been put in place mainly aims at coordinating national social pro-
tection systems. Such coordination clearly yields benefits in terms of lowered costs of migra-
tion, as they make the international transfer of various social rights within the EU easier. 
The key areas of social protection include 1) the coordination of social security rights and 2) the 
portability of supplementary/occupational pensions. Social security rights are subject to coordi-
nation rules laid down in Regulation 1408/71, which is based on 42 EC. Supplementary pension 
rights and other social advantages are subject to the principle of equal treatment of migrant 
workers in article 39 EC. The key Regulations and Directives are presented in the box below. 
 
EU Policies for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes and  
the Portability of Occupational Pensions 
 
Social security regulations: 
Council regulation 1408/71/EEC serves to coordinate social security schemes for persons moving within 
the Community. Its object is to ensure that a person who has used the right to move within the EU will not 
be placed in a worse situation than a person who has always lived in the same Member State. The Regula-
tion has been adapted, improved and broadened several times to allow for the Court’s interpretations and 
other developments at EU level, but also in the light of the frequent changes in the Member States. These 
numerous changes have made the regulation very complex and difficult to work with. 
 
Council regulation 883/2004/EEC aims at simplifying and modernizing the current regulation and once 
the draft Implementing Regulation becomes applicable it will replace Regulation 1408/71. Regulation 
883/2004 reinforces the cooperation between national administrations on social security and expands the 
personal and material scope, as it will not only apply to employed and self-employed persons but to all EU 
nationals who are insured under national law and will also cover pre-retirement benefits. 
 
Portability of occupational pensions: 
The Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the portability of sup-
plementary pension rights. An amended proposal was adopted in October 2007, which aims to guarantee 
mobile workers improved access and better preservation of their supplementary pension rights. It focuses 
on the setting of minimum requirements for better access to pension rights, preservation so that mobile 
workers are not penalized and improved access to useful and timely information. 
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The Community legislation on social security coordination has a very clear content: mobile 
workers and their families benefit (with some exceptions) from social security coverage in the 
country where the person concerned works and must pay corresponding contributions. Since 
national social security schemes can vary considerably, EU law provides the workers with the 
.the right to export their social security rights which means that benefits acquired under the 
legislation of a Member States must be paid without any reduction, modification or suspen-
sion even if the person concerned resides in another Member State. The practical implementa-
tion of this basic principle requires good co-operation and coordination between Member 
States. 
The Regulation on the co-ordination of social security schemes is very broad in scope. It cov-
ers sickness benefits, parenthood and family benefits, invalidity benefits, statutory old age 
pensions, death grants, survivors’ benefits, benefits related to accident at work and occupa-
tional diseases, and unemployment benefits. 
A missing element in the EU framework on social security concerns occupational pensions. 
Today, changing job or country often means losing occupational pension benefits in some 
Member States. The difficulties in transferring these benefits from one country to another 
create some serious obstacles to labour mobility.  
A number of steps have been taken in order to strengthen the portability of occupational pen-
sions. Most recently, an amended Proposal for a Directive on minimum requirements for en-
hancing worker mobility by improving the acquisition and preservation of supplementary 
pension rights was adopted (October 2007). The proposed Directive aims to guarantee mobile 
workers improved access and better preservation of their supplementary pension rights. It 
focuses on the setting of minimum requirements for better access to pension rights and pres-
ervation of rights so that mobile workers are not penalised and on improved access to useful 
and timely information. 
The ongoing Commission work on the ‘portability directive’ is highly needed and supported. 
For instance, an independent expert study show that many pension schemes require workers 
to contribute to the scheme for more than two years before they acquire a right to a pension. 
The study also shows that a fair amount of pension schemes offer no revaluation of workers' 
dormant pension benefits when they move jobs. In effect these rights are frozen until retire-
ment. These results clearly demonstrate the need for a directive to introduce minimum stan-
dards to improve mobile workers' access to supplementary pension rights, and the need for 
these rights to be protected in the years between leaving an employer and retiring.74
 
Another recent study, supporting the proposed directive, shows that on average nearly 40% of 
current workers expect to change employer during the next five years. These people are there-
                                                 
74 Quantitative overview on supplementary pension provision. By Hewitt Associates for the European Commis-
sion, 2007. See also OECD (2007b).  
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fore potentially disadvantaged by the operation of long vesting periods found in supplemen-
tary pension schemes.75
 
Another important issue relates to the social security of mobile workers opting for some of the 
new forms of mobility. While the current EU regulations mainly focus on long-term mobility 
(more than one year) an increasing part of migrant workers, e.g. in the service sector and the 
construction section often work on short-term contracts and frequently change jobs. The hur-
dles for short-term mobility may be very different from those experienced by the more classi-
cal type of migrant workers that decide to emigrate and work for a longer period in another 
Member State.  
For instance, the (financial) hurdles perceived with regard to social security cover tend to be 
higher for short-term mobility than for long-term mobility, since migrant workers that change 
jobs more often are faced with frequent changes in national legislation that applies to them 
when changing jobs. Likewise, more hurdles could be expected for short-term migrants with 
regard to the portability of supplementary pension rights. In order to gain valid knowledge of 
the specific difficulties and hurdles that may arise in relation to various short term mobility 
contracts further research is needed. It should also be examined whether the regulatory 
framework (e.g. no 883/2004) and related administrative practices need to be adjusted to take 
better account of changed mobility patterns. 
In summary, the European labour market, from an institutional perspective, despite unques-
tionably considerable effort at European level, has not yet fully reached the degree of integra-
tion characterizing a single national labour market, or, to draw a perhaps fairer comparison, 
that of the US labour market. Overall, it appears that there is still some scope for improve-
ment fostering geographic mobility across borders. However, within the field of social secu-
rity, harmonisation is not a feasible solution as there is no legal basis for this in the EC Treaty. 
4.8 Conclusion: Geographic Mobility Policies in a Flexicurity Framework 
As a way of conclusion, we will place the discussion on appropriate geographic mobility poli-
cies into a flexicurity framework. 
The concept of flexicurity has attracted massive attention among European policy makers 
recently.76 The fundamental idea behind flexicurity schemes is that there are potential eco-
nomic and societal gains to be made by simultaneously increasing labour market flexibility 
and labour market security. Well-conceived flexicurity schemes at the national level may en-
courage geographic mobility, as they reduce the risk involved in making a move. The reduc-
                                                 
75 Coppin and Vandenbrande (2007).  
76 The Austrian Presidency of the EU in spring 2006 put flexicurity on the top of its agenda. It has recently been 
the subject of a Communication from the European Commission (2007). 
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tion in risk is equivalent to a reduction in mobility costs, which raises the propensity to mi-
grate. 
Given the historical role of the European Union as a means to increase mobility of goods, 
services and labour among the Member States, it is quite remarkable that the European 
flexicurity discourse has put little, if any, weight on the interplay between the spatial flexibil-
ity – or geographic mobility – on the labour market and the various forms of security ar-
rangements. In fact this issue is absent from the Commission’s communication and policy 
documents related to flexicurity. 
The pivot of the flexicurity concept is to combine forms of flexibility with various forms of 
security: (i) job security, i.e. keeping the same job; (ii) employment security, i.e. having a 
good chance of getting a new job, (iii) income security, i.e. having a smooth stream of in-
come; and (iv) combination security, which refers in particular to the reconciliation of work 
and family life.77
The forms of labour market flexibility normally considered in this context are numerical 
flexibility, functional flexibility, working-time flexibility and wage flexibility.78 But this basic 
conceptual framework is quite open to adding geographic mobility as a separate aspect of 
flexibility. We hence obtain a special representation of the so-called Wilthagen matrix, which 
is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 16: Combinations of Spatial Flexibility and Security 
Flexibility/security  
 
Job 
security 
Employment 
security  
Income  
security  
Combination 
security  
Geographic mobility 
within a country  I III V VII 
Cross-border  
geographic mobility  II IV VI VIII 
Notes: Own representation inspired by Wilthagen and Tros (2004), p. 171. 
 
The Wilthagen matrix offers a heuristic tool which can serve to identify different flexicurity 
policies or combinations of flexibility and security for specific schemes, or, as it is also used, 
to identify stylised trade-offs between flexibility and security in different national labour mar-
ket regimes. In this understanding, flexicurity is a complex and multi-dimensional concept, 
which calls for an integrative approach regarding institutions and reforms in different policy 
fields. Flexicurity arrangements are embedded in broader national contexts such as welfare 
state models, bargaining systems and national traditions, just as there are many different 
forms of flexicurity in Europe and in individual Member States. 
                                                 
77 See Wilthagen and Tros (2004). 
78 See Atkinson (1985); Atkinson and Meager (1986). 
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A number of flexicurity arrangements of relevance to geographic mobility immediately come 
to mind, when looking at the eight cells of Table 16 one by one. The list of instruments and 
policies presented in the following is not meant to be exhaustive. 
 
I. Combining geographic mobility and job security within a country
Here focus is on the capacity of employers to relocate their employees between different loca-
tions of a company within a country. This will probably be an issue mainly negotiate between 
the employer and the relevant trade union, but one can imagine public support from the Public 
Employment Service for instance in assisting the employer in finding work for family mem-
bers that intend to follow the employee to the new location. 
II. Combining cross-border geographic mobility and job security
This configuration, where employers aim at relocating their staff from one country to another, 
opens for more considerations concerning relevant public policies. The main task of flexicu-
rity arrangements in this case is of course to facilitate the relocation process by lowering any 
administrative or other barriers that hinder the relocation of a specific worker by a company. 
In general these barriers will however be similar to the barriers faced by workers that simulta-
neously move between countries and get a new employer at the same time, which is repre-
sented by cells IV, VI and VIII in the table. They will therefore be discussed in more detail 
below. 
III. Combining geographic mobility and employment security within a country
A number of instruments are relevant here. On the list of instruments of active labour market 
policy one can mention: 1) a nationwide placement system allowing job-searchers and the 
PES to monitor job vacancies throughout the country, 2) special mobility instruments like 
economic subsidies to unemployed persons moving from one region to another and 3) support 
to the job-search of spouses. 
Outside the realm of active labour market policy one can mention housing policy, which can 
lower the barriers to getting a new home, and transport policy, which can lower the cost of 
transportation for persons choosing the commute on a daily or weekly basis. 
IV. Combining cross-border geographic mobility and employment security
Within active labour market policy a core activity is of course an international placement sys-
tem (exemplified by EURES) allowing job-searchers and the PES to monitor job vacancies on 
an international basis. Furthermore one can think of activities that improve cross-border mo-
bility like training in language skills and recruitment campaigns abroad. 
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Also of relevance, and outside the scope of active labour market policy, are the rules concern-
ing the recognition of foreign exams and skills. So is of course the strictness of the adminis-
trative regulation of foreign labour and immigration policies in general. Furthermore a num-
ber of the instruments of relevance to promote internal labour migration will also be of rele-
vance for cross-border labour migration. 
V. Combining geographic mobility and income security within a country
The core issue here is, of course, how the right to unemployment insurance and social assis-
tance is related to internal mobility within a country. Two aspects are of relevance here. First 
one can consider, whether voluntary mobility within a country will influence the eligibility for 
unemployment insurance or social assistance. This is probably rarely the case in a European 
context. The other issue is, whether the eligibility for especially unemployment insurance is 
related to obeying some rules concerning geographic mobility, either by having to accept a 
certain amount of daily commuting or by having to move more permanently to areas with 
more job vacancies. 
VI. Combining cross-border geographic mobility and income security
Here the central question is of course that of the portability of unemployment insurance be-
tween countries. Two different issues arise: First one has to consider, what sort of unemploy-
ment benefits that are available is available to foreigners, when they become unemployed 
outside their home country. Will they be eligible for benefits similar to those of the home 
country or to those of the host country? For permanent migrants the latter will probably 
mostly be the case, but for persons involved in short-term migration or persons doing cross-
border commuting this is of course a core issue for the motivation to become mobile. 
The other issue has to do with the options for unemployed persons to look for work abroad, 
while being unemployed. Can they keep their right to unemployment benefits during job 
search abroad? In countries with rather generous levels of unemployment insurance, this is of 
coursed a core factor, when considering the cross-border mobility of those unemployed that 
are eligible for unemployment insurance. 
VII. Combining geographic mobility and combination security within a country
Compared to the other forms of security, “combination security” covers a rather wide range of 
security arrangements including for instance maternity leave and childcare. Some of the ar-
rangements will normally be under national legislation and therefore not influence geographic 
mobility within a country. But in cases where there are regional differences in the access to 
childcare institutions, such differences might have an influence of the willingness of families 
to move from one region to another. 
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VIII. Combining cross-border geographic mobility and combination security
Apart from the issues raised with respect to the previous, the access to combination security in 
the case of cross-border mobility will also be influenced by the legislation that regulates the 
options for family members to go along with the migrant worker to the host country. Will 
family members for instance have easy access to social security, health care and education in 
the host country? 
 
To sum up, a number of mobility-oriented policies exist, which can be said to extend labour 
market flexibility in a spatial dimension – within-country and cross-border mobility – while at 
the same time providing various forms of security for workers. Still not all mobility-oriented 
policies fit nicely into the framework of flexicurity. 
Nevertheless, the flexicurity framework provides a useful structure to assess the contribution 
of individual policies. It will inspire the policy recommendations to which we proceed in the 
next chapter, concluding this report. 
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5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The core finding of this study regarding the extent of actual and optimum mobility from a 
labour market perspective is that, weighing the possible positive and negative economic and 
social externalities, geographic mobility is too low in Europe. From a long-term demographic 
perspective, as the population share of the age groups most inclined to migration will decline, 
pro-active geographic mobility raising individual propensities to migrate could serve to coun-
teract falling mobility rates within an ageing Europe.  
There is a twofold role of geographic mobility policies aimed at increased mobility rates: (i) 
enlarging the expected utility gains, and (ii) reducing mobility costs for the individual.  
As for the assessment of EU and national policies, this study points at the crucial importance 
of the following policies to minimise labour market frictions at the national and the trans-
national level: 
- Strengthening the institutional preconditions of mobility on the labour market  
- Developing mobility-friendly educational policies 
- Creating effective information and social networks  
- Studying possibilities to adapt the Community legislation and administrative practices 
in the field of social security coordination to foster mobility  
- Evaluating mobility-related policies properly  
Worries about finding a suitable job are perceived as one of the key hurdles to geographic 
mobility. This establishes a need for flexible labour markets. An environment facilitating real-
location of labour, which exchanges job security for employment security, generally creates 
better opportunities for outsiders, including those coming from a distant labour market. In this 
context, combining flexibility and security according to the concept of flexicurity can be a 
viable solution. Indeed a flexicurity scheme adapted to the specific needs to cushion spatial 
flexibility – geographic mobility within countries and across borders – serves as a broad ori-
entation for the formulation of our policy recommendations. 
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5.2 Strengthening the Institutional Preconditions for Mobility 
As regards the reinforcement on geographic mobility, properly designed activation policies 
combining appropriate job-search monitoring enforcing mobility requirements and pro-
grammes furthering training and mobility might help reduce labour market imbalances. Acti-
vation raises mobility in a system with developed unemployment protection, thus countering 
potential disincentive effects of social benefits. 
Hence, based on discussions in section 4.3 the following actions are recommended. 
The role of active and passive labour market policies:  
 Labour market policies can either inhibit or promote regional mobility. In order to 
ease labour market frictions between regions of high and low unemployment, Member 
States should assess the effects of existing policies and implement more mobility-
oriented labour market policies. This involves, on the one hand, an evaluation and a 
potential revision of access to unemployment benefits and related mobility require-
ments. On the other hand, there is a need to develop mobility-supporting active labour 
market policy schemes. Unemployment benefits should be designed in a way that al-
lows for and stimulates incentives for mobility but not for prolonged benefit depend-
ency.79  
 
 Start-up costs associated with mobility at the individual level could make it reasonable 
to compensate job-seekers through economic incentives to move within a country or 
across national borders. To avoid deadweight loss, these measures have to be targeted 
properly. An alternative could be to give selective financial support, i.e. only when the 
mobility can help to solve problems of labour shortage in another geographic location. 
This kind of selective forms for financial support for mobility has not been tried be-
fore and there is need for an investigation into this area before taking action. 
 
The role of other labour market institutions:  
 National labour market institutions influence the propensity of geographic mobility. 
Hence, in accordance with the flexicurity principle, EU Member States should assess 
the role of their labour market institutions in determining geographic mobility. Fol-
lowing the flexicurity approach it will be helpful to remove barriers to mobility.  
 Furthermore, the European Commission and national authorities should assess the role 
of housing, child care infrastructure and other public or enterprise policies influencing 
the costs of mobility. Effective and targeted policies of this kind help generate combi-
nation security in the flexicurity framework.  
                                                 
79 See also the discussion in OECD (2007b).  
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 Finally, the European Commission and the Member States should investigate and 
document the extent of possible negative side effects from mobility, e.g. brain drain 
issues, and, if such effects can be found, next identify solutions on how to ameliorate 
these potential negative effects.80 
5.3 Developing Mobility-friendly Educational Policies 
Our analysis of the hurdles to intra-EU mobility perceived by citizens underpins the hypothe-
sis that language and cultural barriers are extremely important when explaining the limited 
level of geographic mobility in Europe. While the capacity of acculturation, a process of re-
socialisation involving changes in attitudes, values and identification, is a rather difficult tar-
get for government intervention, this observation suggests two policy targets. First, promotion 
of language capacity could foster geographic mobility. The effect of language is direct and 
indirect. Directly, it reduces the language hurdle negatively associated with cross border mo-
bility propensities. Indirectly, it appears to reduce cultural barriers preventing from migration. 
Second, promotion of education abroad could foster geographic mobility. The effect could 
work through both reducing language and cultural barriers. 
Further, geographic mobility has been recognised to be a chain phenomenon – after the first 
move has been taken, additional moves become more likely. Thus, fostering mobility early in 
life, especially if combined with education, is a candidate for a good mobility policy. 
Therefore, based on the discussions in section 4.4 the following actions are recommended: 
Improve language skills: 
 
 The capability of language learning is a crucial factor to facilitate cross-border mobil-
ity. Hence, Member States should put strong emphasis on creating language learning 
capacities. All pupils should learn at least one foreign language, preferably two, and 
Member States should also encourage adults to maintain improve their language skills. 
 In a mid to long term perspective, upgrading of foreign language teaching at all levels 
of national education systems would greatly help the cause of mobility in Europe. 
More short-term action could consist of direct incentives to language improvement for 
future movers, in the form of EU–sponsored bonuses for language and culture courses 
(e.g., vouchers for applicants to jobs via the EURES portal). 
                                                 
80 However, despite some public discussion, there is no evidence of hollowing out effects in particular in the new 
EU Member States. OECD (2007b) shows that the share of workers living abroad is still much higher in Ireland 
and Portugal than in any other EU member state including the new accession countries. 
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Strengthen exchange programmes:  
 At the EU level, existing educational exchange programmes such as the Erasmus pro-
gramme, the Grundtvig programme etc. are very relevant and efficient promoters of 
geographical mobility, as participation within the programmes tend to increase the 
probability for further mobility later in the life course of individuals. More young peo-
ple, but also adults should therefore be encouraged and supported to make use of the 
existing programmes. This is of particular importance in sectors other than higher 
education such as schooling, vocational training and adult learning. For instance, ini-
tiatives promoting rotation schemes in association with vocational training or during 
apprenticeship may lay a basis for mobility for a larger share of the population. Hence, 
the European Commission should consider if the existing programmes could be fur-
ther promoted. 
 The European Commission and national authorities should also consider whether new 
programmes and funds – or adjustment of existing funds – are needed in order to reach 
learners at all levels. For instance, geographical mobility could be intensified as a key 
objective of policies supported by the European Social Fund and the European Global-
isation Fund.  
Invest in adult and vocational training: 
 
 Member States should develop and implement lifelong learning strategies with a direct 
focus also on geographic mobility. Apart from language learning, one specific action 
could be to develop and support international job rotation networks allowing workers 
at all levels and in all sectors to experience a period of time at a work place in another 
EU country.  
5.4 Creating Effective Information and Social Networks 
The key mobility hurdle besides language and culture perceived by Europeans is related to 
worries about finding a – suitable – job. This observation points toward the necessity to sup-
port information and transparency of international job opportunities in order to establish an 
environment creating opportunities for mobility. The EURES network could play a crucial 
role in this context, but is characterised by some untapped potential so far. It can however be 
further developed to include many more of the vacancies announced in the countries in the 
EU from private employment services. It is difficult to assess the optimal level for a vacancy 
bank of this kind, but the issue must be investigated further. 
But information on conditions and vacancies is not enough for a successful matching of job-
seekers and vacancies. The employer must accept the job-seeker and a prerequisite for this is 
that the employer is given the possibility to assess the qualification of the job-seeker. In addi-
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tion to fostering creation of internationally portable human capital, this demands facilitating 
recognition of skills, like through Europass adopted by the Commission in 2004.  
Taking this at our starting point, the following actions are recommended: 
Extend and improve the EURES network and Europass:  
 
 EURES should continue improving its services, such as the quantity and quality of in-
formation on the portal as well as the numbers and expertise of local advisors. Specific 
attention should be directed towards potentially marginalised groups such as low 
skilled workers, long-term unemployed, women, older workers, and young workers.  
 The European Commission should also direct specific attention to coordinate and cre-
ate synergies between EURES activities and other public as well as market-based re-
lated services. 
 The recent Europass initiative which aims to help workers make their skills and quali-
fications clearly and easily understood and recognised in the EU is very important. 
Hence, efforts in order to strengthen and develop this activity further must be recom-
mended. 
Raise awareness at all levels: 
 
 The European Commission and national Member States should raise public awareness 
of the advantages of geographic mobility – not only at large scale (information cam-
paigns, web portals etc.) but also in local communities encouraging and funding ‘real 
people’ with positive mobility experience to act as ’mobility ambassadors’. 
 In order to promote and mainstream workers mobility within the EU a long list of 
various authorities and social partners should take responsibility. The European 
Commission should invest in a solid study and mapping of specific roles and respon-
sibilities for different actors such as PES, national, regional and local authorities, and 
various other national and European social bodies. Results of this study in terms of 
specific responsibilities should be communicated to each social actor who should be 
committed to implement their responsibilities.  
 
Ensure social integration of migrant workers: 
 All EU Member States should prepare employers and community organizations to the 
vital task of social integration of migrant workers in local communities. It is clear that 
local communities play a key role in integrating migrant workers, but that they are of-
ten inadequately prepared to respond to their needs in several key areas. 
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 Regions seeking immigrant workers should provide an appropriate social, cultural and 
physical infrastructure, as well as a welcoming attitude towards newcomers. Attention 
should also be directed towards the integration of family members of migrant workers. 
As an example, local communities and social partners could organise cultural events 
for migrant workers and their families. Such events could include entertainment and 
multi-cultural foods as well as information on important community and employment 
issues. 
 The European Commission should establish an effective mechanism for dialogue and 
coordination among Member States, NGOs, social partners and the Commission to 
develop and share good practice on successful integration strategies, such as induction 
programmes for new migrants.  
 
Extend the knowledge base related to impacts of information activities: 
 Information, awareness-raising and integration initiatives at all levels should be organ-
ised as pilot projects – allowing for valid documentation of the impact of various 
means. 
5.5 Easing Mobility Barriers due to Diversity of National Systems 
The persistence of national forms of labour market and housing market organization, welfare 
state and fiscal systems could constrain intra-EU mobility. Although our empirical evidence 
suggests that EU citizens may not generally perceive these as the most essential mobility bar-
riers, harmonisation is certainly relevant in designing effective mobility policies. Legal, rec-
ognition, portability and access barriers in these areas yield mobility costs for the individual, 
reducing migration propensities. 
Therefore, based on discussions in section 4.7 the following actions are recommended: 
Reduce barriers within the field of social security: 
 
 Despite significant achievements in the past, the European Commission should con-
tinue to address possible obstacles in the field of coordination of national social secu-
rity regimes, particularly in view of new forms of geographic mobility such as short-
term mobility, which develop and may cause difficulties when routine instruments, 
such as the Regulation on coordination of national social security schemes, are ap-
plied. 
 Some definite progress is to be made regarding the issue of pension portability in the 
realm of preserving supplementary pension rights. Without proper solution of portabil-
ity issues, the second employer-based pillar of the pension system could put a financial 
penalty on mobile workers changing jobs.  
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Improve transparency of qualifications: 
 
 Deficits regarding the recognition of qualifications acquired in one EU Member State 
when moving to another EU Member State poses a major barrier to mobility and to 
suitable employment offers. This also holds for third-country migrants. The European 
Commission should therefore progress with the endeavour of defining training and 
education equivalents so that mobility across borders is facilitated. 
 National Member States should check whether formal educational requirements con-
stitute barriers to regional or cross-border mobility in some professions. 
5.6 Evaluating Mobility-related Policies Properly 
Research on regional mobility, but in particular the analysis of cross-border mobility in the 
EU is hampered by a shortage of appropriate data. It would be of great value to improve this 
information as prerequisite for promoting geographic mobility, especially in relation to re-
gional or national demand for different professions. In this context it is very important to de-
velop a system to identify matching problems in different regions in Europe. In addition, there 
is a serious lack of evaluation studies assessing existing mobility-relevant policies.  
Hence, the following actions are recommended. 
 The European Commission should further enhance the collection of valid data on geo-
graphic mobility and regional patterns of labour supply and demand. 
 The European Commission should also stimulate the collection of valid data on the ef-
ficiency, fairness and impact of various mobility promoting initiatives such as large 
scale information campaigns, the educational exchange programmes, or the European 
web portals. At the same time, however, future policy making would benefit from an 
inventory of national mobility-related policies, in particular if they are evaluated in a 
proper way.  
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6. APPENDIX 
Table A1: Stocks of Foreign Born by Origin and Destination Country for the EU-27 to EU-15 – 2006  
(in thousands) 
    EU15 
    Destination Countries 
  
Country of  
Origin 
AT BE DK FI EL ES FR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK 
Austria : (2.40) : : : 4.7 (5.2) : 11.5 (0.6) 5.8 : 3.8 9.0 
Belgium : : : : : 26.2 67.2 : 35.2 14.8 42.3 : : 19.4 
Germany 107.8 58.7 14.5 (3.5) 20.3 119.2 151.1 10.7 156.7 9.5 85.0 23.3 24.0 199.4 
Denmark : : : : : (3.3) 10.2 : 2.7 (1.4) (2.0) : 24.4 15.3 
Spain : 25.1 (2.1) : : : 140.7 : 19.1 2.0 10.4 6.3 2.4 43.4 
Finland : : (2.4) : : : (4.6) : (1.9) (0.8) : : 123.8 8.7 
France (4.7) 102.3 : : : 148.9 : 7.5 92.2 19.4 13.1 69.3 4.3 85.8 
Greece (3.3) 9.6 : : : (2.0) (4.2) : 13.6 (0.6) 4.6 : 6.1 24.5 
Ireland : : : : : 7.2 8.6 : : (0.6) (3.8) : : 240.9 
Italy 10.7 81.0 : : 4.1 36.8 161.0 6.5 : 8.3 13.0 : 5.4 51.5 
Luxembourg : 5.2 : : : : 10.8 : 6.2 : : : : : 
Netherlands (4.90) 72.7 4.0 : : 28.2 24.4 : 10.4 2.8 : : 4.2 39.3 
Portugal : 16.7 : : : 57.1 463.1 : 4.4 37.7 11.8 : : 55.4 
Sweden : : 16.0 27.4 : 7.9 (3.9) : 5.2 (0.8) (2.2) : : 18.7 
EU
 1
5 
UK 6.4 16.4 9.6 : 6.5 114.5 55.5 24.4 39.1 3.4 31.8 4.7 12.7 : 
Bulgaria 7.4 (3.8) : : 26.9 139.6 15.0 : 17.3 : (2.8) : 4.5 20.4 
Cyprus : : : : 10.6 : : : : : : : : 57.6 
Czech Rep. 25.5 : : . : : : : 8.9 : (3.8) : 5.6 21.3 
Estonia : : : 7.4 : : : : : : . : : : 
Hungary 22.3 : : : : : : : 7.1 : 4.1 : 9.4 8.8 
Lithuania : : : : : 12.4 . : : : (1.5) : : 39.1 
Latvia : : : : : : : : : : . : : 12.4 
Malta : : : : : : : : : : . : : 22.2 
Poland 51.6 20.4 5.1 : 16.0 36.0 47.2 : 69.2 (1.2) 21.7 : 35.6 186.8 
Romania 38.3 10.6 (2.20) : 17.5 446.3 44.4 : 296.4 : 8.8 11.8 10.4 15.3 
Slovenia 9.4 : : : : : : : 9.1 : : : : 14.1 
Slovakia 13.7 : : : : 4.7 (4.4) : 3.9 : : : : 22.6 
                      
EU 15 avail. 146.9 397.8 54.7 38.0 38.6 557.2 1110.4 49.1 399.2 102.6 227.9 110.2 360.3 812.4 
EU 12 avail. 170.2 38.5 12.8 11.3 74.6 642.3 118.3 : 414.7 3.6 45.9 14.4 71.5 423.4 
EU
 1
2 
EU 27 avail. 317.1 436.4 67.6 49.3 113.2 1199.5 1228.7 49.1 813.8 106.2 273.8 124.7 431.8 1235.8  
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The symbol ":" is used 
when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. Information on the stock of foreign born for Germany is not pro-
vided in the LFS. 
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Table A2: Stocks of Foreign Born by Origin and Destination Country from the EU-27 to EU-12 – 2006  
(in thousands) 
    EU12 
     Destination Countries 
  
Country of  
Origin  
BG CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SI SK 
Austria : : : : : : : : : (1.1) : 
Belgium : : : : : : : : : . : 
Germany 0.1 (0.7) (3.8) (1.6) 8.0 : : : 26.4 7.2 : 
France : : : : : : : : (6.3) : : 
Greece 0.3 8.4 : : : : : : : : : 
Ireland : : : : : : : : : : : 
Italy : : : : : : : : : (0.9) : 
Netherlands 0.1 : : : : : : : : : : 
Portugal 0.1 : : : : : : : : : : 
EU
 1
5 
UK 0.3 15.7 : : : : : 3.5 : : : 
Bulgaria : 3.3 : : : : : : : : : 
Cyprus 0.5 : : : : : : : : : : 
Czech Rep. 0.2 : : : : : : : : : 19.3  
Estonia : : : : : 2.4 : : : : : 
Hungary : : : : : : : : : (2.3) (2.3) 
Latvia : : : 3.3 : : (6.3) : : : : 
Lithuania 0.1 : : : : 11.9 : : 10.5 : : 
Malta . : : : : : : : : : : 
Poland 0.1 (1.1) 9.9 : : : : : : : : 
Romania 0.2 3.6 : : 61.3 : : : : : : 
Slovenia : : : : : : : : : : : 
Slovakia 0.1 : 75.0 : 7.1 : : : : : : 
EU 15 avail. 0.9 24.9 3.8 1.6 8.0 : : 3.5 32.7 9.2 : 
EU 12 avail. 1.1 8.0 84.8 3.3 68.3 14.3 6.3 0.0 10.5 2.3 21.6  
EU
 1
2 
EU 27 avail. 2.0 32.9 88.6 4.9 76.3 14.3 6.3 3.5 43.2 11.5 21.6   
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small 
sample size. The symbol ":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreli-
able. 
.
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Table A3: Share of Active Working Age EU-27 and Non-EU-27 Foreign Born Residents in an EU-27 
Country Relative to the Total Active Working Age Population of Country of Residence, 1995-2006  
(percentage) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15                         
AT 11.4 12.2 12.1 13.0 12.2 12.1 13.2 13.2 13.9 13.5 14.5 15.4 
BE 10.0 10.4 10.5 10.8 11.2 11.5 12.2 12.4 12.8 12.7 13.7 13.5 
DK 3.8 4.9 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.8 5.4 6.6 7.1 7.5 7.1 6.8 
EL 4.0 4.2 4.6 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.7 6.4 6.6 7.8 8.0 7.5 
ES 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.3 4.2 5.4 6.8 8.4 9.9 11.8 13.6 
FI : 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.2 0.5 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.3 
FR 11.9 12.0 12.1 11.9 12.1 12.1 12.3 12.4 11.3 11.6 11.6 11.5 
IE : : : 7.0 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.8 10.2 9.0 11.3 : 
IT : : : : : : : : : : : 7.6 
LU 34.2 34.8 35.5 36.2 36.9 38.5 37.8 37.7 39.4 40.8 40.3 40.4 
NL : : : : 10.5 13.2 12.3 13.1 12.6 13.0 13.1 12.8 
PT : : : : 4.7 5.3 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.9 7.2 7.4 
SE : : 9.0 9.2 11.5 12.5 12.2 12.7 13.1 13.2 13.4 14.9 
UK 7.8 7.6 8.5 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.4 9.7 10.2 10.5 11.0 11.8 
EU-15 avail. 10.6 10.1 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.6 10.9 11.4 11.9 12.2 12.9 12.9 
EU-12                  
CY : : : : 10.3 11.2 12.3 13.1 14.1 15.7 16.8 17.3 
CZ : : : : : : : 2.0 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 
EE : : : 20.1 19.2 19.7 18.8 17.7 16.4 15.1 13.8 14.3 
HU : : : : : : 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 
LT : : : 4.9 6.9 6.0 6.1 5.8 5.1 3.9 3.4 4.1 
LV : : : : : : : : : 12.3 11.5 10.6 
MT   : : : : : : : : : : 5.1 4.6 
PL : : : : : : : : : 0.7 0.7 0.5 
RO  : : : : : : : : : 0.1 0.1 (0.1) 
SI : : : : : : : 7.3 7.1 7.7 8.1 7.5 
SK : : : : : : : : 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.7 
EU-12 avail. : : : 12.5 12.1 12.3 9.7 7.9 6.8 6.1 5.8 5.8 
EU-27 avail. 10.6 10.1 10.2 11.4 11.1 11.4 10.3 9.6 9.4 9.2 9.4 9.3 
 
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The symbol 
":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A4: Share of Active Working Age EU-27 and Non-EU-27 Foreign Nationals Resident in Another 
EU-27 Country Relative to the Total Active Working Age Population of Country of Residence, 1995-2006 
(percentage) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15                         
AT 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.2 9.4 9.7 8.9 9.9 8.7 10.7 11.0 
BE 8.8 9.2 9.0 9.2 10.0 9.3 9.4 9.0 8.8 8.7 9.1 9.0 
CZ : : 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 
DE 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.5 8.3 
DK 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 
EL 1.5 1.5 1.9 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.7 4.5 5.1 5.8 6.1 6.0 
ES 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.6 3.7 5.0 6.6 8.2 9.8 11.5 
FI 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 
FR 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.8 6.9 5.7 5.9 5.6 6.1 
IE : : : 3.2 3.2 3.7 4.5 5.3 6.7 6.6 7.7 9.4 
IT : : : : : : : : : : : 5.2 
LU 35.7 36.5 37.4 38.3 39.2 40.4 40.5 40.0 41.5 41.7 42.1 42.3 
NL : : : : 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 
PT : : : : 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 
SE : : 5.6 5.5 5.1 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.1 5.7 5.2 
UK 4.0 : 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.3 6.8 
EU-15 avail. 7.9  8.7  7.5 7.4 6.9 7.2 7.4 7.6 8.0 8.0  8.5  8.4  
EU-12                   
BG : : : : : : 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
CY : : : : 9.7 10.1 10.0 10.2 11.1 12.5 13.5 13.5 
CZ     0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 
EE : : : 33.8 34.4 35.7 20.0 19.8 19.8 20.6 18.7 17.1 
HU : : : : : : 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 
LT : : : 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 
LV : : : : : : : : : 0.8 0.7 0.8 
MT   : : : : : : : : : : 3.1 2.9 
PL : : : : : : : : : 0.1 0.2 0.2 
RO  : : : : : : : : : 0.1 0.1 0.2 
SI : : : : : : : 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
SK : : : : : : : : 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
EU-12 avail. : : : 11.8 11.4 11.8 5.3 4.7 4.3 3.4  3.2  3.1  
EU-27 avail. 7.9  8.7  7.5 9.6 9.2 9.5 6.3 6.1 6.2 5.7  5.9  5.8  
  
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The symbol 
":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A5: Share of Active Working Age EU-15 Foreign Nationals Resident in Another EU-27 Country 
Relative to the Total Active Working Age Population of Country of Residence, 1995-2006 (percentage) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15                         
AT 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.3 
BE 5.4 5.9 5.7 5.7 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.5 5.9 6.1 6.0 
DE 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.3 
DK 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 : : 
EL 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
ES 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.6 
FI 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
FR 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.1 
IE : : : 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.1 : 
IT : : : : : : : : : : 0.3 0.3 
LU 32.8 32.8 33.7 34.3 34.6 35.5 35.9 : 37.3 37.1 39.9 39.6 
NL : : : : 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
PT : : : : 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 
SE : : 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 
UK 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 
EU-15 avail. 5.0  5.0  4.8  4.7 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.6 4.5 4.5 4.4  4.4  
EU-12                  
CY : : : : 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.6 4.9 5.6 6.3 6.6 
CZ : : : (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 0.1 0.08 (0.04) 0.1 
EE : : : 1.06 1.09 1.03 : : : : 0.8 0.4 
HU : : : : : : 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.1 0.1 
MT   : : : : : : : : : : 1.3 1.2 
PL : : : : : : : : : (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
RO  : : : : : : : : : 0.03 : : 
SK : : : : : : : : : : (0.07) 0.1 
EU-12 avail. : : : 0.5 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.2  1.3  
EU-27 avail. 5.0  5.0  4.8  2.6 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.8  2.9   
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The symbol 
":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A6: Share of Active Working Age Non-EU-15 Foreign Nationals Resident in Another EU-27 Coun-
try Relative to the Total Active Working Age Population of Country of Residence, 1995-2006 (percentage) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15             
AT 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.2 7.9 7.8 8.1 7.4 7.9 7.0 7.5 7.7 
BE 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.3 2.8 2.9 3.0 
DE 6.5 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.0 5.5 
DK 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.7 
EL 1.2 1.3 1.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.4 4.4 4.9 5.6 5.4 5.3 
ES 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.7 2.7 3.9 5.6 7.0 8.4 9.9 
FI 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.1 
FR 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.6 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.9 
IE : : : 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.1 3.2 3.3 2.8 : 
IT : : : : : : : : : : : 4.7 
LU 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.6 4.9 4.6 5.3 4.2 4.5 3.4 3.7 
NL : : : : 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.6 
PT : : : : 0.9 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0 
SE : : 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.2 2.8 
UK 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.6 : 4.1 4.1 4.5 
EU-15 avail. 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.3 
EU-12      
BG : : : : : : 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 
CY : : : : 4.6 5.4 5.6 5.6 6.2 6.8 7.4 7.0 
CZ : : 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 
EE : : : 32.8 33.3 34.7 20.0 19.8 19.7 20.5 17.9 16.7 
HU : : : : : : 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 
LT : : : 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 
LV : : : : : : : : : 0.8 0.6 0.7 
MT   : : : : : : : : : . 1.8 1.7 
PL : : : : : : : : : 0.1 0.1 0.2 
RO  : : : : : : : : : (0.07) (0.06) 0.1 
SI : : : : : : : (0.41) (0.31) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39) 
SK : : : : : : : : : 0.2 (0.1) : 
EU-12 avail. : : 0.4 11.4 9.8 10.3 4.6 4.0 4.2 2.8 2.9 2.6 
EU-27 avail. 3.1 3.4 2.0 7.4 6.6 6.9 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.5  
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The sym-
bol ":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A7: Migration inflows from the EU-15 to the EU-27 
(Share of the population which has moved from another EU-15 country since the year before relative to 
the total population of the country of residence, 1995-2006, in percent) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15                         
AT 0.1  0.1  0.2  : 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3  : 0.5  0.2 
BE 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 : : 0.1 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2 
DE 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1 
DK 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.1 
EL 0.1  0.1  (0.1) 0.1 (0.04) (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) (0.03) 0.1  0.1  (0.03)
ES 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2 
FI : : : 0.1 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) : : : 0.1  :
FR 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 : : : :
IE : : : : : : : : : : : :
IT 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 : 0.1 0.1 0.1  : : :
LU 1.1  0.9  0.7  1.2 : 0.7 0.7 0.4 : (0.3) (0.4) 0.7 
NL : : : : 0.2 : : : : : : :
PT : : : : 0.1 (0.1) (0.1) 0.2 0.1  (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
SE : : : : : : : : : : : :
UK 0.3  : 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1 
EU-15 avail. 0.2  0.2  0.1  0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1 
EU-12                   
CY : : : : 0.8 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.7  1.4  1.4  1.3 
CZ : : : : : : : 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
EE : : : : : (0.1) : : : : : 0.1 
HU : : : : : . : : : (0.1 : (0.1
LT : : : : : : (0.3) (0.3) 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
LV : : : : : : : : : : : (0.2)
MT   : : : : : : : : : : : :
PL : : : : : : : : : (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
RO  : : : : : : : : : : 0.1  0.1 
SI : : : : : : : : : : : :
SK : : : : : : : : (0.1) : (0.1) (0.1)
EU-12 avail. : : : : 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3 
EU-27 avail. 0.2  0.2  0.1  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The symbol ":" is used when data is either not 
available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A8: Migration inflows from Non-EU-15 to the EU-27 
(Share of the population which has moved from another non-EU-15 country since the year before relative 
to the total population of the country of residence, 1995-2006, in percent) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15                         
AT 0.3  0.1  0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2  0.2  
BE (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) : : : 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1  0.1  
DE 0.4  0.4  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.2  
DK 0.3  0.4  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3  0.3  
EL 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  (0.04) 
ES 0.03  0.04  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4  0.5  
FI : : : 0.2 : : : (0.1) : : : : 
FR 0.2  0.2  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 : : : : 
IE : : : : : : : : : : : : 
IT 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  
LU : (0.2) : (0.2) : (0.2) : (0.2) : : : : 
NL : : : : 0.4 : : : : : : (0.1) 
PT : : : : (0.1) 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2  0.2  
SE : : : : : : : : : : : 0.1  
UK 0.3  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  
EU-15 avail. 0.2  0.2  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.2  
EU-12                  
CY : : : : 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.5  1.7  
CZ : : : : : : : 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  
HU : : : : : : 0.1 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 : (0.1) 
LT : : : : : : (0.2) : (0.3) (0.2) : : 
PL : : : : : : : : : (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
RO  : : : : : : : : : : (0.02) : 
SK : : : : : : : : : (0.1) : : 
EU-12 avail. : : : : 1.1 1.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3  0.3  
EU-27 avail. 0.2  0.2  0.2 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2  0.2   
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The sym-
bol ":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A9: Regional Mobility Rates (NUTS 2 regions) 
(Percent of population which has moved residence within the country from one NUTS 2 region to another 
since the year before, 1995-2006) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU15                         
AT : 1.0 : : : : : 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.7 
BE 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.7 : : : : 1.7 1.6 
CZ : : : : : : : 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 
DE 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 : 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.3 
EL 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
ES 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 
FI : : : 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 
FR 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.0 : : : 1.7 
IE 1.8 2.0 2.4 : : : : : : : : : 
IT 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.0 : 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
LU 1.1 : : : : : : : : : : : 
NL 1.6 1.0 1.1 2.0 1.9 : : : : : : : 
PT 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 
SE : 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.5 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
UK 1.6 : : : 2.2 : 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 
EU-15 avail. 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
EU-12                 
BG : : : : : : : : : : : 0.2 
HU : : : : 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 
PL : : : : : : 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
RO  : : : : : : : : : 0.2 0.2 0.1 
SK : : : : : : : : 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
EU-12 avail. : : : : 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
EU-27 avail. 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5  
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The sym-
bol ":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A10: Cross-Border Commuting Rates to EU-15 
(Percent of working population which works in a different EU-15 country from the one that resides,  
1995-2006) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15                         
AT 0.7  0.6  0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8  0.6  
BE 1.6  1.5  1.9 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.5  2.2  
DE 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2  0.2  
DK 0.2  (0.1) (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) (0.1) : : : (0.1) : 0.1  
ES 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2  0.1  
FI : (0.1) (0.2) : (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) : : : : : 
FR 0.5  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6  0.7  
IE : : : : : : : : : : 0.4  : 
IT 0.1  0.2  0.2 : : 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  
LU (0.7) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) 1.0 1.0 (0.7) (0.6) 0.8 (0.6) (0.8) 
NL : : : : 0.3 (0.1) 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4  0.4  
SE : : : : : : : : : : 0.4  0.5  
UK 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  
EU-15 avail. 0.4  0.4  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5  0.5  
EU-12                 
BG : : : : : : (0.2) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.3  
CZ : : 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4  0.5  
EE : : : : : (0.2) : (0.3) 0.5 0.8 0.7  1.4  
HU : : : : : : : : 0.4 0.4 0.5  0.6  
LT : : : : : : 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.2  1.5  
LV : : : : : : : : : 0.8 0.7  1.3  
PL : : : : : : : : : 0.2 0.3  0.5  
RO  : : : : : : : : : 0.3 0.4  0.4  
SI : : : : : : : 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8  0.8  
SK : : : : : : : : 1.0 1.3 :  :  
EU-12 avail. : : 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.1  1.4  
EU-27 avail. 0.4  0.4  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8  0.9   
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The 
symbol ":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A11: Cross-Border Commuting Rates to Non-EU-15 (Percent of working population which works 
in a different non EU-15 country from the one that resides, 1995-2006) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15                         
AT 0.4  0.3  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.5  0.4  
BE 0.1  (0.1) (0.1) 0.1 : 0.1 0.1 : (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
DE 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2  0.2  
DK : (0.1) : (0.1) (0.1) : : : (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
ES 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  
FR 0.7  0.7  0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3  0.4  
IT 0.3  0.3  0.3 : : 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3  0.3  
NL : : : : : : (0.1) : : : : : 
PT : : : : : : : : : : : : 
SE : : : : : : : : : : 0.4  0.4  
UK 0.1  0.1  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1  0.2  
EU-15 avail. 0.2  0.2  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.2  
EU-12                  
CZ : : 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1  0.1  
EE : : : : : : (0.4) (0.3) : (0.3) : (0.3) 
HU : : : : : : : : : 0.1 (0.1) : 
LT : : : : : : (0.4) (0.4) 0.6 : 0.5  (0.3) 
PL : : : : : : : : : (0.1) : (0.1) 
RO  : : : : : : : : : 0.1 0.1  0.1  
SI : : : : : : : (0.3) (0.2) (0.1) . (0.1) 
SK : : : : : : : : 2.0 3.3 : : 
EU-12 avail. : : 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.2  0.2  
EU-27 avail. 0.2  0.2  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2  0.2   
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The 
symbol ":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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Table A12: Regional Commuting Rates (NUTS 2 regions) 
(Percent of working population which works in a different NUTS 2 region from the one that resides) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 EU15                         
AT 20.1 8.3 15.4 15.1 14.7 14.2 15.0 9.0 9.8 15.3 12.0 11.1 
BE 18.5 18.7 18.9 21.4 21.2 21.0 21.2 21.8 21.6 20.8 21.6 21.7 
DE : 13.0 13.9 11.2 11.8 23.8 12.5 11.6 12.4 : 12.2 11.9 
EL : : : : 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
ES 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.2 
FI 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 
FR : : : 10.4 10.3 10.7 10.9 11.3 6.2 6.4 6.3 7.0 
IE : : : : : : : 3.4 2.1 1.6 2.4 : 
IT 5.2 5.1 8.7 : : : : : : : : : 
LU : : : : : (0.6) (0.7) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) 
NL 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.4 8.9 : 14.9 12.8 11.5 11.8 12.5 13.3 
PT 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.5 
SE : : : : : : : : : : 6.6 6.0 
EU-15 avail. 8.2 7.3 8.9 9.1 8.1 8.6 8.3 7.1 6.5 6.4 6.9 7.3 
EU-12                  
BG : : : : : 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 
CZ : : : : : 4.4 4.7 4.3 4.8 4.6 4.7 5.2 
HU : : : 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.6 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.4 
PL : : : : : : : : : 1.4 1.7 1.7 
RO  : : : : : : : : : 0.9 0.9 1.0 
SK : : : 5.6 5.2 5.5 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.9 8.9 10.1 
EU-12 avail.    4.1 4.0 3.4 4.0 4.1 4.4 3.4 3.7 4.0 
EU-27 avail. 8.2 7.3 8.9 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 5.3 5.7  
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring data. Note: Data in brackets lack reliability due to small sample size. The 
symbol ":" is used when data is either not available or extremely unreliable. 
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